Elmore, Stacey v. Federal Express Ground

2020 TN WC 120
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedNovember 18, 2020
Docket2020-05-0361
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 TN WC 120 (Elmore, Stacey v. Federal Express Ground) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Elmore, Stacey v. Federal Express Ground, 2020 TN WC 120 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT MURFREESBORO STACEY ELMORE, ) Docket No. 2020-05-0361 Employee, ) V. ) ) FEDERAL EXPRESS GROUND, ) State File No. 25334-2020 Employer. ) ) ) Judge Dale Tipps )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING REQUESTED BENEFITS

This case came before the Court on November 5, 2020, for an Expedited Hearing on whether Ms. Elmore is entitled to the spinal cord stimulator trial ordered by her authorized physician. For the reasons below, the Court holds Ms. Elmore is entitled to the requested benefits.

History of Claim

Ms. Elmore injured her left foot while working for FedEx on November 27, 2018. FedEx accepted the claim and provided medical treatment and temporary disability benefits, which it continues to pay. Ms. Elmore’s authorized podiatrist referred her to a pain specialist when she developed complex regional pain syndrome in her foot and leg, and Ms. Elmore began seeing Dr. Matthew Rupert.!

After treating Ms. Elmore for several months, Dr. Rupert recommended a spinal cord stimulator trial in February 2020. According to Ms. Elmore, that recommendation was denied by utilization review (UR). Counsel for both parties agreed that UR denied the recommended treatment because of missing lab work and that the Medical Director upheld

' Although FedEx provided a panel of pain doctors, Ms. Elmore testified that the adjuster selected Dr. Rupert as her authorized pain specialist. However, she is pleased with Dr. Rupert and wishes to continue treating with him. The parties stipulated that Dr. Rupert is an authorized treating physician. the denial on appeal.

Dr. Rupert addressed the denial in a letter noting that the primary reason for the denial was a “lack of labs.” He explained, “These labs would not be obtained until we had approval, otherwise they would likely need to be repeated.” He concluded, “The patient fits all criteria for this service. These labs will be performed once approved and scheduled. Labs cannot be performed sooner as protocol states these must be current and within 30 days of the scheduled procedure.”

Ms. Elmore requested that the Court order FedEx to provide the recommended trial. FedEx contended that this would be “putting the cart before the horse,” as the labs must be performed before UR could grant approval. It asked the Court to deny Ms. Elmore’s request.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

For the Court to grant Ms. Elmore’s request, she must provide sufficient evidence from which this Court might determine she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2018); McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015). This requires the Court to examine whether she is likely to prove the medical necessity of the spinal cord stimulator trial.

The Workers’ Compensation Law gives an employer the right to submit medical treatment recommended by the authorized treating physician to UR for “evaluation of the necessity, appropriateness, efficiency and quality of medical care services[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(20). The parties agree Dr. Rupert is an authorized physician. So, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(H), his recommendation for a spinal cord stimulator trial is presumed medically necessary. The question for the Court then is whether the UR denial is sufficient for FedEx to rebut this presumption.

The Appeals Board addressed this question in Morgan v. Macy’s, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39 (Aug. 31, 2016). It detailed two distinct methods by which FedEx might rebut the presumption of necessity of Dr. Rupert’s treatment. First, if the treating physician’s recommended treatment does not “explicitly follow,” or if it is not “reasonably derived,” from the ODG guidelines, the employer need only rebut the authorized physician’s recommendation by a preponderance of the evidence. Morgan, at *19. Second, if the employee does establish that the authorized physician followed the ODG guidelines in recommending treatment, the employer must rebut the presumption of medical necessity by clear and convincing evidence. /d.

The parties offered no proof as to whether Dr. Rupert’s recommendation “explicitly follows the treatment guidelines” or “is reasonably derived therefrom.” Thus, the Court

2 can only consider whether the evidence rebutted the medical necessity of Dr. Rupert’s recommendation for the stimulator trial by a preponderance of the evidence.

Rule 0800-02-06-.01(12) defines “medical necessity” as services that are “[i]n accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice, including [the Bureau’s] Treatment Guidelines.” Therefore, to determine whether the stimulator trial is medically necessary, the Court must evaluate whether the recommended treatment falls within the ODG or otherwise meets a generally accepted standard of practice. The parties agreed that UR denied the claim because of a lack of labs. However, neither party moved the UR report or appeal into evidence. Similarly, they offered no proof addressing the ODG or standards of medical practice. Without that information, the Court is unable to evaluate whether Dr. Rupert’s recommendation met those standards. The remaining question then is whether the mere existence of the UR denial overcomes the presumption of medical necessity.

This Court has “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all contested claims for workers’ compensation benefits when the date of the alleged injury is on or after July 1, 2014.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-237. Further, the Court has statutory authority under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-238(a)(3) “to hear and determine claims for compensation, to approve settlements of claims for compensation, to conduct hearings, and to make orders, decisions, and determinations.” (Emphasis added). Finally, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(1) establishes the evidentiary standard for overcoming a treating physician’s opinion regarding medical necessity. If the Court had no authority to hear issues of medical necessity, then a party would have no avenue to argue this evidentiary issue, and section 50-6-204(a)(3)(1) would be made meaningless.

Allowing the unexplained UR denial, without more, to overcome the presumption of medical necessity, would have the same effect. This would prevent the Court from applying the applicable standard of proof and making the determination in section 50-6- 238(a)(3). In other words, it would limit the Court’s jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent with the statute. For this reason, the Court holds that proof of the requirements of the ODG or the applicable standards of practice is necessary to overcome the presumption. As FedEx did not provide this proof, Dr. Rupert’s recommendation is presumed medically necessary. Ms. Elmore therefore appears likely to prevail at trial in establishing that she is entitled to the recommended spinal cord stimulator trial.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. FedEx shall provide Ms. Elmore with medical treatment made reasonably necessary by her November 27, 2018 injury, including the spinal cord simulator trial ordered by Dr. Rupert.

2. This case is set for a Status Hearing on March 31, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. Please call

3 toll-free at 855-874-0473 to participate. Failure to call or appear might result in a determination of the issues without your further participation. All conferences are set using Central Time.

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Related

§ 50-6-102
Tennessee § 50-6-102(20)
§ 50-6-237
Tennessee § 50-6-237
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(d)(1)

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Bluebook (online)
2020 TN WC 120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/elmore-stacey-v-federal-express-ground-tennworkcompcl-2020.