Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennings

90 F. 767, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2532
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of West Virginia·Decided December 22, 1898·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

GOFF, Circuit Judge.

This court lias heretofore disposed of the main questions involved in these cases. 84 Fed. 839. They are now submitted upon the applications of (he receivers for compensation for the services rendered by them; upon the application of George E. Foster for the refunding to him of certain advances made by him to the receivers under orders of the court; and upon exceptions of the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company and of Receiver Broekunier to the master's report.

Without'making special reference to the testimony or to the arguments of counsel based thereon, I conclude that the receivers are entitled to compensation, and that, under the circumstances applicable to the individual services of each receiver, — keeping in view the time they were respectively employed in the discharge of their duties, as well as the responsibilities they assumed, — an allowance of $200 per month tu McOosh, and of $300 per month to Broekunier, during the time they respectively served as receivers, will be fair to them and just to the parties in interest.

Under certain orders of the court, made on the 13 th of April, 1897, and on the 20th of May of that year, George E. Foster, defendant in one suit and complainant in the other, and also the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company, complainant in the original suit and defendant in the cross bill, made advances of money and materials to Receiver Brock-unier, to be used by him in the development of the property in controversy; the former to the amount of $28,119.56, and the latter in the sum of .$17,000. Since these advancements were so made, this court has decided the questions relating to the title to the leases in controversy between the different parties to this litigation, and as the result thereof the said Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company has been given the pos[768]*768session of the land described in the same. That company, having the title and the possession of the property, and being entitled to the production from it, and also the funds in the hands of the court coming therefrom, makes no application to have refunded to it the advancements made by it; but Foster, who is quite differently situated, having lost his title to and the possession of said lands for oil purposes,, as also any interest in the fund in court, requests that he be reimbursed the full amount of his advancements. The Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company objects to such reimbursement of Foster, and insists that the orders appointing the receivers, as well as those authorizing the advancement of money and materials, were irregular, and are invalid because of the fact that notice was not given to it prior to the entry of said orders that a receiver would be asked for and also authority to borrow money on the credit of the property be requested of the court.

On the 13th of April, 1897, the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company moved the court for an injunction against Foster, and for the dissolution of an injunction which Foster had obtained from this court on the 6th of April, 1897, against it, which said motions were argued by the counsel of all the parties in interest, and taken under advisement. The court" (Judge JACKSOISI), without passing on those motions, appointed Charles W. Brockunier receiver of the oil and gas rights in the 50 acres of the B. F. Hawkins lease, and the court so acted without any of the parties having asked for the appointment of a receiver. As the case.then stood, the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company had an injunction (the same having been granted by the circuit court of Tyler county, W. Va., before the case was removed to this court) by which Jennings, Guffey, and others were restrained from taking possession of any part of the land in controversy, and at the. same time Foster had a restraining order which prevented said company from proceeding with the development of the leases, while the operations of adjoining owners were injuring the interests of the true owners of the leases in dispute. Thus, all of the claimants were prohibited from searching for oil, though all of them were insisting on their right so to do, and advising the court that the delay in doing so was most detrimental to their leasehold interests and to the rights of their lessors. It was under these circumstances that the court concluded that it would retain the possession and prosecute the development, under the impartial management of its receiver. It did not then appear to the court— for it was not. then shown by the record — that the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company was the legal owner of the property; and it is worthy of remark that, without the aid of the evidence subsequently placed in the record, the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company would not have been entitled to the decree rendered in its favor, for the court couid not have presumed either the forfeiture or the abandonment of the leases given to Johnston, whose assignees were before the court claiming their validity. The said oil company insisted that the Johnston leases were void, because, it is alleged, of the failure of the lessee and those claiming under him to do certain of the material things set forth in, and made part of, the contract of lease. The questions then presented to the court were not matters of law alone, but they were mixed question's [769]*769of law and fact. The court, therefore, declined to give the possession to any one of the claimants; for, with the conflicting interests of the various adjoining leaseholders, that would have been inequitable, even though bond had been required. Foster was the owner of leases located near to, and some of them adjoining, the territory in dispute, and it was for this reason that the other claimants dreaded to see the possession go to him, for they presumed that he would so conduc'd his development as to cause it to inure to the benefit of his separate and undisputed holdings. likewise also did Jennings, Guffey, and the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company hold leases similarly situated, in which Foster was not interested, and he, I presume, had the same right to fear them that they had to dread him. The subsequent developments, as shown by the testimony, demonstrate that the conclusion reached by the court to appoint a receiver was, as the case was then preseniod, the wisest plan, consistent with the conflicting interests, that could have been adopted, though likely it would have been better for, and less expensive to, the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company had it then been placed in possession. This litigation is not without its hardships, — misfortunes to both the successful as well as the losing parties, — and yet in this regard I do not know that it is peculiarly exceptional. The court regrets that the expenses attending the receivership have been so heavy, and that the other costs amount to the large sum that they do, and yet the expenditures seem to have been unavoidable, and are to be attributed to the importance and magnitude of the litigation. Surely, the Elk Fork Oil & Gas Company will not complain because a small part of Its abundant-supply of oil has been used as a lubricant on the machinery from which has been evolved the incandescent light by which it reads its title clear to all of the now well-developed property for which it has contended.

It will not be necessary to further consider the different orders of the court relating to the receivers, extending their jurisdiction over other leases, and providing for the advancements which were made to one of them, as, from the conclusion I have readied, it will be unprofitable to do so.

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Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennings, 90 F. 767, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2532 (circtdwv 1898).

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