Elliot v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Elliot v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.

86 A.D.2d 593, 446 N.Y.S.2d 194, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15119

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 18, 1982

StatusPublished

This text of 86 A.D.2d 593 (Elliot v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Elliot v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 593, 446 N.Y.S.2d 194, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15119 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982).

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Opinion

In a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award, petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Calabretta, J.), dated May 12, 1981, which dismissed the petition. Judgment reversed, on the law, with $50 costs and disbursements, and proceeding remitted to Special Term for a determination on the merits. The infant petitioner obtained a no-fault arbitration award in her favor for damages sustained while riding on respondent’s bus. However, she did not immediately seek to confirm the award. The application to confirm, brought as a special proceeding by her guardian ad litem, was served well beyond the one-year limitation period set forth in CPLR 7510. Special Term, in dismissing the petition to confirm, held that the application was untimely despite the petitioner’s infancy. There should be a reversal. The one-year time period of CPLR 7510 is a Statute of Limitations where a special proceeding is commenced to obtain judicial relief (see CPLR 7502, subd [a]; 7510; Teachers Assn. of Tarrytowns v Tarrytown Bd. of Educ., 59 AD2d 890; Matter of Belli [Bender & Co.], 24 AD2d 72; see, also, Siegel, New York Practice, § 601; cf. CPLR 215, subd 5). The toll for infancy (CPLR 208) is applicable to such a special proceeding (see CPLR 103, subd [b]; 105, subd [b]; 201). At bar, the infant petitioner had the option of waiting until her disability ceased to commence her own special proceeding to confirm the award or, as she chose to do here, maintain a special proceeding by her guardian ad litem (see Frehe v Schildwachter, 289 NY 250, 252; Bernal v Baptist Fresh Air Home Soc., 275 App Div 88, 97). Until she chose the latter, the limitations period set forth in [594]*594CPLR 7510 was tolled (see id; Francies v County of Westchester, 3 AD2d 850). We have considered the remaining arguments of the parties and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Lazer, Cohalan and Thompson, JJ., concur.

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In a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award, petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Calabretta, J.), dated May 12, 1981, which dismissed the petition. Judgment reversed, on the law, with $50 costs and disbursements, and proceeding remitted to Special Term for a determination on the merits. The infant petitioner obtained a no-fault arbitration award in her favor for damages sustained while riding on respondent’s bus. However, she did not immediately seek to confirm the award. The application to confirm, brought as a special proceeding by her guardian ad litem, was served well beyond the one-year limitation period set forth in CPLR 7510. Special Term, in dismissing the petition to confirm, held that the application was untimely despite the petitioner’s infancy. There should be a reversal. The one-year time period of CPLR 7510 is a Statute of Limitations where a special proceeding is commenced to obtain judicial relief (see CPLR 7502, subd [a]; 7510; Teachers Assn. of Tarrytowns v Tarrytown Bd. of Educ., 59 AD2d 890; Matter of Belli [Bender & Co.], 24 AD2d 72; see, also, Siegel, New York Practice, § 601; cf. CPLR 215, subd 5). The toll for infancy (CPLR 208) is applicable to such a special proceeding (see CPLR 103, subd [b]; 105, subd [b]; 201). At bar, the infant petitioner had the option of waiting until her disability ceased to commence her own special proceeding to confirm the award or, as she chose to do here, maintain a special proceeding by her guardian ad litem (see Frehe v Schildwachter, 289 NY 250, 252; Bernal v Baptist Fresh Air Home Soc., 275 App Div 88, 97). Until she chose the latter, the limitations period set forth in [594]*594CPLR 7510 was tolled (see id; Francies v County of Westchester, 3 AD2d 850). We have considered the remaining arguments of the parties and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Lazer, Cohalan and Thompson, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

86 A.D.2d 593, 446 N.Y.S.2d 194, 1982 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/elliot-v-green-bus-lines-inc-nyappdiv-1982.

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