Elston v. Venegersky

Second Circuit

Elston v. Venegersky

697 F. App'x 22

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedSeptember 1, 2017

Docket16-1378-cv

StatusUnpublished

This text of 697 F. App'x 22 (Elston v. Venegersky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Elston v. Venegersky, 697 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Aisha Elston appeals from the March 29, 2016 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Amon, /.), dismissing her complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Elston sued the City of New York and former deputy commissioner of the New York City Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Alan Vengersky, asserting that she had been fired from her position as a DOC correctional officer, in violation of her right to due process and her contract with the DOC. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Garcia v. Hartford Police, Dep't 706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013). Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Although Elston was a tenured employee, who had a protected interest in her continued employment, she knowingly and voluntarily waived her tenure rights by signing her limited probation agreement with the DOC. See DeMichele v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 789 (2d Cir. 1999); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Roberts, 61 N,Y.2d 244, 249-50, 473 N.Y.S.2d 370, 461 N.E.2d 856 (1984). Thus, she was not entitled to pre-deprivation hearing and could only challenge her termination though an Article 78 proceeding. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1292-93 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (determining that an Article 78 proceeding “constitutes a wholly adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process purposes,” even when the challenged conduct was not random and unauthorized).

We have considered the remainder of Elston’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

SUMMARY ORDER

Aisha Elston appeals from the March 29, 2016 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Amon, /.), dismissing her complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Elston sued the City of New York and former deputy commissioner of the New York City Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Alan Vengersky, asserting that she had been fired from her position as a DOC correctional officer, in violation of her right to due process and her contract with the DOC. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Garcia v. Hartford Police, Dep't 706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013). Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Although Elston was a tenured employee, who had a protected interest in her continued employment, she knowingly and voluntarily waived her tenure rights by signing her limited probation agreement with the DOC. See DeMichele v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 789 (2d Cir. 1999); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Roberts, 61 N,Y.2d 244, 249-50, 473 N.Y.S.2d 370, 461 N.E.2d 856 (1984). Thus, she was not entitled to pre-deprivation hearing and could only challenge her termination though an Article 78 proceeding. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1292-93 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (determining that an Article 78 proceeding “constitutes a wholly adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process purposes,” even when the challenged conduct was not random and unauthorized).

We have considered the remainder of Elston’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

697 F. App'x 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/elston-v-venegersky-ca2-2017.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack