Elliott v. Cruz

137 A.3d 646, 2016 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 204
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 10, 2016
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 137 A.3d 646 (Elliott v. Cruz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Elliott v. Cruz, 137 A.3d 646, 2016 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 204 (Pa. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Senior Judge DAN PELLEGRINI. ■

Before this Court is' a petition to set aside the nomination petition of Ted Cruz (Candidate), pursuant to which he seeks to appear on the April 26, 2016 primary election ballot for the Office of the President of the United States of America, filed by Carmon Elliott (Objector), a registered Republican who resides and votes in Penn: sylvania, asserting that the Candidate is ineligible to hold that office under the United States Constitution.

The parties have stipulated that the Candidate' was born on December 22,1970, in Calgary, Alberta, Canada; that his mother, Eleanor Darragh, was born on November 23, 1934, in the State of Delaware; that his mother is and. has always has been a United States citizen, since the moment of her birth; that at the time of the Candidate’s birth, his mother had been physically present in the United States for more than ten years of her life, including at least five years after she reached the age of fourteen; and.that the Candidate was a citizen from the moment of his birth.

Because the Candidate was born in Canada, Petitioner contends that Candidate’s name should be stricken from the Pennsylvania 2016 primary ballot because he is not a “natural born citizen” within the meaning of Article II, Section l,1 clause 5 of the United States Constitution.

[649]*649I.

A.

Initially, the Candidate contends that we should not. address the question of whether he is a “natural born .citizen” because it presents a non-justiciable political question. He contends that this doctrine applies because the question of whether a candidate is eligible to take office as President of the United States is within the purview of the Electoral College or the United States Congress.

The' political question doctrine is invoked only when the framers of the Constitution made clear their intention that the judiciary abstain from resolving a particular question of constitutional interpretation. In Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the United States Supreme Court addressed this doctrine, stating that:

In general, the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it “would gladly avoid.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). Our precedents have identified a narrow exception [650]*650to that rule, known as the “political question” doctrine. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L,Ed.2d 166 (1986). We have explained that a controversy “involves a political question ... where there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’ ” Nixon v. United States, 606 U.S. 224, 228, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). In such a case, we have held that a court lacks the authority to decide the dispute before it.

— U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 1427, 182 L.Ed.2d 423 (2012); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977).

The political question doctrine should not be invoked then unless it is clear that a court is incapable of rendering a decision because it would otherwise be plainly inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison’s basic assumption that the Constitution is judicially declarable law. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

B.

The touchstone in determining whether the political question doctrine applies is whether the resolution of the question has been textually committed to one or the other political branches of the federal government. To glean whether the Framers textually committed to Congress the issue of a person’s eligibility to serve as President, the Court turns to Article II, Section 1, clauses 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution as originally adopted, as well as the Twelfth Amendment,2 which set forth the procedure by which a person was elected to the office of President of the United States. These provisions:

1. vested in the legislatures of the several states, not Congress, the power to “appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled.”3
2. commanded the electors, once selected, to meet in them respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, and then to transmit them votes to the nation’s seat of government.
3. commanded, upon receipt, the President of the Senate to open the ballots and count the votes in the presence of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
4. provide that only in the case of a tie, or the absence of a majority, does the Constitution allow Congress to choose the President and Vice President.

As can be seen, the Constitution does not vest the Electoral College with [651]*651power to determine the eligibility of a Presidential candidate since it only charges the embers of the Electoral College to select a candidate for President and then transmit their votes to the nation’s “seat of government.” U.S. CONST. amend. XII. ■

Likewise, Congress has no control over the process by which the President and Vice President are normally chosen, other than the very limited one of determining the day on which the electors were to “give their votes.” U.S. CONST, amend. XII. Moreover, this Constitutional design clearly served to insulate the Presidential election process from — not to" commit it to— Congress and potential interference. This is evident because the Constitution also decreed that members of Congress may not serve as presidential electors.

Comparison of the provisions regarding Presidential eligibility with those regarding the eligibility of members of Congress further supports this conclusion. With respect to the latter, the Constitution provides that “[e]ach house [of Congress] shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members,” including whether they have the requisite U.S. citizenship required for service in-the house to which the. person-has been elected. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see also U.S. CONST, art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST, art. I, § 3, cl. 3. No one, then, can serve in Congress without satisfying its internally enforced membership rules.4 Significantly, no Constitutional provision places such power in Congress to determine Presidential eligibility. Moreover, other than setting forth the bare argument, the Candidate offers no further support for the contrary proposition.

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Bluebook (online)
137 A.3d 646, 2016 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 204, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/elliott-v-cruz-pacommwct-2016.