Elson Ford, Jr. v. The Oaks Academy (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 16, 2019
• Docket: 19A-CT-483
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 16 2019, 9:33 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Elson Ford, Jr. Liberty L. Roberts Indianapolis, Indiana Church Church Hittle + Antrim Noblesville, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Elson Ford, Jr., August 16, 2019 Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CT-483 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Oaks Academy, The Honorable David J. Dreyer, Appellee. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D10-1702-CT-5870

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 1 of 9 [1] Elson Ford, Jr., pro se, appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of The

Oaks Academy and Elizabeth Hamilton (together, “Appellees”). 1 We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Simonna Woodson and Ford have a child together, J. On March 21, 2014,

Woodson signed an enrollment contract for the 2014/2015 academic year for J.

to enroll as a second grade student at The Oaks Academy, and she later signed

a summary of tuition and payment options document for J. for that year. J.

was also enrolled in The Oaks Academy for the 2015/2016 academic year.

Although a written enrollment contract was not signed for that year, Woodson

signed a summary of tuition and payment options document for the year. In

January 2016, Woodson informed The Oaks Academy that problems had

developed over the holiday break, that Ford could no longer pick up J. from

school, and that she was acquiring paperwork and would provide it to the

school.

[3] In February 2016, Woodson obtained an ex parte order for protection against

Ford under cause number 49G21-1602-PO-4502 (“Cause No. 4502”) in the

Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division, and she provided a copy of the

order to The Oaks Academy. The cover sheet for the order identified Ford as

the respondent. A box field under the phrase “Petitioner/Protected

Person/Child’s Name if Child is Protected Person” contained Woodson’s

1 Hamilton is an administrator at the school.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 2 of 9 name, and immediately below that the sheet stated “And/or on behalf of minor

family member(s): . . . [J.]” Appellees’ Appendix Volume II at 46. The court

set the matter for hearing on March 7, 2016. The order of protection named

Woodson as the petitioner and stated that Ford was enjoined from threatening

to commit acts of domestic or family violence “against the Petitioner and the

following designated family or household members, if any: [J.]” and that he

was prohibited from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly

or indirectly communicating with the Petitioner, except: civil communication

regarding child and to effectuate parenting time at neutral location.” Id. at 48.

[4] The Oaks Academy contacted legal counsel regarding the protective order. The

Oaks Academy provided Ford with access to the school facility for Lauds,

chapel, and lunch, and it determined that it would not release J. to Ford, that

Ford could not participate in field trips, and that the restrictions were to remain

in effect until new documentation was provided to the school. It informed its

faculty and Ford of the restrictions. It asked Woodson and Ford to provide

updated court documents after the March 7th hearing and was later advised the

hearing was moved to July 2016.

[5] On February 29, 2016, Ford filed a petition to establish paternity under cause

number 49C01-1602-JP-7450 (“Cause No. 7450”) in the Marion Circuit Court.

On July 15, 2016, the court issued a Preliminary Order on Establishing

Paternity under Cause No. 7450 finding that it was in the best interests of the

child to grant shared physical custody and joint legal custody pending a final

hearing and awarding Ford parenting time including Wednesdays after school

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 3 of 9 and on weekends. The court ordered the parties to communicate via text

messaging or email about all issues involving legal custody and parenting time

exchanges in light of the protective order under Cause No. 4502. On August

19, 2016, The Oaks Academy was provided with court documents relating to

the paternity action, and Ford was permitted to pick up J. from school during

the 2016/2017 academic year. Ford signed a summary of tuition and payment

options document for the 2016/2017 academic year.

[6] Ford filed a complaint, as amended in August 2017, alleging that he and

Woodson had an agreement with The Oaks Academy, that The Oaks Academy

had no legal reason to exclude his access to J.’s school, and that The Oaks

Academy excluding him from his child’s education was a breach of contract. In

August 2017, The Oaks Academy filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

arguing that Ford was not a party to the 2014/2015 enrollment contract and

that contract did not address student pick-up or parental involvement in school

events. The court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on September 18,

2017, at which Ford did not appear. Ford later filed a motion to reopen the

hearing. On October 12, 2017, the court granted The Oaks Academy’s motion

to dismiss. Ford appealed, and in June 2018 this Court issued a decision

finding that Ford had not received notice of the hearing on the motion to

dismiss and remanded for further proceedings.

[7] The trial court on remand held a hearing on November 19, 2018, at which it

heard argument. The Oaks Academy’s counsel argued that Ford was not a

party to the enrollment contract for the 2014/2015 academic year, that contract

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 4 of 9 was not for the relevant time period, there was no contract for the 2015/2016

school year, and that the contract was a tuition contract. Ford’s counsel argued

the school accepted J. for three years, the school “probably didn’t make parents

resign-up every year as long as they paid their tuition,” and there was a

contractual agreement between Ford and Woodson and The Oaks Academy

“even though it may not be written for each and every semester that the . . .

child is enrolled in the school.” Transcript Volume 2 at 9-10. Ford filed a

motion for leave to supplement the record requesting that the court consider

documents showing he had a contractual relationship with The Oaks Academy.

The court granted Ford’s motion for leave to supplement the record, indicated

there would be consideration of matters outside the pleadings and the motion to

dismiss would be treated as one for summary judgment, and provided deadlines

for the parties to present any pertinent materials. The Oaks Academy

submitted a brief, an affidavit of the Head of School for The Oaks Academy

Fall Creek campus, the 2014/2015 enrollment contract, the summary of tuition

documents, the protective order under Cause No. 4502, and paternity action

documents under Cause No. 7450. Ford filed a response together with his

affidavit and school and paternity documents. On February 6, 2019, the court

entered summary judgment in favor of The Oaks Academy.

Discussion

[8] A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as trained attorneys and is

afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.

Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). We review an order for

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 5 of 9 summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Our review of a summary

judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court.

Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind.

2001). We may affirm on any grounds supported by the Ind. Trial Rule 56

materials. Catt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 2002). The

moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there

are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013). If the moving

party succeeds, then the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence

establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

[9] Ford asserts that he had a contractual agreement with The Oaks Academy even

though it may not have been written for every semester that J. was enrolled in

the school, that the protective order did not apply to The Oaks Academy or J.,

that the trial court gave no explanation for its entry of summary judgment, and

that The Oaks Academy did not affirmatively negate his claims as required to

merit summary judgment. Appellees respond that Ford was not a party to the

2014-2015 enrollment contract and there was no contractual obligation

regarding student pick-up or parental participation in school activities. They

argue that Ford’s “real criticism is with The Oaks Academy’s attempted

compliance with the ex parte Protective Order from February 9, 2016 through

the end of the 2015-2016 academic year.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. They also

argue that they did not have a contractual obligation to release J. to Ford or

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 6 of 9 allow him to participate in school activities. In reply, Ford argues that a

contractual relationship involves the exchange of a promise for performance, he

agreed to pay tuition, and The Oaks Academy agreed to educate his child.

[10] The basic requirements for a contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, and a

meeting of the minds between the contracting parties on all essential elements

or terms of the transaction. Jernas v. Gumz, 53 N.E.3d 434, 445 (Ind. Ct. App.

2016), trans. denied. In addition, to be valid and enforceable, a contract must be

reasonably definite and certain. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS § 33 (recognizing that, in order to give effect to a contract, its

terms must be “reasonably certain”)); see also Comment (b) to RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (observing that “the degree of certainty required

may be affected by the dispute which arises and by the remedy sought”). In

interpreting a contract, a court may not write a new contract for the parties or

supply missing terms. B&R Oil Co., Inc. v. Stoler, 77 N.E.3d 823, 829 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2017), trans. denied.

[11] The designated evidence shows that in January 2016 Woodson informed The

Oaks Academy that Ford could no longer pick up J. from school and that in

February 2016 she obtained an order for protection against Ford from the

Marion Superior Court under Cause No. 4502. The cover sheet for the order

for protection, in the section identifying the petitioner/protected person,

referenced J. as well as Woodson. The Oaks Academy received a copy of the

protective order and, after consulting legal counsel, decided to provide Ford

with access to its facility for Lauds, chapel, and lunch, that it would not release

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 7 of 9 J. to Ford at any time, and that Ford could not participate in field trips. Ford

does not assert that he designated evidence showing that he updated Appellees

with respect to the protective order or Cause No. 4502. The designated

evidence shows that the Marion Circuit Court issued an order in July 2016

granting shared physical custody and parenting time under Cause No. 7450 and

that The Oaks Academy was provided with documents related to the paternity

action and permitted Ford to pick up J. from school during the 2016/2017 year.

The enrollment contract and tuition documents do not contain provisions

governing the release of students or field trips, and Ford does not designate

other evidence of such terms.

[12] Even assuming some agreement existed between Ford and The Oaks Academy

based on J.’s enrollment in the school and the payment of tuition, The Oaks

Academy made a prima facie showing that it had not entered into an agreement

which required it to release J. to Ford or to permit him to participate in field

trips after it received a copy of the order for protection issued by the Marion

Superior Court and before it received the paternity court documents, and Ford

did not respond with evidence showing that The Oaks Academy had such an

agreement with him. See B&R Oil Co., 77 N.E.3d at 829 (finding there was

nothing in the text of a right of first refusal that suggested or would support an

inference that the agreement granted a right to purchase any property other

than the leased premises).

[13] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of

The Oaks Academy.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 8 of 9 [14] Affirmed.

Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CT-483 | August 16, 2019 Page 9 of 9