Ellis v. Harder Mechanical Contractors, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedAugust 23, 2022
Docket4:21-cv-00844
StatusUnknown

This text of Ellis v. Harder Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (Ellis v. Harder Mechanical Contractors, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ellis v. Harder Mechanical Contractors, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GARY ELLIS, et al., Case No. 21-cv-00844-JSW

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

10 HARDER MECHANICAL Re: Dkt. No. 20 CONTRACTORS, INC., 11 Defendant.

12 13 Now before the Court for consideration is the unopposed motion for preliminary approval 14 of class action settlement filed by Plaintiffs Gary Ellis and Jeff Shipe (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). 15 The Court has considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in the case, 16 and it finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 17 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval. 18 BACKGROUND 19 A. Factual Background. 20 Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of current and former hourly-paid California 21 employees of Harder Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (“Defendant”). The first amended complaint 22 (“FAC”) alleges class claims based on allegations that Defendant’s wage policies and practices 23 violated California Labor Code sections 201-203 and 1194. At mediation, the parties reached an 24 agreement to resolve this action, and now Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of a proposed class 25 action settlement (“Settlement”). 26 B. The Settlement Agreement. 27 1. The class definition. 1 employees who worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period.” (Declaration of Eric 2 Grover in support of Preliminary Approval (“Grover Decl.”), Ex. A at §§ I.F and I.FF.) The Class 3 Period is May 1, 2016 through June 2, 2022. (Id. at § I.G.) “Settlement Class Members” 4 (“SCMs”) are defined as “all Class Members who do not submit a valid Request for Exclusion.” 5 (Id. at §§ I.F and I.FF.) There are an estimated 2,200 Class Members. (Grover Decl. ¶ 38.) 6 2. Payments to settlement class members. 7 The Maximum Settlement Amount (“MSA”) is $1,500,000 plus Defendant’s share of 8 payroll taxes. (Id. at § I.G.) After subtracting fees and costs, the Net Settlement Amount is 9 estimated to be $1,079,000.00. (Id. at § I.R.) SCMs will receive individual settlement payments 10 in an amount to be calculated by dividing the number of Qualified Shifts for each individual SCM 11 by the total number of Qualified Shifts for all SCMs. (Id. at § III.K(2)(a)(1)). The payment ratio 12 for each SCM will then be multiplied by the Net Settlement Amount to calculate the SCM’s share 13 of the Net Settlement Amount. (Id.) No gross individual settlement payment will be less than 14 $25, and each SCM is expected to receive an average individual payment of $490.45. (Grover 15 Decl. ¶ 25.) Defendant has no reversionary interest in the MSA. Unclaimed funds will be sent to 16 the State Controller’s Office, Unclaimed Property Division. (Id., Ex. A at § III.K(2)(d)). 17 3. Proposed class notice. 18 The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Notice”) explains the terms of the 19 Settlement, describes how Class Members can opt out or object, and gives the deadlines to do so. 20 (Grover Decl. ¶ 26; Settlement Agreement, Exs. 1-2.) The Notice will be individualized to 21 provide each Class Member’s number of Qualified Shifts and calculation of their estimated 22 Individual Settlement Payment. (Settlement Agreement, Ex. 1.) The Notice informs Class 23 Members that they have 45 calendar days from the date the Notices are mailed to request 24 exclusion from or object to the Settlement. (Id.) The Notice explains the process to dispute the 25 number of Qualified Shifts stated on their individualized Notice. (Id.) 26 The Court will address additional facts as necessary in the analysis. 27 ANALYSIS 1 court should grant such approval only if it is justified by the parties’ showing that the court will 2 likely be able to (1) “certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal” and (2) “approve 3 the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2).” Fed. R. Civ P. 23(e)(B). If the court preliminarily certifies the 4 class and finds the settlement appropriate after “a preliminary fairness evaluation,” then the class 5 will be notified, and a final fairness hearing scheduled to determine if the settlement is fair, 6 adequate, and reasonable pursuant to Rule 23. Villegas v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. CV 09- 7 00261 SBA (EMC), 2012 WL 5878390, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012). 8 A. Class Certification. 9 Class actions must meet the following requirements for certification: (1) the class is so 10 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact 11 common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 12 claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 13 the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 14 23(a), a putative class action must also meet one of the conditions outlined in Rule 23(b)—as 15 relevant here, the condition that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 16 over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 17 available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 23(b)(3). Prior to certifying the class, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs satisfied their 19 burden of demonstrating that the proposed class satisfies each element of Rule 23. 20 1. Rule 23(a). 21 The Court preliminarily finds, for purposes of this settlement, that the Rule 23(a) factors 22 are satisfied. First, the total number of Class Members is 2,200. The putative class thus satisfies 23 the numerosity requirement. See Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 536 (N.D. 24 Cal. 2012) (“While there is no fixed number that satisfies the numerosity requirement, as a general 25 matter, a class greater than forty often satisfies the requirement, while one less than twenty-one 26 does not.”). 27 Second, the commonality requirement is satisfied because there are common questions of 1 putative class members who worked for Defendant during the same time period. See 2 Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co., 303 F.R.D. 611, 617 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding commonality 3 requirement satisfied where class members were subject to the same challenged policies and 4 procedures). 5 Third, the typicality requirement is satisfied. Plaintiff Shipe worked on-site for Defendant 6 in California, was paid hourly, and was subject to Defendant’s alleged uniform wage policies and 7 practices. Shipe’s claims challenge a course of conduct that applied to all putative class members, 8 and thus, all members suffered the same or similar injury. 9 Finally, the proposed class representative and class counsel appear to be adequate 10 representatives of the class. Shipe was allegedly injured by the same course of conduct shared by 11 the class members. Plaintiff’s counsel has experience litigating employment-based class action 12 claims under California law. 13 2. Rule 23(b). 14 Rule 23(b)(3) requires establishing the predominance of common questions of law or fact 15 and the superiority of a class action relative to other available methods for the fair and efficient 16 adjudication of the controversy. 17 Rule 23(b)(3) first requires “predominance of common questions over individual ones” 18 such that “the adjudication of common issues will help achieve judicial economy.” Valentino v. 19 Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996). This “inquiry focuses on the 20 relationship between the common and individual issues.” Vinole v.

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Bluebook (online)
Ellis v. Harder Mechanical Contractors, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ellis-v-harder-mechanical-contractors-inc-cand-2022.