MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 30 2019, 9:29 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Matthew J. McGovern Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Elton Maurice Funches, Jr., September 30, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-138 v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Kelli E. Fink, Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 82C01-1802-F4-1310
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 1 of 19 Case Summary [1] Elton Maurice Funches, Jr., appeals his convictions for level 4 felony unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and level 6 felony dealing in a
synthetic drug. He argues that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution,
and Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2 were violated by the admission of evidence
obtained pursuant to a search warrant that he alleges was unsupported by
probable cause. He further argues that the trial court clearly erred in overruling
his objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and concluding
that the State’s reason for its peremptory strike of the only African-American
member of the jury pool was not a pretext for intentional discrimination.
Concluding that none of his rights were violated and finding no error, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In February 2018, Vanderburgh County Sheriff’s Department Detective Joshua
Patterson and other police officers executed a search warrant at 1730 South
Kerth Avenue in Evansville, a single-story house occupied and rented by
Funches. The search warrant authorized law enforcement to search the
premises and Funches’ Chrysler 300 for evidence pertaining to the crime of
possession or dealing in controlled substances, specifically synthetic
cannabinoids. During the search of Funches’ residence, officers discovered a
Ruger revolver, a Glock semiautomatic handgun, a stack of currency totaling
$806.00, and 1358.4 grams of a green leafy substance, which was identified as
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 2 of 19 synthetic cannabinoids. Some of the leafy substance was packaged in Ziploc
baggies. When questioned during the search, Funches admitted that police
would find the synthetic cannabinoids and a firearm in the residence and that
he had traded the drugs for one of the firearms. He also admitted that he
usually purchased two pounds of the drug at a time for $1000 a pound.
[3] The State charged Funches with level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm
by a serious violent felon and level 6 felony dealing in a synthetic drug.
Funches filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search
warrant. Funches filed a memorandum in support of the motion arguing that
the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause as required under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2. The trial court
held a hearing on the motion, at which Funches submitted the affidavit for the
search warrant, the search warrant, and the return on the search warrant. The
trial court took the motion under advisement and subsequently denied it.
During trial, Funches objected to the admission of the evidence obtained
pursuant to the search warrant and incorporated the arguments and evidence
heard at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The jury found Funches guilty
as charged. The trial court sentenced Funches to concurrent terms of eight
years for the level 4 felony conviction and 547 days for the level 6 felony
conviction. This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 3 of 19 Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – The search warrant was supported by probable cause. [4] Funches argues that any evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant was
inadmissible because the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause
that police would find evidence of dealing or possession of synthetic
cannabinoids at his residence. We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission
of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Cartwright v. State, 26 N.E.3d 663, 667
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, we review de novo the trial
court’s determination regarding the existence of probable cause to support a
search warrant. Smith v. State, 982 N.E.2d 393, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.
denied.
[5] Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution require probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant. Id. at 404. The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution contains nearly identical
language. State v. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ind. 2006). The warrant
requirement is a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 4 of 19 dwellings. Chiszar v. State, 936 N.E.2d 816, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
denied (2011). To generally deter law enforcement officers from violating
people’s Fourth Amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court has
established the exclusionary rule, which prohibits the admission of evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Reinhart v. State, 930 N.E.2d 42,
48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Indiana also prohibits the admission of evidence
seized in violation of Article 1, Section 11. Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307,
313-14 (Ind. 2018).
[6] These federal and state constitutional rights are codified in Indiana Code
Section 35-33-5-2, which sets forth the information that an affidavit for a search
warrant is required to contain. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 953. Indiana Code
Section 35-33-5-2(a) provides that a search warrant affidavit must particularly
describe “the house or place to be searched and the things to be searched for[,]”
allege “substantially the offense in relation thereto and that the affiant believes
and has good cause to believe that ... the things sought are concealed there[,]”
and set “forth the facts known to the affiant through personal knowledge or
based on hearsay, constituting the probable cause.”
[7] In determining whether to issue a search warrant, “[t]he task of the issuing
magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Jaggers v.
State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 181 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983)). “The duty of the reviewing court is to determine whether the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 5 of 19 magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that probable cause existed.”
Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39). Probable cause is a fluid concept
incapable of precise definition and must be decided based on the facts of each
case. Smith, 982 N.E.2d at 404. “The level of proof necessary to establish
probable cause is less than that necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jellison v. State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). “[P]robable
cause means a probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing.” Fry
v. State, 25 N.E.3d 237, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “Probable cause
may be established by evidence that would not be admissible at trial.” Jellison,
656 N.E.2d at 534. Such evidence may include hearsay, which is an out-of-
court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence
Rule 801(c).
[8] When this Court reviews whether probable cause supported the issuance of a
search warrant, “we nonetheless afford ‘significant deference to the magistrate’s
determination’” and “focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of
the evidence support that determination.” Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 953 (quoting
Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 98-99 (Ind. 1997)) (emphasis added). We
consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that
were presented to the issuing magistrate and not post hoc justifications. Jaggers,
687 N.E.2d at 182; see also Flaherty v. State, 443 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982) ( “The issue ... is whether the affidavit itself, without additional
information or testimony presented after the search warrant is executed, alleges
sufficient facts upon which the issuing authority could have made an
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 6 of 19 independent determination of probable cause.”). “A presumption of validity of
the search warrant exists, and the burden is upon the defendant to overturn that
presumption.” Rios v. State, 762 N.E.2d 153, 156-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Snyder v. State, 460 N.E.2d 522, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)). “In
determining whether an affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant, doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding the
warrant.” State v. Shipman, 987 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
[9] Here, Detective Patterson executed the search warrant affidavit, which reads as
follows:
On 02/13/2018, your affiant was conducting surveillance in the area of 1728 S Kerth Ave. Your affiant has conducted surveillance in the area several times over the past week and has observed frequent short term vehicle traffic park in front of 1728 S Kerth Av[e.], 1730 Kerth Ave, and 1732 S Kerth Ave. These houses share a common parking area off of Kerth Ave and in front of the residences. On several occasions, the vehicles would have multiple occupants and upon their arrival at the residence, only one occupant would go inside, leaving the others behind in the running vehicle. Your affiant recognizes this as common practice with illegal narcotic sales. Your affiant determined that a common vehicle is always parked in front of the residences during this short term vehicle traffic. It is a … Chrysler 300, bearing Indiana license plate 887TPG. When this vehicle is not there, no short term traffic is observed. Your affiant believes the owner of this vehicle lives at or next to 1728 S Kerth Ave and is possibly dealing from the residence. A check of the vehicle registrations show[s] the owner as Elton Funches. Funches has several prior narcotic arrests. Your affiant was advised by another detective within the Evansville-Vanderburgh Drug Task Force, that they received information from a reliable confidential
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 7 of 19 source that Funches deals in large amounts of synthetic cannabinoids. Detectives also received a tip within the past two weeks that there was heavy traffic occurring at 1730 S Kerth Ave.
On yesterday’s date, 02/13/2018, your affiant observed a black mustang in front of the residence along with the Chrysler 300. Your affiant is familiar with this vehicle and its owner, Will Simpson, as being involved in illegal narcotic sales in different parts of Evansville. … The vehicle was parked in front of 1728 S Kerth Ave, with an unknown passenger seated in the vehicle. Your affiant observed the owner of the vehicle exit a residence near 1728 S Kerth Ave. Your affiant could not see exactly which residence the vehicle owner came from. The owner entered the vehicle and left the area.
Your affiant observed this vehicle make a traffic violation and had the Evansville Police Department patrol units initiate a traffic stop for the violation. An investigation revealed over one hundred grams of synthetic cannabinoids. Simpson was read his Miranda Rights and stated he understood. He agreed to speak with your affiant. Simpson told your affiant that they had bought the synthetic cannabinoids from “Boo” Funches, [who] resides at 1728 S Kerth Ave. Your affiant knows Elton Funches has an alias of “Boo” in RMS.[ 1] Simpson was shown a photograph of 1728 S Kerth Ave and confirmed that was where Funches lives and where they bought the synthetic cannabinoids. He went on to tell your affiant that there was approximately 5-10 pounds of synthetic cannabinoids and possibly $10,000 US currency inside the residence.
You[r] affiant applied for and was granted a judicially signed search warrant for 1728 S Kerth Ave. … On today’s date,
1 We presume that RMS stands for Record Management System.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 8 of 19 02/14/2018, detectives with the drug task force began surveillance on 1728 S Kerth Ave. Detective Knight observed an unknown male exit the residence at 1732 S Kerth Ave. This unknown male, walked over to and inside 1730 S Kerth Ave. He soon exited 1730 S Kerth Ave with vehicle keys and unlocked the … Chrysler 300 that is registered to Elton Funches. He gets inside the vehicle and removes a white plastic grocery bag. He then closes the vehicle door and takes the keys back inside 1730 S Kerth Ave. The unknown male then returns to 1732 S Kerth Ave. This is the same type of bag your affiant located in Will Simpson’s vehicle the day before. That bag contained the synthetic cannabinoids that Simpson stated he had just bought from Funches.
Your affiant then learned that 1730 S Kerth Ave is a rental property. Your affiant was able to contact the owner of the rental property who confirmed that Elton Funches rents 1730 S Kerth Ave. Both 1728 and 1730 S Kerth Ave have similar features. Both are white in color, have a covered porch supported by three pillars, and share a common parking space. Your affiant believes Simpson mistakenly stated he bought the synthetic cannabinoids from 1728 S Kerth and instead meant 1730 S Kerth Ave.
Defendant’s Ex. 1, Ex. Vol. 6 at 270-73.
[10] Funches argues that the affidavit does not have sufficient indicia of probable
cause because it fails to establish the reliability of the hearsay statements upon
which it relies, namely, those of the confidential informant, the tip to law
enforcement, and Simpson. When an affidavit is based on hearsay, Indiana
Code Section 35-33-5-2(b) requires that the affidavit must either “(1) contain
reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the
declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 9 of 19 information furnished; or (2) contain information that establishes that the
totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay.” (Emphasis added.) For
purposes of proving probable cause, the trustworthiness of hearsay can be
established in a number of ways,
including where (1) the informant has given correct information in the past; (2) independent police investigation corroborates the informant’s statements; (3) some basis for the informant’s knowledge is shown; or (4) the informant predicts conduct or activities by the suspect that are not ordinarily easily predicted. Depending on the facts, other considerations may come into play in establishing the reliability of the informant or the hearsay.
Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 182. “[U]ncorroborated hearsay from a source whose
credibility is itself unknown, standing alone, cannot support a finding of
probable cause to issue a search warrant.” Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 227).
[11] In addressing Funches’ argument, we begin by noting that it is premised on the
faulty presumption that the affidavit attempts to establish probable cause based
solely on the hearsay statements. To the contrary, the affidavit does not rely
exclusively, or even predominantly, on the hearsay statements; it also contains
considerable “facts known to the affiant through personal knowledge,” see Ind.
Code § 35-33-5-2(a), and a probable cause determination is based on all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit. See Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 181.
[12] The affidavit reveals that Detective Patterson conducted surveillance of the area
in front of 1728 and 1730 S. Kerth Avenue several times over the course of a
week. The two houses share a common parking area in front of the residences.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 10 of 19 Detective Patterson observed vehicles with multiple passengers stop in front of
the houses, with one person leaving the vehicle to go inside one of the houses
while the other passengers waited with the vehicle running. Detective Patterson
recognized this behavior “as a common practice with illegal narcotics sales.”
Defendant’s Ex. 1, Ex. Vol. 6 at 272. When Detective Patterson observed this
behavior, Funches’ Chrysler 300 was always parked in front of the houses.
When Funches’ Chrysler 300 was not present, Detective Patterson did not
observe this “common practice.” Funches has several prior narcotic drug
arrests. Another detective advised Detective Patterson that a reliable
confidential source informed police that Funches deals in large amounts of
synthetic cannabinoids. Also, police received a tip that there was heavy traffic
occurring at 1730 S. Kerth Avenue. The information obtained by Detective
Patterson through his own surveillance and his experience and knowledge as a
law enforcement officer support a reasonable inference that activity common to
illegal drug sales was occurring at or near 1730 S. Kerth Avenue and that
Funches was likely involved in that activity, and therefore the totality of the
circumstances corroborates the hearsay statements. See Ind. Code § 35-33-5-
2(b)(2).
[13] In addition to the above, the affidavit also shows that Detective Patterson
observed a vehicle belonging to Will Simpson, who Detective Patterson knew
to have been involved in illegal narcotic sales, parked in front of 1728 and 1730
S. Kerth Avenue with an unknown passenger seated inside the vehicle.
Detective Patterson saw Simpson exit one of the houses near 1728 S. Kerth
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 11 of 19 Avenue, although he could not see exactly which house Simpson left. After
Simpson drove away, he was pulled over for a traffic violation, and officers
found over one hundred grams of synthetic cannabinoids in a white grocery
bag. Simpson told police that he bought the drug from “Boo” Funches, and
Detective Patterson knew that Funches had an alias of “Boo.” Defendant’s Ex.
1, Ex. Vol. 6 at 272. Simpson was shown a picture of the house at 1732 S.
Kerth Avenue and believed that it was Funches’ house.
[14] After Detective Patterson was issued a search warrant for 1728 S. Kerth
Avenue, police officers conducted additional surveillance of the area. Detective
Knight 2 saw a man exit 1732 S. Kerth Avenue, walk over to and go inside 1730
S. Kerth Avenue, then shortly thereafter exit that residence with car keys. The
man unlocked Funches’ Chrysler 300, collected a white grocery bag that was
the same kind of bag that held the synthetic cannabinoids found in Simpson’s
vehicle, and then returned the car keys to 1730 S. Kerth Avenue before
returning to 1732 S. Kerth Avenue. Detective Patterson then learned that
Funches rented 1730 S. Kerth Avenue. 1730 S. Kerth Avenue has similar
features to 1728 S. Kerth Avenue. Here again, the totality of the circumstances
corroborates Simpson’s hearsay statement that Funches had been dealing
2 A police officer may properly rely on information obtained from a fellow officer under the collective- knowledge doctrine. McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 529 (Ind. 2018). The collective- or imputed-knowledge doctrine applies to both investigative stops and search warrants. Id. “Unlike the hearsay requirement of the warrant statute, designed to ensure an informant’s veracity, the collective-knowledge doctrine presumes a fellow officer’s credibility, thus ‘no special showing of reliability need be made as a part of the probable cause determination.’” Id. at 530 (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.5(a) (5th ed. 2017)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 12 of 19 synthetic cannabinoids, and Detective Patterson himself confirmed which
house was Funches’. 3 We conclude that all the circumstances in the affidavit
and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom support the magistrate’s
determination that there was probable cause to believe that evidence pertaining
to the crime of dealing or possession of synthetic cannabinoids would be found
at Funches’ premises. We conclude that the search warrant was issued in
accordance with the constitutional and statutory rights guaranteed to Funches. 4
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence.
Section 2 – The trial court did not clearly err in overruling Funches’ Batson objection. [15] During voir dire, defense counsel objected to one of the State’s peremptory
strikes as follows:
I’m going to raise a Batson challenge on this one. …. [That prospective juror] is the only African-American in the [jury pool].
3 Funches argues that Simpson’s hearsay statements were unreliable, citing Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949. Spillers is clearly distinguishable. In Spillers, the State argued that the hearsay statement at issue was reliable because it was a statement against the penal interest of the person who made it. Our supreme court rejected that argument because the person who made the statement had been arrested for drug possession, and “his tip was less a statement against his penal interest than an obvious attempt to curry favor with the police.” Id. at 956. Here, unlike the hearsay statement in Spillers, the reliability of Simpson’s hearsay statement is based on the corroboration of the totality of circumstances. 4 Funches also argues that the search of his house was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution based on the factors articulated by our supreme court in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). However, he has waived that issue by raising it for the first time on appeal. See Howard v. State, 818 N.E.2d 469, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“A defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on appeal. The failure to raise an issue at trial waives the issue for appeal.”) (citation omitted), trans. denied (2005).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 13 of 19 …. He said, I’m not going to hold law enforcement to a lower standard, I’m not going to disbelieve them automatically out of the gate, I’m going to consider all of the evidence. Nothing with [that prospective juror] that stood out from anybody else, any other Caucasian jurors.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 70. The prosecutor responded,
Yes. My response to that would be there’s no systematic part or reason that we’re doing that. He is on federal parole for voluntary manslaughter. (inaudible). I didn’t want to get into [that] in front of everybody … because I didn’t want him to feel very uncomfortable, but he is on federal parole.
Id. The trial court found that because the prospective juror was the only
African-American member of the jury pool, Funches had made a prima facie
case of discrimination. Id. at 70-71. The trial court then asked the prosecutor
to confirm what crime the juror was on federal parole for. Id. at 71. The
prosecutor showed the trial court the juror’s questionnaire, pointing out that the
juror “gave the cause number, it’s a federal cause number.” Id. The trial court
then ruled, “[B]ased on what I’ve seen in the questionnaire and [the
prosecutor’s] argument, I’ll allow that [peremptory] challenge. Okay, your
Batson objection is overruled.” Id. After a recess, the prosecutor informed the
trial court and Funches that the prosecutor had discovered that the juror had
been convicted of a state crime and that his parole had ended in 2007. Id. at 76-
77. The prosecutor also explained that he had originally been under the
impression that the juror was still on parole based on information from the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 14 of 19 “NCIC.” 5 Id. at 76. The trial court asked whether there were jurors who had
been selected who had felony convictions, and the prosecutor informed the trial
court that there were not. Id. at 77. The trial court then affirmed its previous
ruling. Id.
[16] Funches argues that his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution were violated by the State’s use of a peremptory strike to
strike the only African-American prospective juror. “Purposeful racial
discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal
protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to
secure.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. “The exclusion of even a sole prospective juror
based on race, ethnicity, or gender violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.” Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 2012).
“Pursuant to Batson and its progeny, a trial court must engage in a three-step
process in evaluating a claim that a peremptory challenge was based on race.”
Cartwright, 962 N.E.2d at 1220. At the first step, the defendant must make a
prima facie showing that there are “circumstances raising an inference that
discrimination occurred.” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1208. At the second step, if
the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to “‘offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question.’” Id. at 1209
(quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477). “A race-neutral explanation means ‘an
5 We presume this refers to the National Crime Information Center.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 15 of 19 explanation based on something other than the race of the juror.’” Highler v.
State, 854 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 360 (1991)). “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Addison, 962
N.E.2d at 1209 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). “[T]he issue
is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.” McCormick v. State, 803
N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768).
[17] Even if the State’s reasons appear on their face to be race-neutral, at the third
step, the trial court must perform the essential task of assessing whether the
State’s facially race-neutral reasons are credible. Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1209.
The second and third steps must not be conflated. See id. at 1210 (“The
analytical structure established by Batson cannot operate properly if the second
and third steps are conflated.”) (quoting United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555,
559 (7th Cir. 2011)). In determining whether the State’s explanation for the
strike is credible and not a pretext for discriminatory intent, the trial court must
consider the State’s explanation “in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.”
Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251-52 (2005)); see also Snyder, 552
U.S. at 478 (“[I]n considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling
claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of
racial animosity must be consulted.”). Although this third step requires the trial
court to evaluate “the persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the
prosecutor, “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Highler, 854 N.E.2d at
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 16 of 19 828 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768). At this stage, the defendant may offer
additional evidence to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s reasons are pretextual.
Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1210. Then, “in light of the parties’ submissions, the
trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful
discrimination.” Id. at 1209 (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477).
[18] “[U]pon appellate review, a trial court’s decision concerning whether a
peremptory challenge is discriminatory is given great deference, and will be set
aside only if found to be clearly erroneous.” Cartwright, 962 N.E.2d at 1221
(quoting Forrest v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (Ind. 2001)); see also Jeter v. State,
888 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2008) (“On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on the
issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.”)
(citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)), cert. denied. “The trial
court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s reasons were not pretextual is
essentially a finding of fact that turns substantially on credibility. It is therefore
accorded great deference.” Highler, 854 N.E.2d at 828. We also note that
“where … a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the
peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of
intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had
made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination becomes moot.”
Cartwright, 962 N.E.2d at 1222; accord Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1209 n.2.
[19] Funches’ argument on appeal appears to focus on the third step. Specifically,
he argues that this Court should find that the prosecutor’s reason for striking the
only African-American is pretextual because the prosecutor later admitted that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 17 of 19 the prospective juror was no longer on parole and because the juror answered
questions during voir dire in a manner that indicated that he would be fair in
this case. Funches further argues that the only reason that the prosecutor struck
the juror was because he had a prior criminal record and such a reason should
not be sufficient to remove the only African-American member of the jury pool.
We are unpersuaded by Funches’ argument.
[20] When Funches’ made his Batson challenge, the trial court had the prospective
juror’s questionnaire. That questionnaire asked, “Have you or any of your
immediate family members been charged with or convicted of a felony? If yes,
please explain:” Court’s Ex. 1, Ex. Vol. 5 at 97. The prospective juror wrote,
“Myself 1986 Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter.” Id. He also wrote the
cause number for his case. Id. Although it was later revealed that the NCIC
database had mistakenly provided a federal parole number for the juror, the
trial court and Funches were informed of this mistake. Funches does not assert,
nor does the record suggest, that the prosecutor intentionally attempted to
mislead the judge. Further, it is undisputed that the juror had been either
charged with or convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, which is a
serious offense. It is the trial court’s task to judge the credibility of the
prosecutor, and we defer to its conclusion. 6 See Highler, 854 N.E.2d at 828.
Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the
6 Despite the juror’s representations that he could be fair in this case, it would not be unreasonable for the State to be concerned that the juror might be biased against the State because of his criminal record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 18 of 19 State’s reason for striking the juror was not a pretext for intentional
discrimination.
[21] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-138 | September 30, 2019 Page 19 of 19