1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELVIS TERAN, Case No.: 26-CV-1205 JLS (DEB)
12 Petitioners, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden of the (ECF No. 1) Imperial Regional Detention Center, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Elvis Teran’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 19 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is 20 Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4) and Petitioner’s Traverse 21 (“Traverse,” ECF No. 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s 22 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela who entered the United States on 25 November 7, 2024, and was briefly detained by the Department of Homeland Security. 26 Pet. ¶ 2. Petitioner was released on parole valid through November 5, 2026. Id. On 27 October 1, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained when he appeared for his second master 28 calendar hearing. Id. ¶ 24. Petitioner was not accused of any violation, provided any 1 advance notice, or provided an individualized custody determination prior to his re- 2 detention. Id. ¶ 30. Prior to his re-detention, Petitioner complied fully with all conditions 3 of his parole, attended all check-ins, has no criminal history, was lawfully employed, had 4 a work authorization and a U.S. Social Security Card, and lived with his domestic partner 5 in Queens. Id. ¶ 29. 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 8 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 9 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 10 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 11 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 12 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 13 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 14 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 15 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 16 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 17 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 18 (citations omitted). 19 DISCUSSION 20 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or 21 consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶ 22 33. The Court agrees. 23 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 24 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 25 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 26 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 27 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 28 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 1 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 2 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 3 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 4 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 5 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). 6 Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 7 government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 8 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 9 be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting 10 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial 11 discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that 12 individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of 13 custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 14 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 15 Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 16 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore his alleged statutory and 17 constitutional violations fail. Ret. at 2. The Court disagrees. Petitioner has been granted 18 humanitarian parole, granting him parole until November 5, 2026. Pet. ¶ 2. Petitioner is 19 not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in 20 the United States since November 2024. Id. Upon arrival, he was determined to not be a 21 danger to the community or a flight risk and has attended his check-in appointments. Id. ¶ 22 29. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due 23 process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, 24 e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her 25 initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a 26 flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining 27 at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 28 1146, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has 1 [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he 2 is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga 3 Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding petitioner had a 4 protected liberty interest in his release). 5 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 6 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 7 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient 8 to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. See 9 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELVIS TERAN, Case No.: 26-CV-1205 JLS (DEB)
12 Petitioners, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden of the (ECF No. 1) Imperial Regional Detention Center, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Elvis Teran’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 19 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is 20 Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4) and Petitioner’s Traverse 21 (“Traverse,” ECF No. 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s 22 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela who entered the United States on 25 November 7, 2024, and was briefly detained by the Department of Homeland Security. 26 Pet. ¶ 2. Petitioner was released on parole valid through November 5, 2026. Id. On 27 October 1, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained when he appeared for his second master 28 calendar hearing. Id. ¶ 24. Petitioner was not accused of any violation, provided any 1 advance notice, or provided an individualized custody determination prior to his re- 2 detention. Id. ¶ 30. Prior to his re-detention, Petitioner complied fully with all conditions 3 of his parole, attended all check-ins, has no criminal history, was lawfully employed, had 4 a work authorization and a U.S. Social Security Card, and lived with his domestic partner 5 in Queens. Id. ¶ 29. 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 8 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 9 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 10 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 11 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 12 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 13 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 14 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 15 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 16 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 17 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 18 (citations omitted). 19 DISCUSSION 20 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or 21 consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶ 22 33. The Court agrees. 23 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 24 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 25 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 26 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 27 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 28 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 1 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 2 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 3 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 4 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 5 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). 6 Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 7 government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 8 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 9 be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting 10 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial 11 discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that 12 individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of 13 custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 14 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 15 Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 16 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore his alleged statutory and 17 constitutional violations fail. Ret. at 2. The Court disagrees. Petitioner has been granted 18 humanitarian parole, granting him parole until November 5, 2026. Pet. ¶ 2. Petitioner is 19 not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in 20 the United States since November 2024. Id. Upon arrival, he was determined to not be a 21 danger to the community or a flight risk and has attended his check-in appointments. Id. ¶ 22 29. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due 23 process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, 24 e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her 25 initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a 26 flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining 27 at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 28 1146, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has 1 [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he 2 is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga 3 Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding petitioner had a 4 protected liberty interest in his release). 5 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 6 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 7 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient 8 to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. See 9 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be 10 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 11 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 12 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved 13 and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 14 requirement would entail.” Id. 15 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s 16 revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 17 heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has 18 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. “Freedom 19 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 20 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 21 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and providing for his family and 22 continuing to work. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his 23 parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form 24 the other enduring attachments of normal life.”). 25 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 26 parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an 27 opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶ 30. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should 28 be paroled because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is 1 no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 2 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the 3 noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no criminal 4 record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, has work authorization and 5 a U.S. Social Security Card, and has filed an asylum application. Traverse at 2. “Once a 6 noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely 7 because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to 8 present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the 9 noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d 10 at 1760. Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their 11 response, do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant 12 reconsideration of his parole. See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not 13 received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is 14 high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine 15 whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting 16 Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up). 17 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 18 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 19 1130; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the 20 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 21 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail 22 to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice, 23 reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret. 24 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in 25 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v. 26 Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting 27 a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre- 28 deprivation hearing); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, 1 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from 2 custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). 3 I. Attorney’s Fees 4 Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal 5 Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 18. The EAJA provides in part: 6 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an 7 application for fees and other expenses which shows that the 8 party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an 9 itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or 10 appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were 11 computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the 12 United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be 13 determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the 14 civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought. 15 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). 16 The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under 17 the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment. 18 CONCLUSION 19 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 20 Corpus (ECF No. 1). The Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner 21 from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. The Court ORDERS, 22 prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for 23 revocation of his parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether 24 detention is warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and 25 26 27 28 1 || convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.' 2 || The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by March 19, 2026, confirming 3 || that Petitioner has been released. 4 Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and 5 || corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are 6 ||instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee 7 || application. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: March 13, 2026 10 (ee 1 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || ——____—__- 27 Ih This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1133; Pinchi, 792 28 || F. Supp. 3d at 1038; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez y. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).