Elves Julmist, Jr. v. Miami-Dade County

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: June 12, 2024
• Docket: 2023-0687
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed June 12, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

Nos. 3D23-109 & 3D23-687 Lower Tribunal No. 21-20697 ________________

Elves Julmist, Jr., Appellant,

vs.

Miami-Dade County, et al., Appellees.

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.

Law Offices of Jimmy De La Espriella, and Javier A. Finlay, for appellant.

Fox Rothschild LLP, John R. Herin, Jr., Victor G. Sanabria; Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Daniel Frastai, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees.

Before SCALES, MILLER, and GORDO, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Miami-Dade County, Fla., Code of Ordinances, ch. 2,

art. XIII, § 2-96.1 (2023) (“From and after September 16, 1960, all traffic

engineering services shall be performed by the traffic and transportation

department, and such department shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all

traffic control devices in both the incorporated and unincorporated areas of

the county, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction to exercise the powers,

duties and functions set forth herein.”); Miami-Dade County, Fla., Code of

Ordinances, ch. 2, art. XIII, § 2-95.1(g) (2023) (“The department shall

assume full responsibility for the operation, maintenance[,] and replacement

of all existing signs[,] signals, and markings now in use in the several

municipalities . . . .”); see also Polite v. State, 116 So. 3d 270, 275 (Fla. 2013)

(“[I]n Florida, the witness’s testimony as to the correctness of the [recorded]

statement is essential to the admission of the evidence.”); Robles v.

Metropolitan Dade County, 802 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)

(upholding sovereign immunity based on emergency exception where county

“had to choose between different actions, each of which posed a potential

threat to the public”); Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 738 n.3 (Fla. 1989)

(“The way in which government agents respond to a serious emergency is

entitled to great deference, and may in fact reach a level of such urgency as

to be considered discretionary and not operational.”).