Elsa Gonzalez Fuentes v. Todd Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: 21-70125
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELSA GONZALEZ FUENTES; E.A.G.F.; No. 21-70125 K.G.F.; A.C.G., Agency Nos. A209-008-179 Petitioners, A209-008-180 A209-008-181 v. A209-008-182

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 22, 2026** Seattle, Washington

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Elsa Gonzalez Fuentes and her children, E.A.G.F., K.G.F., and

A.C.G. (collectively, “Petitioners”), citizens of Mexico, petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration judge’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own

reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision

upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir.

2019). “We review purely legal questions de novo, and the agency’s factual findings

for substantial evidence.” Perez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 788, 792 (9th Cir.

2022).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and

withholding of removal. To establish eligibility for asylum, Petitioners must

“demonstrate a likelihood of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.’” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). To establish eligibility for withholding of removal,

Petitioners must show “that it is more likely than not” that they will be persecuted if

returned to Mexico “because of” their membership in a particular social group or

other protected ground. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357, 360 (9th

Cir. 2017); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). And for both claims, Petitioners “must

prove a causal nexus between one of [their] statutorily protected characteristics and

2 either [their] past harm or [their] objectively tenable fear of future harm.”

Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioners

failed to establish a nexus between their alleged persecution and their family-based

particular social group, family members of Salvador Cruz Salas (the paternal

grandfather of A.C.G.). The agency reasonably concluded that Cruz Salas was not

motivated to harm A.C.G. because of their familial relationship, but instead “simply

want[ed] to raise his grandson because he [was] sad that his own son [was] missing

and presumed dead.” Gonzalez Fuentes testified that A.C.G. was Cruz Salas’s only

grandchild and that Cruz Salas repeatedly asked to take custody of A.C.G. There is

no evidence in the record that Cruz Salas threatened to harm A.C.G. or the other

Petitioners. The agency reasonably concluded that this was a “personal dispute,”

rather than persecution based on a protected ground. See Pagayon v. Holder, 675

F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A personal dispute is not, standing alone,

tantamount to persecution based on [a protected ground].”).

Petitioners’ second proposed particular social group is “those who have

opposed romantic advances of an armed community defense force member and been

threatened as a result thereof.” Substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that this proposed group lacks social distinction and therefore is not

cognizable. See Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (the

3 BIA’s conclusion regarding social distinction is a question of fact reviewed for

substantial evidence). Petitioners assert that this group is recognized as distinct in

Mexican society because “few have the courage to oppose the threatening advances

of an armed self-defense force member.” But Petitioners fail to point to any country

reports, background reports, or other evidence in the record supporting the

conclusion that Mexican society recognizes as a group those who, without more,

oppose the romantic advances of an armed community defense member and are

threatened as a result thereof. See Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1243.

Because the lack of a nexus to a protected ground is dispositive of Petitioners’

asylum and withholding of removal claims, see Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077,

1081 (9th Cir. 2016), we need not address their arguments regarding internal

relocation.

2. Petitioners argue that the BIA denied Petitioners due process because it

limited its discussion of CAT relief to a discussion of internal relocation. For a due

process violation to have occurred: (1) the proceeding must have been “so

fundamentally unfair” that Petitioners were prevented from reasonably presenting

their case; and (2) Petitioners must show prejudice, “which means that the outcome

of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Lacsina

Pangilinan v. Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting

Ibarra–Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006)). The BIA did not

4 ignore Petitioners’ CAT claim, see Antonyan v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th

Cir. 2011), but agreed with the IJ’s analysis as to one factor (internal relocation) and

found no error in the IJ’s decision on CAT generally. Moreover, the evidence in the

record does not compel the conclusion that Petitioners more likely than not will be

tortured in Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1). Generalized

evidence of violence and crime in Mexico is insufficient to prove eligibility for CAT

protection. Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).

Petitioners did not present evidence that they or any of their family members were

ever harmed or tortured in Mexico.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.1

1 The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 1) is denied.