Elliott v. Henry County, TN CV-98-637-JD 08/27/99 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Sheila Elliott
v. Civ. No. 98-637-JD
Henry County, Tennessee, et al.
O R D E R
The plaintiff, Sheila Elliott, brought this action against
the defendants, Henry County, Tennessee; Leon Williams; Strafford
County, New Hampshire; Richard Cavanaugh; Robert Sinclair;
Transcor America, Inc.; Marlene Vogel; Sylvester Rush;1 Junious
Hamm, Jr.; and unidentified agents, asserting claims under 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1988, and New Hampshire state law. Before
the court is the motion to dismiss of defendants Henry County,
Tennessee, and Leon Williams for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) (document
30) .2
1Sylvester Rush has been voluntarily dismissed from this case.
2In the present motion to dismiss (document no. 30), Henry County, Tennessee, and Williams (the "defendants") renew their earlier motion to dismiss (document no. 14) filed before the plaintiff amended her complaint. This order therefore resolves both of the defendants' pending motions. Background3
On November 22, 1995, the State of New Hampshire issued an
arrest warrant for the plaintiff, Sheila Elliott.4 On December
22, 1995, Elliott was arrest by Paris, Tennessee, police pursuant
to the arrest warrant. She was held in custody from December 22,
1995, until December 31, 1995, in the Henry County, Tennessee,
jail, under the supervision Leon Williams, the Sheriff of Henry
County. During her incarceration and her subsequent
transportation Elliott was deprived of necessary medical
3The following does not constitute findings of fact of the court and is provided for context purposes only. The events described are derived from the allegations of the amended complaint and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. See Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar A s s 'n , 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) .
4The warrant, as relevant, read:
To the sheriff of any county in this state, or his deputies or any police officer of any city or town within the state:
We command you to take the defendant, if found to be within your precinct, and bring him [sic] before the Rochester District Court.
Pl.'s O b j . to Defs.' Henry County and Leon Williams Mot. to Dismiss, E x . A l .
The court also notes the inconsistent spelling of the plaintiff's name in this record.
2 treatments.
On December 28, 1995, a hearing was held at the General
Sessions Court House, Henry County, Tennessee, concerning
Elliott's extradition to New Hampshire. At the hearing Elliott
signed a document governing the terms of her extradition to New
Hampshire, which the court accepted and entered as an order. The
document stated:
Sheriff's Office Henry County, Tennessee
I, Sheila E. Elliot, hereby certify that I freely and voluntarily agree to accompany New Durham New Hamphire [sic] P.D. as a prisoner of Strafford County, State of New Hampshire for the purposes of answering the charge of Interference of Custody there pending against me.
Furthermore, I hereby waive all formality and am willing to return to Strafford Co. with the said officers without the Governor's reguisition or other paper legally necessary to such cases and I Exonerate Henry County Sheriff's Dept, and all other officers of the said department, from any blame, compulsion, or interference in this connection.
12/28/95 Def w/ advice of counsel states in open Court she desires to waive extradition & proceed to New Hampshire - Waiver accepted
Pl.'s Obj. to Defs.' Henry County and Leon Williams Mot. to
Dismiss, E x . A 2 .
On December 31, 1995, Henry County and Leon Williams, acting
through deputies and jailers under their control and supervision.
3 delivered the plaintiff to Marlene Vogel, an employee of Transcor
America, Inc., and an unidentified male employee of Transcor.
Transcor America is a for profit business engaged in the business
of transporting prisoners under contract with various
governmental agencies.5
On December 31, 1995, Transcor's employee Vogel stripped
Elliott of her clothes and had her stand naked, move her body
parts, and exhibit herself. She was thereafter put into leg
irons, handcuffs, and placed in a van in a small metal cage. The
van seat did not have a seat belt or harness restraint. The
plaintiff was unable to move her hands and feet, and was tossed
about in the cage throughout the journey. Transcor agents
refused to inform Elliott where she was, where she was going,
what the date was, or when she might arrive in New Hampshire.
Elliott was placed in a number of jails and holding cells in
substandard conditions, and was reguired to sleep on floors of
jails without proper bedding. Despite cold weather, the
plaintiff was not allowed any additional clothing beyond the
lightweight clothing she wore at the time of her arrest. During
her transportation, the plaintiff's medical needs, including
treatment for asthma, were unattended.
51he delivery apparently occurred in Henry County, Tennessee.
4 Transcor refused to allow the plaintiff to contact her
family or an attorney and deprived her of her opportunity to be
released upon bail. On January 1 , 1996, Elliott arrived at and
was released to the Strafford County House of Corrections.
Again, she was stripped of her clothes, required to stand naked,
move her body parts, and exhibit herself. Thereafter, each time
the plaintiff was visited by an attorney, priest, health care
provider, or family, or each time she attended court, the
plaintiff was strip searched.
The charge upon which the plaintiff was arrested was
eventually dismissed on the basis that the plaintiff did, in
fact, have joint custody of her son.
In her amended complaint the plaintiff asserts violations of
federal and state laws against all defendants in Count I
(unreasonable search), Count II (unreasonable arrest); Count III
(unlawful transportation); Count IV (violation of right to speedy
trial, assistance of counsel, and bail); and Count V (violation
of right to privacy). The plaintiff asserts further claims under
state law against all defendants in Count VI (assault and
battery); Count VII (negligence); Count VIII (negligent
infliction of emotional distress); Count IX (intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Count X (respondeat superior);
and Count XI (negligent hiring, training, and supervision).
5 Discussion
The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating facts
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the
defendants. See United Elec., Radio and Machine Workers v. 163
Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1090 (1st Cir. 1992) ("United
El e c . I"), rev'd on other grounds, 987 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1993);
Concord Labs., Inc. v. Ballard Medical Prods., 701 F. Supp. 2 72,
274 (D.N.H. 1988); Velcro Group Corp. v. Billarant, 692 F. Supp.
1443, 1446 (D.N.H. 1988) . Employing the prima facie analysis for
determining personal jurisdiction, the court takes "specific
facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or
not disputed) and contrue[s] them in the light most congenial to
the plaintiff's jurisdictional claim."6 Massachusetts School of
Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n., 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 1998). The court then adds "to the mix facts put forward by
the defendants, to the extent that they are uncontradicted." Id.
In addition, the court construes all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. See Velcro Group, 692 F. Supp. at 1446.
In this case the court's subject matter jurisdiction is
6The parties do not reguest a hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction, nor is the record "rife with contradictions." Bolt v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 676 (1st C i r . 1992).
6 predicated upon both the diversity of citizenship of the parties
and the federal law under which various claims of the plaintiff
arise.7 "When the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction
rests wholly or in part on the existence of a federal question,
the constitutional limits of the court's personal jurisdiction
are drawn in the first instance with reference to the due process
clause of the fifth amendment." Lorelei Corp. v. Guadalupe, 940
F.2d 717, 719 (1st Cir. 1991). The Fifth Amendment permits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a federal
question case "'if that defendant has sufficient contacts with
the United States as a whole.'" I d . (quotinq Whistler Corp. v.
Solar Electronics, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (D. Mass.
1988)). Furthermore, "sufficient contacts exist whenever the
defendant is served within the sovereiqn territory of the United
States." Id.
A statutory limitation to a federal court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction exists under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 4 (f) and (e). Rule 4 (f) confines the service of
process issued by federal courts to the "territorial limits of
the state in which the district court is held." Fed. R. Civ. P.
7The court notes the lack of complete diversity between the parties which, althouqh not relevant to the present motion, potentially implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
7 4(f) (West 1999). Rule 4(e), however, authorizes extra
territorial service in instances where "a United States statute
provides for such service," and, "[i]f no federal statute
exists," in accordance with "the law of the state in which the
district court sits." Lorelei, 940 F.2d at 720.
In this case, as in Lorelei, no federal statute exists and
the court defers to the state long-arm statute as authorized
under Rule 4 (e). To exert jurisdiction over a defendant under a
state's long-arm statute, the exercise of jurisdiction must
comport with both the strictures of the state statute and with
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See i d .
_____ The defendants moving for dismissal are Henry County,
Tennessee, and Williams ("defendants"). The New Hampshire
long-arm statute governing individuals is New Hampshire Revised
Statutes Annotated ("RSA") § 510:4(1) (Supp. 1994). In Phelps v.
Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171 (1987), the New Hampshire Supreme
Court interpreted RSA § 510:4 to afford jurisdiction over foreign
defendants "to the full extent that the statutory language and
due process will allow." See also, Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129
N.H. 520, 523 (1987) ("This court has consistently interpreted
this statute to grant jurisdiction whenever the due process
clause of the United States Constitution permits it.") .
Under Tennessee law, Henry County is a corporation. See Tennessee Code Annotated ("TCA") § 5-1-103 (West 1999) ("Every
county is a corporation and the members of the legislative body
of each county assembled are the representatives of the county
and authorized to act for it."). Furthermore, TCA § 5-1-105
(West 1999) provides that "[s]uits may be maintained against a
county for any just claim, as against other corporations." RSA
§ 293-A:15.10 (1998) is the New Hampshire long arm statute
governing service on foreign corporations, and it "includes no
restriction upon the scope of jurisdiction available under state
law and thus authorizes jurisdiction over such entities to the
full extent permitted by the federal Constitution." Sawtelle v.
Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1388 (1st Cir. 1995).
Although the defendants assert that the reguirements of New
Hampshire's long arm statutes are not met, the court assumes for
the purposes of this order that New Hampshire statutory
reguirements are satisfied. See Massachusetts School of Law at
Andover, 142 F.2d at 35 (addressing lack of jurisdiction under
Due Process Clause rather than state long arm statute).
Therefore, the court's personal jurisdiction analysis of the
claims asserted against Henry County and Williams proceeds to a
Due Process Clause analysis.
9 I. General Jurisdiction
The plaintiff asserts that both general jurisdiction and
specific jurisdiction exist over the defendants. The exercise of
general personal jurisdiction over a party is appropriate "when
the litigation is not directly founded on the defendant's
forum-based contacts, but the defendant has nevertheless engaged
in continuous and systematic activity, unrelated to the suit, in
the forum state." United Elec. I , 960 F.2d at 1088. Again, it
is the plaintiff's burden to affirmatively allege facts in
support of personal jurisdiction. See, Massachusetts School of
Law, 142 F.3d at 34.
The plaintiff does not affirmatively allege that the
defendants have engaged in any conduct, whether within New
Hampshire or not, beyond those allegations immediately related to
the claims in this case. The plaintiff simply asserts that she
may, with further discovery, be able to demonstrate that the
defendants engage in systematic and substantial activity in New
Hampshire when they enforce New Hampshire warrants and violate
extradition waivers, but that it is unknown how often they engage
in such activity.8 The record compels a conclusion that the
plaintiff has not affirmatively alleged facts to support a
8The plaintiff does not reguest that the court continue ruling on the motion pending further discovery.
10 finding that the defendants have engaged in continuous and
systematic activity in New Hampshire. The exercise of general
jurisdiction over the defendants is therefore unwarranted.
II. Specific Jurisdiction
The First Circuit uses a tripartite analysis to determine
whether exercising specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant comports with the Due Process Clause. See
Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 206-12; United Elec. I , 960 F.2d at
1089. The court first inguires whether the plaintiff's claims
underlying the litigation directly arise out of, or relate to,
the defendants' forum-state activity. See Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d
at 206. Such activity must be an important or material element
of proof of the plaintiff's case. See United Elec. I , 960 F.2d
at 1089. The inguiry reguires a showing of both cause in fact
and legal cause, i.e., but-for causation and proximate causation.
See Massachusetts School of La w , 142 F.3d at 35. The court next
inguires whether "the defendant's in-state contacts . . .
represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of that state's laws and making the defendant's
involuntary presence before the state's courts foreseeable."
United Elec. I, 960 F.2d at 1089. Finally, the court inguires
11 whether exercising jurisdiction would comport with fair play and
substantial justice, which entails analysis of the "gestault"
factors discussed more fully below. See Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at
209-12. As a preliminary issue, the court must identify the
conduct properly attributable and/or imputed to defendants Henry
County and Williams. The plaintiff's claims arise from a
continuum of events beginning with her allegedly unlawful arrest,
search, and detention in Tennessee, her subseguent placement with
and transport by defendant Transcor to Strafford County, New
Hampshire, and conduct which occurred upon her arrival at and
during her confinement in the Strafford County House of
Corrections.
Although the plaintiff alleges in her complaint that
Transcor was at all times an agent of Henry County and Williams,
she does not appear to argue in her revised memorandum of law
that personal jurisdiction over Williams and Henry County is
warranted on the basis of such an agency relationship. In any
event the court concludes that the actions of Transcor cannot be
imputed to Henry County or Williams on an agency theory in this
case.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) § 1 states that
Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
12 control, and consent by the other so to act.
It is a "legal concept which depends upon the existence of
required factual elements" including manifestation by the
principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent's
acceptance, and their agreement that "the principal is to be in
control of the undertaking." I d . c m t . b. Both Tennessee and New
Hampshire follow the Restatement in this regard. See Singh v.
Therrien Management Corp., 140 N.H. 355, 358 (1995); Investors
Syndicate v. Allen, 198 Tenn. 288, 296 (1955); see also, Haskins
v. Yates, Civ. No. ------ , 1998 WL 80967 at *4 (Tenn. C t . A p p .
A u g . 5, 1988).
The record does not indicate that Williams or Henry County
agreed to have Transcor act as it agent. Nor does the record
indicate that Transcor was subject to the control of Henry County
or Williams after it had acquired custody of the plaintiff.
Indeed, the documents filed by the plaintiff indicate that if
Transcor was acting as an agency of any party, it would be
Strafford County. Transcor's contract, titled "Prisoner's
Receipt," states that Marlene Vogel, an employee of Transcor, is
"the duly appointed agent for . . . Strafford County . . ." and
the assignor is identified as Richard Cavanaugh. Pl.'s Obj. to
Defs'. Henry County and Leon Williams Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A3.
Transcor's apparent agency relationship with Strafford
13 County is consistent with the provisions of the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Law, which both Tennessee and New Hampshire have
enacted. See RSA ch. 612; TCA tit. 40 ch. 9 (1998). These
statutes provide for the arrest and delivery of a person to the
duly authorized agent of the demanding state. See, e.g., RSA
§ 612:8 (1998) (officers authorized "to deliver the accused,
subject to the provisions hereof, to the duly authorized agent of
the demanding state."); TCA § 40-9-118 (1998) (same). RSA
§ 612:10 and TCA § 40-9-119 provide terms controlling the
delivery of the person to the agent "appointed" to receive the
person. Transcor's contract specifically provides that it is the
"duly appointed states agent for" Strafford County.
The court therefore concludes that the conduct properly
attributable to Henry County and Williams in considering the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over them is limited solely to
the conduct of Henry County, Williams, and their deputies or
employees. Indeed, despite her allegations of an agency
relationship, in her arguments in support of personal
jurisdiction the plaintiff relies on conduct that occurred in
Tennessee prior to the transfer of custody of the plaintiff to
Transcor.9
91he plaintiff asserts in the alternative that Transcor was the agent of Cavanaugh and Strafford County.
14 A. Relatedness
"In order for the extension of personal jurisdiction to
survive constitutional scrutiny, a claim must 'arise out of, or
be related to, the defendant's in-forum activities.'"
Massachusetts School of Law, 142 F.2d at 35 (quoting
Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 206). In cases where tort claims are
asserted. First Circuit jurisprudence "customarily look[s] to
whether the plaintiff has established 'cause in fact (i.e., the
injury would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's
forum-state activity) and legal cause (i.e., the defendant's
in-state conduct gave birth to the cause of action).'" Id.
(quoting United Elec. I , 960 F.2d at 1089) .
The plaintiff argues that her initial arrest and detention
in Tennessee pursuant to a New Hampshire warrant and the
defendants' alleged subsequent arrangement in Tennessee for her
transport back to New Hampshire is sufficient to meet the
requirements of the "relatedness" prong of the First Circuit's
Due Process analysis. Yet none of this conduct occurred in New
Hampshire. Moreover, the locus of her injuries or harm, inter
alia, her alleged unlawful arrest, detention, and search, her
assault and battery, and the invasion of her privacy, occurred in
Tennessee where she was subjected to the acts attributable to
Williams and Henry County. See Ziegler v. Indian River County,
15 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995) (harm is felt where arrest
occurred). The mere fact that the defendants acted pursuant to a
New Hampshire warrant or that they detained a New Hampshire
resident does not suffice to subject them to the personal
jurisdiction of this court. See Williams v. Cook County
Sheriff's Dept., No. 93 C 212, 1995 WL 75386, at *2 (N.D. 111.
Feb. 22, 1995); Cook v. Holzberqer, 788 F. Supp. 347 (S.D. Ohio
1992). Nor is the act of placing a phone call to New Hampshire
to notify authorities of the apprehension of the plaintiff,
assuming this occurred, an adeguate basis for asserting
jurisdiction. See Williams, 1995 WL 75386 at *2 (and cases
cited) ("a phone call by a law enforcement official from one
state notifying a law enforcement agency in another state of the
apprehension of a wanted person does not give rise to minimum
contacts sufficient to subject the law enforcement officer to
personal jurisdiction") .
The court concludes, therefore, that the plaintiff's claims
and the underlying conduct of the defendants is not sufficiently
related to the State of New Hampshire to support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over them. See, e.g., Massachusetts School
of Law, 142 F.3d at 35, 36. Similarly, the plaintiff has failed
to meet her burden of demonstrating purposeful availment or that
jurisdiction is warranted given consideration of the "gestault
16 factors."
B. Personal Availment
The "[fJunction of the purposeful availment requirement is
to assure that personal jurisdiction is not premised solely upon
a defendant's random, isolated, or fortuitous contacts with the
forum state." Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1391 (quotations and
citations omitted). The First Circuit's analysis of purposeful
availment considers the voluntariness of the defendant's relevant
actions, and whether the court's exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant would be foreseeable. See id., 70 F.3d at 1391-94.
The plaintiff arques that the defendants purposefully
directed their activities at a New Hampshire resident, were
contacted by a New Hampshire County Sheriff's Department with
which they made transportation arranqements, and then contacted
the New Durham Police Department to obtain a copy of the warrant.
The plaintiff has cited no precedent to support her arqument that
such conduct constitutes purposeful availment sufficient to
support personal jurisdiction. Indeed, other courts that have
addressed similar factual scenarios have concluded just the
opposite. See Williams v. Garcia, 569 F. Supp. 1452, 1456-57
(E.D. Mich. 1983); see also, Williams v. Cook County Sheriff
Dept., 1995 WL 75386 at *2.
17 Although the plaintiff alleges that the defendants
purposefully directed their actions at a New Hampshire resident
and subseguently facilitated her transfer to the agent of
Strafford County, all of this conduct occurred in Tennessee and
had its injurious effect in Tennessee. The only possible conduct
through which the defendants purposefully and affirmatively
availed themselves of New Hampshire could be telephone calls made
by the defendants to New Hampshire authorities. The plaintiff's
allegations in this regard are vague. Assuming, however, that
the defendants phoned New Durham and Strafford County authorities
to inform them that the plaintiff was in their custody and to
facilitate the delivery of the plaintiff to Strafford County's
agent in Tennessee, such conduct is not an adeguate basis for
jurisdiction. See Williams v. Garcia, 569 F. Supp. at 1457; see
also, Williams v. Cook County, 1995 WL 75386 at *2.
The court cannot conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction
in this state would be foreseeable. There is no indication that
the defendants have entered this state, have engaged agents in
this state, or have engaged in conduct out of this state which
caused injury within the state.
C. Gestault Factors
Finally, the court considers whether exercising jurisdiction
18 would comport with fair play and substantial justice. See
Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 209-10. In this inquiry the court
considers five "gestalt" factors:
(1) the defendant's burden of appearing, (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies.
I d . at 2 0 9.
The First Circuit has noted that "the concept of burden is
inherently relative, and, insofar as staging a defense in a
foreign jurisdiction is almost always inconvenient and/or costly,
[] this factor is only meaningful where a party can demonstrate
some kind of special or unusual burden." Pritzker v. Yari, 42
F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 1994). In this case there is no special or
significant burden.
Although New Hampshire has an interest in redressing harm
done to its residents, all of the acts properly attributed to
Williams and Henry County, and the injuries flowing therefrom,
occurred outside the state of New Hampshire. In such
circumstances. New Hampshire's interest in adjudicating the
claims asserted against Williams and Henry County is greatly
diminished. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395 (this factor cuts
against jurisdiction when "the acts comprising the defendants'
19 alleged negligence occurred almost entirely outside of New
Hampshire."). The plaintiff's choice of forum is presumably the
most convenient and "must be accorded a degree of deference."
Id. However, it also appears that many witnesses may reside in
Tennessee and other states between Tennessee and New Hampshire.
See Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 211 (considering location of
witnesses) .
Finally, although the court does not find that the
administration of the judicial system significantly affects the
analysis in this case, public policy weighs heavily in favor of
not exercising jurisdiction. Should the court exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendants in this case, there would be
few, if any, instances where law enforcement officers and police
departments would not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of
out of state courts simply because they assisted in extradition
proceedings involving that state's residents or extradition
reguests. See Cook, 788 F. Supp. at 351.
Conclusion
In light of the above discussion, the court concludes that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants would
violate the defendants' due process rights. The court therefore
grants the renewed motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction of Henry County, Tennessee, and Williams (document
20 no. 30), as well as the initial motion to dismiss (document no.
14) .
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A. Diclerico, Jr. District Judge
August 26, 1999
cc: James W. Craig, Esguire Peter G. Beeson, Esguire James H. Drescher, Esguire Michael D. Ramsdell, Esguire Brian T. Tucker, Esguire