Elvin Antonio Briones v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit·Decided October 26, 2018·No. 18-10183·Unpublished

Opinion

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-10183

Non-Argument Calendar

Agency No. A088-011-831

ELVIN ANTONIO BRIONES, Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(October 26, 2018)

Before BRANCH, HULL and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Elvin Antonio Briones, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his claim for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Briones contends the IJ and the BIA erred in concluding he was not entitled to withholding of removal based on persecution on account of his political opinion. After review, we deny Briones’s petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2005, Briones entered the United States on a B2 visitor visa, with authorization to remain for one month. In September 2010, the Department of Homeland Security issued Briones a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), which charged him with being removable under INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for remaining in the United States longer than permitted. Briones admitted the allegations in his NTA and conceded removability.

On October 19, 2010, Briones filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on his political opinion. Briones’s application claimed that while in Nicaragua, members of the Sandinista Party targeted him with threats, harassment, and several attacks due to his participation in the Liberal Party and that he feared the Sandinistas would target him again if he returned to Nicaragua.

After a hearing, the IJ denied Briones’s claims. The IJ concluded that Briones’s asylum claim was time-barred and that Briones was ineligible for withholding of removal and CAT relief. The IJ found Briones credible, but determined, based on the totality of the evidence, that Briones had not suffered past harm in Nicaragua rising to the level of persecution required for withholding of removal and that Briones had not shown that his fear of future persecution was objectively reasonable.

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, noting that Briones had abandoned his asylum and CAT claims by failing to challenge them on appeal. 1 As to withholding of removal, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Briones had not shown past persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future harm.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the BIA did not expressly adopt the IJ’s decision, but did explicitly agree with the IJ’s findings that Briones had not shown past persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future harm, we review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ as to these issues. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2010). We review de novo claims of legal error, including Briones’s argument that the BIA did not give reasoned consideration to his withholding of

1 Briones does not challenge the BIA’s ruling as to his asylum and CAT claims in his petition for review, and thus he has abandoned them in this Court as well. See Cole v. U.S Att’y Gen., 712 F.3d 517, 530 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an appellant’s failure to adequately raise an issue in the opening brief will result in the claim being deemed abandoned).

removal claim. Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 871-72 (11th Cir. 2018). We review the agency’s factual determinations under the highly deferential substantial evidence test. Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). Under this test, we must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. We will reverse factual findings only when the record compels us to do so, and “the mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.” Id.

III. WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL To qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, an applicant must show that upon returning to his country his life or freedom would be threatened because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To satisfy this burden of proof, the alien may establish past persecution based on a protected ground. Rodriguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2013). Establishing past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption that his life or freedom would be threatened upon return to his country. Id. Alternatively, the alien may establish that it is “more likely than not” that he would be persecuted upon removal to his country based on a protected ground. Id. This “more likely than not” standard is more stringent than the “well-founded fear of persecution”

required for asylum. Tan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2006). A well-founded fear of future persecution must be subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006).

Although the INA does not define persecution, this Court has said that persecution is an “extreme concept,” and that “a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation” and “[m]inor physical abuse and brief detentions do not amount to persecution.” Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding alien had not shown persecution where he was arrested for participating in a student demonstration, interrogated and beaten for five hours, detained for four days, and monitored after his release); see also Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding alien had not shown persecution where he was threatened, detained at a police station for 36 hours, kicked and beaten with a belt, and suffered multiple scratches and bruises requiring two days of hospitalization); Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1289-91 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding alien had not shown persecution where authorities detained him for five days, made him stand in the sun for two hours, and monitored him after release). In determining whether the petitioner has suffered persecution, the harm suffered by the petitioner must be considered cumulatively. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d at 1308; Shi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d 1231,

1235 (11th Cir. 2013). However, harm done to others does not constitute persecution unless the harm is directed against the applicant personally. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d at 1308-09.

IV. BRIONES’S CLAIMS

A. Past Persecution As an initial matter, Briones’s argument that the IJ and the BIA failed to consider the evidence of harm cumulatively lacks merit. The BIA explicitly said it had considered the harm “cumulatively,” and the IJ expressly based his conclusion on “the totality of the evidence.” As to Briones’s contention that both the IJ and the BIA failed to discuss all of his evidence of mistreatment, there is no requirement that they do so. See Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 803 (11th Cir. 2016). The record shows that both the BIA and the IJ gave reasoned consideration to his claims, arguments, and evidence, and announced their decisions in terms sufficient to enable us to perceive that the agency has “heard and thought and not merely reacted.” See Jeune, 810 F.3d at 803; Lin, 881 F.3d at 874. That is all that is required.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Elvin Antonio Briones v. U.S. Attorney General, (11th Cir. 2018).

Elvin Antonio Briones v. U.S. Attorney General (Elvin Antonio Briones v. U.S. Attorney General) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Luz Marina Silva v. U.S. Attorney General
448 F.3d 1229 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Liana Tan v. U.S. Attorney General
446 F.3d 1369 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Yi Feng Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General
451 F.3d 1287 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Niftaliev v. U.S. Attorney General
504 F.3d 1211 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General
504 F.3d 1341 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Mejia v. U.S. Attorney General
498 F.3d 1253 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Djonda v. US Atty. Gen.
514 F.3d 1168 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Attorney General
577 F.3d 1341 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Ayala v. U.S. Attorney General
605 F.3d 941 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Jiaren Shi v. U.S. Attorney General
707 F.3d 1231 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
Chadrick Calvin Cole v. U.S. Attorney General
712 F.3d 517 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
De Santamaria v. U.S. Attorney General
525 F.3d 999 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Jose Cendejas Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General
735 F.3d 1302 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
Putu Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General
779 F.3d 1284 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
Yasmick Jeune v. U.S. Attorney General
810 F.3d 792 (Eleventh Circuit, 2016)
Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Attorney General
881 F.3d 860 (Eleventh Circuit, 2018)