Ellis v. United States

780 F. Supp. 783, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18823, 1991 WL 274850
CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedSeptember 11, 1991
Docket89-C-0045-S
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 780 F. Supp. 783 (Ellis v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ellis v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 783, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18823, 1991 WL 274850 (D. Utah 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

SAM, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on the motion of the defendant United States of America to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. 1

The United States urges that plaintiffs’ claims are jurisdictionally barred because they arise from the alleged negligence of a contractor with the United States, the United States owed plaintiffs’ decedents no actionable duty, and that this court is without subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).

FACTS

Plaintiffs are the survivors of three Morton Thiokol, Inc. (“Thiokol") employees who were killed when the rocket motor they were working on caught fire.

In order to deploy the Peacekeeper missile, the United States Air Force entered into a facilities and production contract with Thiokol for the design and manufacture of stage one motors for the Peacekeeper missile. The contract was to be performed at Air Force Plant 78 (“Plant 78”), a government-owned contractor-operated facility located within Thiokol’s Box Elder County, Utah operation site.

On December 29, 1987, during the core removal operations of the manufacture of a Peacekeeper stage one motor, a fire erupt ed in Building M592 at Plant 78 which killed five persons, including plaintiffs’ decedents.

Pursuant to its contract with the Air Force, Thiokol was responsible for designing and manufacturing the Peacekeeper rocket motor. The United States did not supervise or control the day to day operations of Thiokol employees at Plant 78, and by contract, Thiokol was responsible for safety at Plant 78.

As of December 29, 1987, the Air Force Plant Representative Office (“AFPRO”) located at Thiokol’s Wasatch facility had a safety office consisting of two persons, and a manager who came on site in November 1987. The AFPRO safety personnel conducted random safety inspections of Thiok-ol’s operations. In addition, the Ballistic Missile Office (“BMO”) located at Norton Air Force Base in San Bernardino, California, also had a systems safety office monitoring sixty to eighty contracts. BMO personnel would periodically make visits to contractor facilities. BMO had the authority to order work stoppages if it was deter *785 mined that Thiokol failed to comply with proper safety measures.

Although the government reserved the right to monitor Thiokol’s performance, pursuant to its contract with the government, Thiokol remained responsible for safety at Plant 78 regardless of any act or failure to act by the government in the surveillance or enforcement of Thiokol’s compliance with the contract safety requirements.

In May of 1987, approximately seven months prior to the fatal accident, Thiokol employees had a near-miss incident when there was a loud popping noise accompanied by a flash, smoke and fumes while they were extracting the core from Peacekeeper motor PK-303. The motor did not ignite and a safety team assembled by Thiokol concluded that the probable cause of the near-miss incident was electrostatic discharge of friction, initiated by the core being removed from the motor.

Prior to the near-miss incident, core removal procedures were performed by Thiokol employees inside the same building. A joint Thiokol-Air Force review of the near-miss incident resulted in corrective safety actions, the primary one being that core extractions were thereafter to be done by remote control from a bunker located some distance away.

Thiokol safety procedures, in place at the time of the accident, provided that no one should have been in the building during core removal operations.

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for summary judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant urges that three independent grounds exist for dismissing plaintiffs’ action: (1) plaintiffs improperly seek to hold the government liable for Thiokol’s negligence; (2) the government did not owe plaintiffs’ decedents any actionable duty; and, (3) the FTCA discretionary function exception pre-eludes recovery. The court addresses only the discretionary function exception.

The waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by what is referred to as the discretionary function exception. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) provides:

Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of the statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

Plaintiffs must overcome the discretionary function exception as part of their burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Miller v. United States, 710 F.2d 656, 662 (10th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939, 104 S.Ct. 352, 78 L.Ed.2d 316 (1983); Baird v. United States, 653 F.2d 437, 440 (10th Cir.1981).

In their complaint, plaintiffs generally allege that the government was negligent in fulfilling its role in the design and manufacture of the Peacekeeper missile, including the design and maintenance of the equipment, tooling, procedures and facilities used in its manufacture, as well as its review of Thiokol’s activities in this regard. Plaintiffs also assert that the government was negligent in fulfilling its safety responsibility including the manner and details of the Air Force’s inspection and monitoring of Thiokol’s safety program and procedures.

The United States contends that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the discretionary function exception because the Air Force’s conduct at issue in this case involved the permissible exercise of policy based judgment. The government’s position is that as part of its policy that military supplies be procured by contract from private industry the government delegated to Thiokol the responsibility to design and manufacture the Peacekeeper missile including the delegation of full and primary responsibility for worker safety.

*786 In response, plaintiffs first urge that the government employees had no discretion but were required to review the corrective actions resulting from the near-miss incident and to insure that they were implemented and effective. They point to an internal written policy which they allege required AFPRO to ensure Thiokol’s compliance with corrective measures taken after the near-miss incident. They also point to a memorandum by AFPRO’s program manager to his superiors to the effect that his office would ensure the effectiveness of the corrective actions.

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Bluebook (online)
780 F. Supp. 783, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18823, 1991 WL 274850, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ellis-v-united-states-utd-1991.