RENDERED: JANUARY 30, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1248-MR
ELMER J. GEORGE, JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SPENCER FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE S. MARIE HELLARD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 20-CI-00143
MEREDITH BOOTH GEORGE (NOW THOMPSON) APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
JONES, L., JUDGE: The parents of a minor child with joint custody and equal
parenting time could not agree on which school their child would attend. Forced to
decide the issue, the Spencer Family Court chose the school favored by the child’s
mother, Meredith Booth George, now Thompson (Mother). Dissatisfied, the
child’s father, Elmer J. George, Jr. (Father), then filed this appeal. We affirm. I. Factual Background and Procedural History
The Spencer Family Court incorporated Mother and Father’s marital
settlement agreement into the decree of dissolution of their marriage. The
agreement provided that Mother and Father would share joint custody of Child and
would each have equal parenting time.
In the fall of 2023, Mother filed a “motion regarding school choice.”
The motion noted that Child would begin kindergarten in the fall of 2024, but
Mother and Father had been unable to agree on which school Child would attend.
Mother, who resided in Spencer County, preferred Spencer County Elementary
School (Spencer Elementary). Father, who resided in Marion County, preferred
Saint Augustine Catholic School (Saint Augustine) in Lebanon, Kentucky. Child
had attended preschool in both Spencer County and at Saint Augustine.
The family court held a hearing on the school choice dispute in June
2024. Mother presented her own testimony and that of the principal of Spencer
Elementary. Mother testified that Child is tightly bonded with her younger son,
Child’s half-sibling, who is roughly four years younger than Child. Mother
testified that her younger son would attend Spencer Elementary when he reached
school age. Mother noted that Child had attended preschool in Spencer County
and at Saint Augustine. According to Mother, some of Child’s preschool friends
would be attending Spencer Elementary and his preschool teacher would be a
-2- student-teacher at Spencer Elementary for the then-upcoming school year. Mother
also testified that children who lived in her neighborhood would be attending
Spencer Elementary.
Child’s paternal grandparents each testified that many of Child’s
relatives on his Father’s side had attended, or were then attending, Saint Augustine.
Child’s grandfather testified that his office is very close to Saint Augustine and so
he had often picked up Child and Child’s cousin after school. Grandfather also
mentioned numerous family members who had obtained professional degrees after
attending Saint Augustine. Father testified that several children who lived in his
neighborhood attended Saint Augustine, including at least three children who lived
on Father’s street. Father testified that around twelve of Child’s cousins were then
attending Saint Augustine.
Father also submitted numerous depositions. The deponents, who
included public school employees who nonetheless sent their children to Saint
Augustine, praised Saint Augustine’s academics, overall atmosphere, and the
extracurricular opportunities for its students. The deponents also noted Saint
Augustine’s strong support from its graduates, their families, and the community at
large.
The family court issued a 20-page order in July 2024, ruling that
Child would attend Spencer Elementary.
-3- Father filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, arguing the decision
was infirm because it did not explicitly and sufficiently address the best interest
factors in Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.270. The motion also noted that a
court reporter had mistakenly failed to enter several depositions into the record.
Finally, Father submitted over fifty additional findings of fact he believed the
family court should have made.
In August 2024, the family court issued a 28-page amended order.
The court made more explicit findings regarding both the best interest factors in
KRS 403.270 and the deposition testimony. However, the Court again concluded
Child would attend Spencer Elementary. Father then filed this appeal.
II. Analysis
The overarching issue before us is whether the trial court committed
reversible error by ordering Child to attend Spencer Elementary. To support that
main argument, Father raises three issues. First, he contends the family court
committed reversible error by not adopting all of his proposed findings of fact
contained in his motion to alter, amend, or vacate. Next, Father argues the family
court improperly presumed public schools to be inherently preferable. Finally,
Father argues the family court misapplied the best interest factors in KRS 403.270.
We have explained that when a court is forced to decide which school
a child will attend that:
-4- the overriding principle, as correctly determined by the trial court, is that the best interest of the child be served by the trial court’s decision. As to what constitutes the best interest of the child, any factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; any decisions based upon said facts are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Young v. Holmes, 295 S.W.3d 144, 146 (Ky. App. 2009) (citations omitted). See
also, e.g., Burchell v. Burchell, 684 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Ky. App. 1984); Warawa v.
Warawa, 587 S.W.3d 631, 636 (Ky. App. 2019).
A. No Additional Findings of Fact Required
Father first contends the family court erred by failing to adopt the
findings of fact he requested in his motion to alter, amend, or vacate. Father’s
proposed findings generally discuss his intensive involvement in Saint Augustine
and the deponents’ positive views of, and experiences with, that school. Father
argues the proposed findings are “crucial facts.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. However,
we agree with Mother that the proposed findings are cumulative and redundant of
findings already made by the family court.
The family court made findings sufficiently summarizing the evidence
presented by Father. For example, the family court found that Father had
presented testimony that his family members and friends who attended Saint
Augustine had gone on to be successful adults. Similarly, the court found that
Father had presented deposition testimony that Saint Augustine had “top notch”
-5- teachers and there was a “positive community surrounding St. Augustine.” R. at
426. The family court also made findings that Father presented testimony
regarding the generally small class sizes at Saint Augustine, the school’s quality
academic programs, and the advanced classes its graduates tended to take in high
school. The family court summed up the evidence by finding that “Saint
Augustine has a wonderful community with lots of supportive alumni and school
events and fundraisers,” and “is likely a wonderful institution, providing quality
education . . . .” R. at 436.
The family court made adequate findings noting Father had presented
evidence about the positive attributes of Saint Augustine, both academically and
socially. Father has not shown the court had to make additional findings to recite
in further, granular detail each deponent’s positive comments about Saint
Augustine. A court is required to make essential findings necessary to support its
judgment; a court is not required to exhaustively recite each statement made by a
witness. The family court’s well-written decision is thorough. Father has not
shown that the family court failed to make findings essential to a proper decision
about which school Child would attend. See, e.g., Age v. Age, 340 S.W.3d 88, 98
(Ky. App. 2011) (noting that when a party files a motion for additional findings,
the trial court first determines whether its findings are sufficient and “the question
-6- on appeal is whether the omitted finding involves a matter that is essential to the
trial court’s judgment”).
B. No Presumption Favoring Public Schools
Next, Father argues the family court presumed public schools were
“inherently in a child’s best interest and that a deficiency in a public school is
necessary to determine that a private school serves the bests [sic] interest of a
child.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Specifically, Father takes issue with the following
portion of the family court’s order:
All other factors appearing to be equal between the two homes of the parents, the schools must be examined more closely. Here, the Spencer Public School system is shown to be superior in that the school achieved high test grades compared to other public schools in Kentucky and there was no such information provided for St. Augustine. If St. Augustine receives grades from testing, such evidence was not shown. Even though the Petitioner [Father] has offered to pay the full cost of tuition at Saint Augustine, making this case analogous to Young v. Holmes, supra., [sic] there is insufficient evidence to show that St. Augustine is superior, and it has not been shown that the child has extraordinary needs that cannot be met by the public schools. (Kentucky cases provide that a showing of inadequacy on the part of the public schools to provide for the special needs of a child may be grounds for sending the child to private school over public school.)
R. at 433-34 (citations omitted).
The family court appropriately concluded that the evidence showed
each parent provided a loving, appropriate home for Child. Thus, the school
-7- choice decision revolved around a comparison of the schools because each home
environment was appropriate. However, making such a comparison was difficult
because Saint Augustine, as a private school, did not participate in the standardized
statewide tests on which Spencer County performed well. Father has not shown
error in the trial court’s methodology or conclusions.
We do not perceive the family court as having imposed a presumption
in favor of public schools. Instead, the family court noted that there was evidence
that Saint Augustine’s academics were commendable but there were no objective
metrics to support that subjective viewpoint since there was no evidence of how
Saint Augustine had performed on statewide tests. On the other hand, there was
evidence that Spencer Elementary had performed well on those statewide tests.
Thus, the family court concluded Spencer Elementary was “shown to be superior”
and there was “insufficient evidence to show that St. Augustine is superior[.]” R.
at 433.
That discussion is an acknowledgement of the lack of objective
academic evidence about Saint Augustine and does not contain a patently
discriminatory animus. As the family court noted, there was evidence
commending the academic success of each school. However, there was objective
evidence of Spencer Elementary’s academic success in the form of standardized
test scores. Perhaps another court would have placed more emphasis on the
-8- testimony regarding the positive academic attributes of Saint Augustine instead of
the test scores of Spencer Elementary. However, we cannot re-evaluate the
evidence or conclude the family court erred by choosing to place more weight on
the test scores than the subjective evidence of Saint Augustine’s academic
prowess. See, e.g., Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
Moreover, the family court’s brief notation about Kentucky precedent
is accurate. See Ridgeway v. Warren, 605 S.W.3d 567, 572 (Ky. App. 2020)
(holding that “absent an agreement, a parent cannot be ordered to pay private
school tuition unless the trial court also finds that public schools have been shown
to be inadequate to meet the child’s needs . . .”). Thus, the family court did not err
by finding that there was no inherent need for Child to attend Saint Augustine
because it could meet a need of Child’s which Spencer Elementary could not.
C. No Misapplication of Best Interest Factors
Finally, we reject Father’s argument that the family court misapplied
the best interest factors in KRS 403.270. That statute is designed to guide a court
when making child custody decisions. However, consideration of the best interest
factors in KRS 403.270 was appropriate here because “[i]ssues concerning
educational decisions . . . are matters of custody.” Warawa, 587 S.W.3d at 636.
As it pertains here, KRS 403.270 provides:
(2) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child and equal consideration
-9- shall be given to each parent . . . . The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents . . . as to his or her custody;
...
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents, his or her siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests;
(d) The motivation of the adults participating in the custody proceeding;
(e) The child’s adjustment and continuing proximity to his or her home, school, and community;
(k) The likelihood a party will allow the child frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with the other parent . . . .
The family court more than adequately addressed those factors. As to
the wishes of the parents, the family court aptly noted that the parents disagreed
about which school Child should attend. Moreover, the court found that neither
parent had improper motivations. Those findings are supported by substantial
evidence and those factors are not directly at issue here.
Father asserts the family court did not appropriately assess KRS
403.270(2)(c), which requires a court to consider the interaction and relationship of
-10- Child with his parents, siblings, and others. Father emphasizes Child’s close
relationship with a cousin who attends Saint Augustine, and that roughly twenty
children from Father’s neighborhood attend Saint Augustine. Father also stresses
that Child’s paternal grandfather often picked child up from Saint Augustine’s
preschool, but could not do so if Child attended Spencer Elementary.
The court noted the close relationship between Child and his cousin,
but pointed out that Child also has a “step sibling” (more properly characterized as
a half-sibling) who would attend Spencer Elementary upon reaching school age.
Father asserts the relationship with the cousin should be given more priority
because the cousin and Child are closer in age, meaning they would attend
elementary school together for more years than would Child and the sibling. The
family court could have deemed more significant the closeness in age between
Child and his cousin compared to Child and his sibling. However, Father has not
shown the court was required to do so since the indisputable fact is that neither the
cousin nor the sibling will ever be in Child’s classroom because neither will be in
Child’s grade. The family court did not err by failing to favor Child’s relationship
with the cousin over the sibling. See Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354.
The family court noted that children from Father’s neighborhood
would attend Saint Augustine. But the court also noted that children from
Mother’s neighborhood would attend Spencer Elementary. The fact that Mother
-11- could only recall the name of one child from her neighborhood who would attend
Spencer Elementary is irrelevant, contrary to Father’s assertions. The fact that
there may have been more children from Father’s neighborhood who would attend
Saint Augustine than the number of children from Mother’s neighborhood who
would attend Spencer Elementary is, again, a factor the family court could have
weighed more heavily. However, Father fails to show the family court erred by
not finding those raw numbers dispositive. As the family court noted, there was
evidence that Child would likely see familiar faces at both schools, so neither
school had an inherent advantage on that front. See Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354.
The simple fact, as the family court recognized, was that during
school hours Child would not be able to socialize freely with any children—
neighbors or relatives alike—who were not in his class. Neither Father nor Mother
produced evidence that a specific student to whom Child was closely bonded
would be in Child’s classroom at either Saint Augustine or Spencer Elementary.
However, due to the equal timesharing arrangement, Child would still be able to
see children from both neighborhoods outside school hours.
The same basic level of equipoise is true of Child’s ability to spend
time with both Mother’s and Father’s families.1 Father stressed that Child would
1 The family court did not address KRS 403.270(2)(k), which focuses on whether a parent would be likely to allow a child to have meaningful contact with the other parent. Here, there is no evidence compelling a finding that Father or Mother would intentionally prevent Child from
-12- not be able to see his paternal grandfather as much if Child attended Spencer
Elementary. However, the family court accurately noted that Mother’s parents
lived nearby Mother’s home so Child would not be able to see those grandparents
as easily if Child attended Saint Augustine. In other words, Child has relatives
residing near both Mother’s and Father’s homes. Regardless of which school
Child attended, attending school in a different county would necessarily negatively
impact the ability Child has to spend time after school with extended family in
another county.
The family court then addressed KRS 403.270(2)(e), which focuses
on Child’s “adjustment and continuing proximity to his or her home, school, and
community[.]” The family court noted that Child had attended preschool in
Spencer County and that his friends from that preschool, as well as his favorite
teacher, would be at Spencer Elementary. The family court also noted that
children who live in Mother’s neighborhood would also be attending that school.
Father has not shown error in those findings, which are supported by substantial
evidence. Similarly, Child also attended preschool at Saint Augustine and many of
his classmates would be attending kindergarten at that school. Child would also
having contact with the other parent or the other parent’s family. Thus, any failure to consider KRS 403.270(2)(k) does not entitle Father to relief.
-13- have relatives from Father’s side of the family attending Saint Augustine. Again,
there was evidence regarding this statutory factor favoring each school.
The family court acknowledged as much by finding Child “is well
adjusted to both of his homes and the preschools he has attended. He is well
bonded to family and community members in both his parents’ homes, and this
should continue despite the fact that the child must attend one school or another.”
R. at 432. Father has shown no error in those findings or conclusions, which are
supported by substantial evidence.
Father stresses that Saint Augustine is smaller than Spencer
Elementary, however, the family court did not ignore that fact. The court noted
that Saint Augustine’s average class size was 15-23 students whereas the average
class size at Spencer Elementary was 22 students. Thus, as the family court found,
it was statistically possible that Child’s class at Saint Augustine would actually be
larger than at Spencer Elementary. The family court noted that Spencer
Elementary was a large school but also recounted testimony that Spencer
Elementary’s principal had taken steps to institute a “pod” educational system
whereby students at that school had some of the benefits of smaller schools, such
as consistent interaction with the same group of students. The family court alone
possessed the unique ability to evaluate the testimony and weigh the conflicting
evidence. See Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354. Father has not shown the family court’s
-14- factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence nor that the court abused
its discretion or misapplied binding authority in reaching its legal conclusions.
We are aware this decision is emotionally fraught for both Father and
Mother. Both parties presented evidence to support their respective school
preferences. The family court thoroughly analyzed the evidence, and its findings
of fact are supported by substantial evidence. The family court also made
conclusions of law which do not ignore or contravene established precedent.
Father is obviously dissatisfied with the result, but he has not shown the trial court
committed any reversible errors.
As the family court repeatedly stressed, Child has the extraordinary
benefit of being supported and loved by two parents, two extended families, and
two communities. However, Child can only attend one school, and there were
factors favoring each option. Faced with a difficult, binary choice, the family court
adequately assessed the evidence and relevant law before deciding that Spencer
Elementary was the best choice for Child.
Perhaps another court would have weighed the evidence differently
and reached a different conclusion. However, the family court here appropriately
recognized the applicable law, sufficiently analyzed the evidence, and adequately
explained the rationale for its ultimate conclusion. Father has not shown the
court’s well-written decision contains crucial omissions, unsupported or extraneous
-15- findings of fact, or erroneous legal conclusions. See Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354.
We affirm the family court’s diligent, thoughtful order.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Spencer Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ephriam W. Helton Allison S. Russell Ramona C. Little Louisville, Kentucky Danville, Kentucky
-16-