NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-167
ELLEN MOYNIHAN
vs.
CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Ellen Moynihan, has worked as a public
school teacher and administrator since 1988. She began her
career in Norfolk, Virginia, where she taught elementary school
for four years before moving away from the area. She then
taught in Stamford, Connecticut for three years and in Sutton,
Massachusetts for six years before accepting a position in
Worcester, where she continued to work until the time of this
appeal. In 2016, pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 3 (4), she applied
to the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) to
"purchase" credit for her years of service outside of Worcester.2
1 Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System.
2General Laws c. 32, § 3 (4), permits public school employees to contribute a sum of money to their pension fund to represent payments they would have made during years they spent teaching elsewhere. This act is referred to as "purchasing" The plaintiff was permitted to purchase credit for her Stamford
and Sutton years of service, but MTRS denied her request with
respect to her time in Norfolk, reasoning that she was
prohibited by statute and regulation from purchasing service for
which she had already received a retirement allowance.
The plaintiff appealed that denial to the Division of
Administrative Law Appeals (DALA), which affirmed it. She then
appealed DALA's decision to the Contributory Retirement Appeal
Board (CRAB), which also affirmed the MTRS ruling. Having
exhausted her administrative remedies, the plaintiff sought
review in the Superior Court, where a judge denied her motion
for judgment on the pleadings and instead granted judgment to
the defendants on much of the same reasoning as had been offered
by MTRS and DALA. Discerning no error, we likewise affirm.
Discussion. "It is well established that judicial review
of a CRAB decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is narrow."
Lydon v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct.
365, 366-367 (2022), quoting Murphy v. Contributory Retirement
Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 333, 344 (2012). While we review
questions of law de novo, we nonetheless typically defer to
CRAB's expertise and accord great weight to its interpretation
those years of service. Doing so permits teachers to increase the size of payments they receive from MTRS in retirement. See Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 466 Mass. 292, 294-295 (2013).
2 and application of the statutory provisions it administers. Id.
at 367. "We will reverse or amend CRAB's decision only if it is
arbitrary or capricious, based upon an error of law or unlawful
procedure, unwarranted by the facts found by the agency . . . or
unsupported by substantial evidence" (citation omitted). Id.
"In certain situations, a member of a retirement system may
purchase additional creditable service, or credit, for work or
other service performed before becoming a member of a retirement
system." Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys. v.
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 466 Mass. 292, 294 (2013).
Importantly, however, "no credit shall be allowed . . . for any
service for which the member shall be entitled to receive a
retirement allowance from any other state." G. L. c. 32,
§ 3 (4).
This case turns on the meaning of the phrase "retirement
allowance." The plaintiff's chief argument is that this phrase
is "commonly understood" to refer to "the retirement benefit
that a member obtains at retirement," but the principal case on
which she relies to support this proposition plainly refers to
retirement allowances provided by the Massachusetts retirement
system.3 See Young v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 486
3 At times, the plaintiff alludes to the definition offered in G. L. c. 32, § 1, as supporting her cause. Section 1 defines retirement allowance as "the sum of the amount of the annuity and the amount of the pension provided for in sections one to
3 Mass. 1, 3 (2020) (describing "retirement allowance" in context
of G. L. c. 32). As such, we decline to adopt this narrow
reading of the statute, as "[t]he language of the statute is not
to be enlarged or limited by construction unless its object and
plain meaning require it." Dube v. Contributory Retirement
Appeal Bd., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 21, 23-24 (2000), quoting
Gateley's Case, 415 Mass. 397, 399 (1993). Instead, MTRS, under
authority granted to it by G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (b), has
promulgated 807 Code Mass. Regs. § 19.04 (2010), which states:
"(1) [G. L. c. 32, § 3 (4),] provides that no credit shall be allowed and no payment shall be accepted for any service for which the member shall be entitled to receive a retirement allowance from any other state.
"(2) For purposes of 807 CMR 19.04(1), the term 'retirement allowance' means any out of state governmental defined benefit plan, or defined contribution plan offered in lieu of a defined benefit plan or as the sole retirement plan but not as a supplemental plan, in which a member is eligible to receive, or has received, a benefit based in whole or in part upon employer contributions."
The parties do not dispute that the Norfolk, Virginia
school system made payments into the Virginia retirement fund on
the plaintiff's behalf, and that she received a payout in the
amount of $4,156.20 from that system when she ended her
twenty-eight inclusive." G. L. c. 32, § 1. The internal reference to §§ 1 to 28 reflects, however, that the definition offered in § 1 refers only to retirement benefits provided under the statute -- that is, for work performed specifically in Massachusetts. The plaintiff eventually concedes this point in her brief before this court.
4 employment there and departed the area in 1992. CRAB concluded
that Norfolk's contributions to the plaintiff's retirement fund
constituted employer contributions, and the payment of those
funds to her amounted to a retirement allowance. We defer to
CRAB's interpretation of its regulation. See Lydon, 101 Mass.
App. Ct. at 367. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff
was properly precluded from purchasing her Norfolk years of
service by MTRS and discern no error on the part of the Superior
Court judge in denying the plaintiff's motion on that basis.
The plaintiff raises several additional arguments in urging
us to reverse CRAB's ruling, which we address in turn. First,
she contends that the proper time for determining whether she
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-167
ELLEN MOYNIHAN
vs.
CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Ellen Moynihan, has worked as a public
school teacher and administrator since 1988. She began her
career in Norfolk, Virginia, where she taught elementary school
for four years before moving away from the area. She then
taught in Stamford, Connecticut for three years and in Sutton,
Massachusetts for six years before accepting a position in
Worcester, where she continued to work until the time of this
appeal. In 2016, pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 3 (4), she applied
to the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) to
"purchase" credit for her years of service outside of Worcester.2
1 Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System.
2General Laws c. 32, § 3 (4), permits public school employees to contribute a sum of money to their pension fund to represent payments they would have made during years they spent teaching elsewhere. This act is referred to as "purchasing" The plaintiff was permitted to purchase credit for her Stamford
and Sutton years of service, but MTRS denied her request with
respect to her time in Norfolk, reasoning that she was
prohibited by statute and regulation from purchasing service for
which she had already received a retirement allowance.
The plaintiff appealed that denial to the Division of
Administrative Law Appeals (DALA), which affirmed it. She then
appealed DALA's decision to the Contributory Retirement Appeal
Board (CRAB), which also affirmed the MTRS ruling. Having
exhausted her administrative remedies, the plaintiff sought
review in the Superior Court, where a judge denied her motion
for judgment on the pleadings and instead granted judgment to
the defendants on much of the same reasoning as had been offered
by MTRS and DALA. Discerning no error, we likewise affirm.
Discussion. "It is well established that judicial review
of a CRAB decision pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14, is narrow."
Lydon v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct.
365, 366-367 (2022), quoting Murphy v. Contributory Retirement
Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 333, 344 (2012). While we review
questions of law de novo, we nonetheless typically defer to
CRAB's expertise and accord great weight to its interpretation
those years of service. Doing so permits teachers to increase the size of payments they receive from MTRS in retirement. See Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 466 Mass. 292, 294-295 (2013).
2 and application of the statutory provisions it administers. Id.
at 367. "We will reverse or amend CRAB's decision only if it is
arbitrary or capricious, based upon an error of law or unlawful
procedure, unwarranted by the facts found by the agency . . . or
unsupported by substantial evidence" (citation omitted). Id.
"In certain situations, a member of a retirement system may
purchase additional creditable service, or credit, for work or
other service performed before becoming a member of a retirement
system." Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement Sys. v.
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 466 Mass. 292, 294 (2013).
Importantly, however, "no credit shall be allowed . . . for any
service for which the member shall be entitled to receive a
retirement allowance from any other state." G. L. c. 32,
§ 3 (4).
This case turns on the meaning of the phrase "retirement
allowance." The plaintiff's chief argument is that this phrase
is "commonly understood" to refer to "the retirement benefit
that a member obtains at retirement," but the principal case on
which she relies to support this proposition plainly refers to
retirement allowances provided by the Massachusetts retirement
system.3 See Young v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 486
3 At times, the plaintiff alludes to the definition offered in G. L. c. 32, § 1, as supporting her cause. Section 1 defines retirement allowance as "the sum of the amount of the annuity and the amount of the pension provided for in sections one to
3 Mass. 1, 3 (2020) (describing "retirement allowance" in context
of G. L. c. 32). As such, we decline to adopt this narrow
reading of the statute, as "[t]he language of the statute is not
to be enlarged or limited by construction unless its object and
plain meaning require it." Dube v. Contributory Retirement
Appeal Bd., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 21, 23-24 (2000), quoting
Gateley's Case, 415 Mass. 397, 399 (1993). Instead, MTRS, under
authority granted to it by G. L. c. 32, § 20 (5) (b), has
promulgated 807 Code Mass. Regs. § 19.04 (2010), which states:
"(1) [G. L. c. 32, § 3 (4),] provides that no credit shall be allowed and no payment shall be accepted for any service for which the member shall be entitled to receive a retirement allowance from any other state.
"(2) For purposes of 807 CMR 19.04(1), the term 'retirement allowance' means any out of state governmental defined benefit plan, or defined contribution plan offered in lieu of a defined benefit plan or as the sole retirement plan but not as a supplemental plan, in which a member is eligible to receive, or has received, a benefit based in whole or in part upon employer contributions."
The parties do not dispute that the Norfolk, Virginia
school system made payments into the Virginia retirement fund on
the plaintiff's behalf, and that she received a payout in the
amount of $4,156.20 from that system when she ended her
twenty-eight inclusive." G. L. c. 32, § 1. The internal reference to §§ 1 to 28 reflects, however, that the definition offered in § 1 refers only to retirement benefits provided under the statute -- that is, for work performed specifically in Massachusetts. The plaintiff eventually concedes this point in her brief before this court.
4 employment there and departed the area in 1992. CRAB concluded
that Norfolk's contributions to the plaintiff's retirement fund
constituted employer contributions, and the payment of those
funds to her amounted to a retirement allowance. We defer to
CRAB's interpretation of its regulation. See Lydon, 101 Mass.
App. Ct. at 367. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff
was properly precluded from purchasing her Norfolk years of
service by MTRS and discern no error on the part of the Superior
Court judge in denying the plaintiff's motion on that basis.
The plaintiff raises several additional arguments in urging
us to reverse CRAB's ruling, which we address in turn. First,
she contends that the proper time for determining whether she
qualified for retirement benefits from another agency was the
time at which she applied to MTRS to purchase credit for her
Norfolk years of service, and that, at that time, she did not
qualify for a retirement allowance from Virginia. We are
unpersuaded by this argument, however. The case on which the
plaintiff relies for this principle, Dube, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at
24-25, distinguished a set of facts in which a party could not
be prohibited from purchasing years of service based on the
nebulous possibility that they might become qualified to receive
a retirement allowance in the future. Where, as here, the
plaintiff has actually received the retirement allowance from
another system, we do not read Dube to preclude MTRS's
5 interpretation of the definition of retirement allowance in 807
Code Mass. Regs. § 19.04(2).
Second, the plaintiff argues that the denial of her request
to purchase credit for her Norfolk years of service, as compared
to CRAB's acceptance of her Stamford and Sutton years,
constitutes a "distinction without a difference" that defeats
the purpose of G. L. c. 32, § 3 (4). We are not persuaded.
While we are not without sympathy to the obvious similarity
between the various retirement schemes, the plaintiff conceded
that "those funds [received from Virginia] supplemented [her]
income" as part of her argument that the funds did not
constitute a retirement allowance. The plaintiff's ability to
dispose of that cash sum however she saw fit in the intervening
years since her departure from Virginia constitutes a material
difference between her retirement allowance in Virginia and the
funds from Stamford and Sutton that she rolled into the MTRS
fund.
Third, the plaintiff argues that the administrative
magistrate and CRAB erred in ruling as a matter of law and
denying her an evidentiary hearing to explore "the nature of the
Virginia retirement plan, the contributions made for [the
plaintiff] and her entitlement to a retirement allowance." This
argument, however, conflates legal and factual disagreements
between the parties. The underlying facts of this case are not
6 in dispute and, accordingly, we discern no error in concluding
that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the defendants should be
estopped from disallowing the purchase of credit for her years
of service in Norfolk because they relied on those years in
calculating her payments to MTRS. This argument suffers from
several fatal defects,4 but, regardless, "[t]he courts cannot
estop the conduct of a governmental officer or agency, as they
might a private actor, because the public interest in the lawful
work of the governmental actor overrides the unfairness or
injury to the private complainant." Ridgeley Mgt. Corp. v.
4 In order to establish a claim of equitable estoppel, the plaintiff is required to show:
"(1) a representation or conduct amounting to a representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to whom the representation is made; (2) an act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation is made; and (3) detriment to the reliant person as a consequence of the act or omission." (Quotations, citation, emphasis, and internal punctuation omitted.)
Renovator's Supply, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 419, 426-427 (2008). We agree with the Superior Court judge and would be hard pressed to conclude that the plaintiff has suffered a detriment where she was required to make higher payments to the MTRS only because her salary was increased based on her years of service in Norfolk. Even if all three parts of the prima facie case were satisfied, the allegedly wrongful conduct in question -- miscalculation of the plaintiff's salary -- was performed by the Worcester school system, which is not a party to this case.
7 Planning Bd. of Gosnold, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 801 (2012). On
these facts, we discern no reason to deviate from this general
rule.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Massing & Desmond, JJ.5),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: May 28, 2024.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.