1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 4 5 Elvira Aguirre, Case No. 2:21-cv-01285-VAP-JPRx 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order DENYING Motion to v. Remand and GRANTING Motion 8 Westrock Services, LLC et al., to Dismiss (Dkts. 8, 12) 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 Before the Court is Plaintiff Elvira Aguirre’s Motion to Remand (Dkt. 8), 13 and Defendant Westrock Services, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 12). After 14 considering all the papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the 15 Motions, the Court deems this matter appropriate for resolution without a 16 hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7-15. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion 17 to Remand, and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 18 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 This case arises out of an alleged wrongful discharge of Plaintiff’s 21 husband, Salvador Aguirre (“Mr. Aguirre”) from his employment with 22 Defendant. As the spouse of Mr. Aguirre, Plaintiff claims that Defendant is 23 liable for losses she suffered from her husband’s alleged wrongful discharge 24 and termination of medical benefits. (See Dkt. 1-2). 25 26 1 1 On May 20, 2019, Mr. Aguirre filed suit against Defendant in the 2 Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles for, inter alia, wrongful 3 discharge. Defendant removed the case to this Court. (See Case No. 2:19- 4 cv-07568-VAP-JPRx, Dkt. 1). The Court remanded Mr. Aguirre’s case to the 5 Los Angeles Superior Court for lack of jurisdiction on November 19, 2019. 6 (Dkt. 22). Mr. Aguirre’s case is still pending in state court. 7 8 On January 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant in the 9 Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles for her alleged injuries in 10 connection with her husband’s discharge. Plaintiff alleges the following 11 claims: (1) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; 12 (2) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Intentional Infliction of 13 Emotional Distress; (4) Loss of Consortium; (5)1 Breach of Implied Covenant 14 of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (6) Breach of Implied Contract; (7)2 15 Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. 16 17 On February 11, 2021, Defendant removed Plaintiff’s case on the basis 18 of diversity jurisdiction. On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to 19 Remand. (Dkt. 8). Before the Court could hear Plaintiff’s Motion to 20 Remand, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 18, 2021. (Dkt. 21 12). Both parties filed oppositions and reply briefs to each respective 22 Motion. (Dkts. 18-22). 23
24 1 The Complaint erroneously labels this as the Sixth Cause of Action. (Dkt. 1-2, at 6). 25 2 The Complaint erroneously labels this as the Sixth Cause of Action. (Dkt. 26 1-2, at 8). 2 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A. Removal 3 A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to federal 4 court if the federal court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 5 1441(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court has jurisdiction over civil 6 actions where there is complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in 7 controversy exceeds $75,000. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 8 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Section 1332 requires complete diversity of 9 citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than 10 each of the defendants.”). “[T]he amount in controversy includes damages 11 (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an 12 injunction, and attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or 13 contract.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th 14 Cir. 2018). 15 16 “The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right 17 of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska 18 Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 19 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). The presumption against removal 20 means that “the defendant always has the burden of establishing that 21 removal is proper.” (Id.). Moreover, the district court must remand any case 22 previously removed from a state court “if at any time before final judgment it 23 appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 24 1447(c). 25 26 3 1 B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to bring a mo- 3 tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 4 Rule 12(b)(6) is read along with Rule 8(a), which requires a short, plain 5 statement upon which a pleading shows entitlement to relief. Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding that the Fed- 7 eral Rules require a plaintiff to provide “‘a short and plain statement of the 8 claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is 9 and the grounds upon which it rests” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).); Bell 10 Atl. Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When evaluating a Rule 11 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all material allegations in the com- 12 plaint—as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them—as 13 true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 14 See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005); ARC Ecol- 15 ogy v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005); Moyo v. 16 Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994). “The court need not accept as 17 true, however, allegations that contradict facts that may be judicially noticed 18 by the court.” Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 19 20 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 21 does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 22 the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and con- 23 clusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 24 not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Rather, the allega- 25 tions in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 26 4 1 speculative level.” (Id.) To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must al- 2 lege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 3 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009). 4 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it 5 asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 6 Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defend- 7 ant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 8 ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 9 556).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 4 5 Elvira Aguirre, Case No. 2:21-cv-01285-VAP-JPRx 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order DENYING Motion to v. Remand and GRANTING Motion 8 Westrock Services, LLC et al., to Dismiss (Dkts. 8, 12) 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 Before the Court is Plaintiff Elvira Aguirre’s Motion to Remand (Dkt. 8), 13 and Defendant Westrock Services, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 12). After 14 considering all the papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the 15 Motions, the Court deems this matter appropriate for resolution without a 16 hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7-15. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion 17 to Remand, and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 18 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 This case arises out of an alleged wrongful discharge of Plaintiff’s 21 husband, Salvador Aguirre (“Mr. Aguirre”) from his employment with 22 Defendant. As the spouse of Mr. Aguirre, Plaintiff claims that Defendant is 23 liable for losses she suffered from her husband’s alleged wrongful discharge 24 and termination of medical benefits. (See Dkt. 1-2). 25 26 1 1 On May 20, 2019, Mr. Aguirre filed suit against Defendant in the 2 Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles for, inter alia, wrongful 3 discharge. Defendant removed the case to this Court. (See Case No. 2:19- 4 cv-07568-VAP-JPRx, Dkt. 1). The Court remanded Mr. Aguirre’s case to the 5 Los Angeles Superior Court for lack of jurisdiction on November 19, 2019. 6 (Dkt. 22). Mr. Aguirre’s case is still pending in state court. 7 8 On January 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant in the 9 Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles for her alleged injuries in 10 connection with her husband’s discharge. Plaintiff alleges the following 11 claims: (1) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; 12 (2) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Intentional Infliction of 13 Emotional Distress; (4) Loss of Consortium; (5)1 Breach of Implied Covenant 14 of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (6) Breach of Implied Contract; (7)2 15 Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. 16 17 On February 11, 2021, Defendant removed Plaintiff’s case on the basis 18 of diversity jurisdiction. On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion to 19 Remand. (Dkt. 8). Before the Court could hear Plaintiff’s Motion to 20 Remand, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 18, 2021. (Dkt. 21 12). Both parties filed oppositions and reply briefs to each respective 22 Motion. (Dkts. 18-22). 23
24 1 The Complaint erroneously labels this as the Sixth Cause of Action. (Dkt. 1-2, at 6). 25 2 The Complaint erroneously labels this as the Sixth Cause of Action. (Dkt. 26 1-2, at 8). 2 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A. Removal 3 A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to federal 4 court if the federal court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 5 1441(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court has jurisdiction over civil 6 actions where there is complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in 7 controversy exceeds $75,000. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 8 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Section 1332 requires complete diversity of 9 citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than 10 each of the defendants.”). “[T]he amount in controversy includes damages 11 (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an 12 injunction, and attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or 13 contract.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th 14 Cir. 2018). 15 16 “The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right 17 of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska 18 Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 19 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). The presumption against removal 20 means that “the defendant always has the burden of establishing that 21 removal is proper.” (Id.). Moreover, the district court must remand any case 22 previously removed from a state court “if at any time before final judgment it 23 appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 24 1447(c). 25 26 3 1 B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to bring a mo- 3 tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 4 Rule 12(b)(6) is read along with Rule 8(a), which requires a short, plain 5 statement upon which a pleading shows entitlement to relief. Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding that the Fed- 7 eral Rules require a plaintiff to provide “‘a short and plain statement of the 8 claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is 9 and the grounds upon which it rests” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).); Bell 10 Atl. Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When evaluating a Rule 11 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all material allegations in the com- 12 plaint—as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them—as 13 true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 14 See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005); ARC Ecol- 15 ogy v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005); Moyo v. 16 Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994). “The court need not accept as 17 true, however, allegations that contradict facts that may be judicially noticed 18 by the court.” Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). 19 20 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 21 does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 22 the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and con- 23 clusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 24 not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Rather, the allega- 25 tions in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 26 4 1 speculative level.” (Id.) To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must al- 2 lege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 3 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009). 4 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it 5 asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 6 Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defend- 7 ant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 8 ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 9 556). 10 11 The Ninth Circuit has clarified that: (1) a complaint must “contain suffi- 12 cient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the op- 13 posing party to defend itself effectively” and (2) “the factual allegations that 14 are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it 15 is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of 16 discovery and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th 17 Cir. 2011). Although the scope of review is limited to the contents of the 18 complaint, the Court may also consider exhibits submitted with the com- 19 plaint, Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 20 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990), and “take judicial notice of matters of public rec- 21 ord outside the pleadings,” Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 22 649 (9th Cir. 1988). 23 24 25 26 5 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Removal 3 The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Although 4 unclear, Plaintiff appears to argue that removal was improper because 5 Plaintiff’s case is related to her husband’s case in the Los Angeles Superior 6 Court. (See generally, Dkt. 8). The Court disagrees. 7 8 Defendant based its removal on diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1). As 9 noted above, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court has jurisdiction over civil 10 actions where there is complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in 11 controversy exceeds $75,000. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 12 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Section 1332 requires complete diversity of 13 citizenship; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than 14 each of the defendants.”). Plaintiff does not dispute that diversity jurisdiction 15 exists in this matter, and Defendant has met its burden in showing that 16 removal was proper. The Court accordingly DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to 17 Remand. 18 19 B. Failure to State a Claim 20 In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s 21 claims fail for several reasons, including Plaintiff’s lack of standing to assert 22 the relief she seeks. (Dkt. 12). Plaintiff fails to address any of these 23 arguments. (Dkt. 18). Indeed, although Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the 24 Motion, it is devoid of substance. The Opposition is three pages long, 25 consists of quotes from the Complaint, and conclusory statements such as 26 6 1 the “[m]oving party simply tries to argue that the allegations are not true. 2 DUTY IS STATED.” (Dkt. 18, at 3). 3 4 Plaintiff’s failure to address meaningfully any of the contentions in 5 Defendant’s Motion is grounds for dismissal of the entire action. Siqueiros 6 v. Fannie Mae, No. 13-01789-VAP (DTBx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195427, 7 at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (citing Silva v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 5:10–cv– 8 01854–JHN (PJWx), 2011 WL 7096576, *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011) (“In 9 addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff concedes [this] claim should 10 be dismissed by failing to address Defendants' arguments in his 11 Opposition.”); Tatum v. Schwartz, No. S–06–01440 DFL EFB, 2007 WL 12 419463, *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2007) (“[Plaintiff] tacitly concedes this claim by 13 failing to address defendants' argument in her opposition.”)). 14 15 The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to DISMISS WITH 16 LEAVE TO AMEND. 17 / / / 18 / / / 19 / / / 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 7 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED and Defendant's Motion to 3 | Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on or before 4 | May 7, 2021. 5 6 | ITIS SO ORDERED. 7 8 Dated: 4/22/21 Vip ~. A, ? belt ‘ A 9 Virginia A. Phillips 10 United States District Judge 11 12
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26