RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNEDY, Circuit Judge, joined. FEIKENS, Senior District Judge (pp. 1402-17), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
GUY, RALPH B., Jr., Circuit Judge.
Warden Betty Kassulke appeals the grant to petitioner Elizabeth Turpin (“Turpin”) of a writ of habeas corpus. The district court found that the denial of Turpin’s severance motion and the admission of certain writings into evidence rendered her state court trial fundamentally unfair. Turpin cross-appeals the district court’s decision that her four other arguments for habeas corpus relief are without merit. We find that Turpin is not entitled to habeas corpus relief, and reverse the district court’s grant of the writ.
I.
During the latter half of January 1986, Elizabeth Turpin and Karen Brown visited a Lexington, Kentucky, area bar in the compa[1394]*1394ny of Anthony Basham and Dong Elliot. Basham drove the group home from the bar, and during the drive Turpin remarked to Brown that her husband, Michael Turpin, had obtained a large insurance policy and that she “wouldn’t want to be worth that much dead to someone.” (App. at 322.) Turpin then stated, “kind of ... in a joking manner,” that she and Brown could “bump off” Michael to “get the money” from his life insurance policy. (App. at 323.) Brown took Turpin’s statement seriously, and replied that she “kn[e]w somebody that could do it if you wanted him to[.]” (App. at 323.) Brown stated several times, however, that she would only approach this person if Turpin asked her to do so. (App. at 324.)
Shortly thereafter, Brown approached Keith Bouchard and offered him several thousand dollars to murder Michael. (Tr. Vol. XII, p. 71.) Bouchard was receptive to this proposal.
On the night of February 2, 1986, Bou-chard, Brown, and Turpin drove Turpin’s car to another bar in the Lexington area. Upon exiting the bar later that night, Turpin and Brown discovered that Turpin’s car had been moved to a parking spot other than the parking spot in which they had parked it. Since Michael was the only person besides Turpin to have a key to the vehicle, Turpin surmised that Michael was the person who had moved it. This realization greatly upset both Turpin and Brown. Brown was so agitated that she told Bouchard, with whom she had recently ingested cocaine, that they “need[ed] to get rid of Mike” that night. (App. at 293.) Turpin felt the same way, as she said to Bouchard, “I don’t care how you do it; I just want to get — get it over with.” (App. at 294.)
The trio thereafter returned to Brown’s apartment, where they discussed different ways of committing the murder. Using a firearm was not a possibility, because they had already tried and failed to obtain a gun that night. (App. at 295.) Brown proposed “rigging up” a car bomb to Michael’s car, but Bouchard replied that it was “too late for that.” (App. at 297.) Turpin then found a corkscrew and suggested that they use it as the murder weapon, but Bouchard said that a corkscrew injury would “just make [Michael] mad.” (App. at 297.) The trio next considered a plan according to which Turpin would carry on a “normal conversation” with Michael while Bouchard walked behind Michael and slit his throat. (App. at 299.) This plan also was discarded, though, because Turpin said she “probably couldn’t handle doing it.” (App. at 299.) The trio nevertheless continued to discuss the possibility of using “knives” to murder Michael. (App. at 299.) When Bouchard asked Turpin how he and Brown would be able to enter Turpin’s apartment to commit the murder, Turpin gave them her key to it. (App. at 299.) Before leaving Brown’s apartment with Brown, Bou-chard asked Turpin, “[I]s this what you want”? (App. at 300.) Turpin responded by nodding her head. (App. at 300.)
Bouchard and Brown thereafter armed themselves with knives and proceeded to Turpin’s apartment. Michael answered their knock at his door and allowed the pair to enter. As Brown began to feign concern about whether Turpin had arrived home safely that night, Bouchard lunged at Michael and began stabbing him in the face and throat. A struggle ensued and, at one point, Brown held Michael down and covered his mouth while Bouchard continued to stab him. (App. at 308-09.) After Michael died, the pair returned to Brown’s apartment. There they met Turpin, who asked them whether “it [was] over with.” (App. at 320.) Bou-chard, who was covered with Michael’s blood, simply replied, “[L]ook what your husband did to me[.]” (App. at 320.)1
A jury later found Turpin and Brown guilty of capital murder after their joint trial in Kentucky state court. Turpin and Brown each were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years. Bou-chard pled guilty to capital murder and testified for the prosecution during the joint trial. [1395]*1395Turpin appealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, which affirmed her conviction.
Turpin thereafter filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief, in which she presented six possible grounds for the relief sought. In response, the Commonwealth of Kentucky filed a motion for summary judgment. Turpin’s petition was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the district court grant the Commonwealth’s motion and dismiss Turpin’s petition with prejudice. After Turpin filed objections to this recommendation, the district court rejected the recommendation in part and granted Turpin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. These appeals followed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant Turpin’s petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Serra v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348, 1350 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1317, 127 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994). The first of Turpin’s two arguments that the district court accepted is that the trial judge’s denial of her severance motion violated her due process rights. During her joint trial, the prosecution played for the jury a tape of Brown’s statement to a police interrogator. The trial judge excluded, however, that portion of the tape which came after Brown told the interrogator she wanted a lawyer. Turpin asserts that the excluded portion of the tape is exculpatory as to her. Since this portion of the tape conceivably might not have been excluded if Turpin had been tried alone, Turpin maintains that the denial of her severance motion violated her fundamental right to present evidence in her own defense.2
In considering this argument, the magistrate judge and district court looked to cases that addressed the issue of whether the denial of a severance motion was an abuse of discretion that deprived a defendant of his due process rights. As a general matter, however, severance cases focus either on antagonistic defense claims, see, e.g., Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943, 100 S.Ct. 2169, 64 L.Ed.2d 798 (1980), or on an asserted need for codefendant testimony, see, e.g., Tifford v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 954 (5th Cir.1979). Antagonistic defense claims present issues that are clearly distinct from those raised here. Similarly, the analysis used in the codefendant testimony cases is shaped by the need to determine whether the codefendant in fact would testify in a separate trial and, if so, what the precise nature of that testimony would be. See, e.g., Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir.1970). Here, in contrast, the denial of Turpin’s severance motion effectively excluded from her trial a known, discrete item of evidence — the suppressed portion of Brown’s statement.3 Turpin’s argument therefore is better analyzed under the cases that have considered due process challenges to state court rulings that excluded an item of evidence proffered by a criminal defendant.
These cases rest upon the proposition that “[t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 [1396]*1396U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). We have recognized that this right includes within it the right of a criminal defendant “to present evidence on his behalf[.]” Allen v. Morris, 845 F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1011, 109 S.Ct. 799, 102 L.Ed.2d 790 (1989). The right to defend one’s self against the state’s accusations is not absolute, however, “and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. at 1046.
The Supreme Court looks to several factors in determining whether a defendant’s due process rights require the admission of a particular item of evidence. First, the Court considers the extent to which the proffered evidence is “critical” in the context of the case. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049. Second, the Court considers the extent to which the proffered evidence “tend[s] to exculpate” the accused. Id. at 297, 93 S.Ct. at 1046-47. Finally, the Court determines whether the proffered evidence bears “persuasive assurances of trustworthiness[.]” Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049.4
In Chambers, the Court considered these factors in the course of addressing an issue very similar to that presented here. The defendant in Chambers was accused of shooting a police officer. At trial, Chambers called to the witness stand one McDonald, who had confessed to the murder on three separate occasions shortly after it was committed. While McDonald was on the stand, Chambers elicited the fact that McDonald had confessed to the crime charged. McDonald had recanted his confessions prior to trial, however, and the state highlighted this fact during its “cross” examination of him. In response, Chambers sought to re-examine McDonald as an adverse witness, but the trial judge refused to let him do so.
Chambers then sought to admit the testimony of the three persons to whom McDonald had confessed. The first of these witnesses, Sam Hardin, took the stand, and in the presence of the jury told the story of McDonald’s confession to him. When the state objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds, the trial judge sustained the objection and ordered the jury to disregard Hardin’s testimony. Chambers next called Berk-ley Turner to testify. The jury was excused and Turner related the particulars of McDonald’s confession to him. The state again objected on hearsay grounds and was sustained. Finally, Chambers called Albert Carter to the stand. Outside of the presence of the jury, he too told the tale of McDonald’s confession to him, but the state objected once more on hearsay grounds and was sustained.
The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of all this testimony, when “coupled with the State’s refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process.” Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049. The Court’s reasoning focused on the excluded testimony of the three witnesses, which was clearly exculpatory and “critical to Chambers’ defense.” Id. The core of the Court’s reasoning concerned the reliability of the excluded testimony. The Court noted that “each of McDonald’s confessions was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder occurred”; that “each [confession] was corroborated by some other evidence in the case”; and that the rationale for the penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule squarely applied to the confessions. Id. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-49.5 [1397]*1397The Court accordingly concluded that “[t]he hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability.” Id. at 300, 93 S.Ct. at 1048.
The facts here differ materially from those set forth in Chambers. There is of course no question that the excluded portion of Brown’s statement pertained to critical issues in Turpin’s trial. Unlike the witnesses’ testimony in Chambers, however, the excluded portion of Brown’s statement was of dubious exculpatory value and bore considerable indicia of wtreliability.
A careful review of the excluded portion of Brown’s statement belies Turpin’s claim that it clearly exculpates her.6 She points out that, in the excluded portion of Brown’s statement, Brown asserted that Turpin did not think Bouchard and Brown would actually kill her husband and that Turpin “never did say kill him.” Brown also stated, however, that (1) on the night of the murder, Turpin was the first person to mention the idea of killing her husband;7 (2) shortly before the murder, Turpin discussed with Brown and Bouchard the possibility of killing her husband that night;8 and (3) although Turpin knew that Bouchard and Brown were going to Turpin’s apartment when they left to commit the murder, she did not try to stop the pair, but instead told Bouchard to “do whatever you’ve got to do[.]” (App. at 251.) Given these remarks, Brown’s statement inculpates Turpin as much as it exculpates her.
We note that the conduct of the parties at the time of the trial judge’s decision indicates that they shared our view of the nature of the excluded portion of Brown’s statement. As Turpin’s attorney acknowledged at oral argument, the Commonwealth, not Turpin, sought admission of Brown’s statement at trial. Moreover, although Turpin’s severance motion was filed 10 days after the trial judge decided to suppress the excluded portion of Brown’s statement, Turpin’s brief in support of her motion nowhere mentioned the trial judge’s suppression ruling, and indeed did not specifically mention Brown’s statement. (See app. at 275-82.)
We next examine the extent to which Brown’s statement is worthy of trust. It is true that the statement was among the items of evidence relied upon by the Commonwealth in its attempt to have the death penalty imposed upon Brown. Such reliance can be an important indicia of reliability. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 2151, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979).9 For the reasons that follow, however, we think that Brown’s statement is fundamentally untrustworthy.
The unreliability of Brown’s statement is highlighted when the statement is contrasted with the testimony that was excluded in Chambers. First, and admittedly of lesser significance, is the fact that Brown’s statement was made to a police interrogator and was not a spontaneous utterance to a close acquaintance. Second, the critical portions of Brown’s statement were “corroborated” [1398]*1398only by Turpin’s own self-serving testimony at trial.10
Most important, although Brown’s statement arguably was against her penal interest, a reading of the statement as a whole reveals that Brown’s purpose in making the statement was to avoid criminal liability to the extent possible, not to accept it.11 Brown’s story changed dramatically over the course of her interrogation, as she sought to escape criminal liability. Near the outset of her interrogation, Brown flatly stated, “I can sit and look you honestly in the eye and tell you I don’t know who killed [Michael Turpin].” (App. at 190.) Later, Brown admitted to spending the night of the murder with Turpin and Bouchard, but asserted that they had not left Brown’s apartment after they returned from a local bar. (App. at 211-12.) When Brown was told that Bouchard was being questioned, however, she stated that she had accompanied Bouchard to the murder scene and that she had seen Bouchard stab Michael to death. She nevertheless insisted that Bouchard had instigated Michael’s murder and that she had tried to dissuade Bouchard from committing the crime. (App. at 250, 254.) Thus, Brown’s statement plainly is rife with fabrications that she hoped would minimize her criminal liability. The rationale supporting the hearsay rule’s penal-interest exception — that persons generally “will not- make damaging statements against themselves unless they are true[,]” United States v. Tovar, 687 F.2d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir.1982) — therefore does not apply to Brown’s statement. Cf. Rivera v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 915 F.2d 280, 281-82 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant Rivera’s due process rights violated by exclusion of codefend-ant Norman’s confession that “he [Norman] alone” committed crime charged, when confession was excluded for no “better reason than that it [was] hearsay.”)
The dissent undoubtedly feels that the trial judge would have been wiser simply to let a jury determine the exculpatory value and reliability of Brown’s statement. On that point the dissent may be right, and that fact might have been sufficient to carry the day if in this case we were exercising our supervisory powers over a federal court. But we exercise a more limited power here. Turpin was convicted in Kentucky state court, so the issue before us is not whether it would have been wiser to have granted Turpin’s severance motion, but whether the trial’s judge’s failure to do so violated the minimal requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. That clause does not compel the admission of evidence that is unreliable and of questionable exculpatory value.
III.
The district court also accepted Turpin’s argument that her due process rights were violated by the admission of both an excerpt [1399]*1399from a letter she wrote to Michael Turpin and an entry from her diary. The letter excerpt was written one year before Michael’s murder and concerned one of Turpin’s acquaintances. It stated:
She lives in Manhattan and loves it. Her husband got killed in an oil rig accident and she got about five million in a settlement. She drives a red 944 and buys clothes all the time. She sells real estate, too.
(App. at 110.) Turpin’s diary entry was written two years before Michael’s murder, while Turpin was in high school. It stated:
I see my life stretching disgustingly ahead of me. I see power, wealth and death in my pools of green eyes. Power because of my ability to manipulate people. Yes, that’s right. I use • people only for the furtherance of my own being and the best part of it is that I feel no guilt or remorse concerning this fact. Well, what can I say? Along with power comes wealth. I know I can get everything I want. No problem. I admit I’m not perfect, but flaws do not stand in the way of achieving my highest, no matter how devious my means are. Now the difficult topic, death. Maybe alcohol, maybe overdose, maybe by means of violence. All I know is that I don’t want to live past thirty. I’d like to die at twenty-seven. What a delightful age to kiss life good-bye. Then I could be just like James Douglas. Yet, he is incomparable to none. He is a Dionysius, and he lives. I heard something funny on a commercial one time. I think it was for the movie Reckless. It showed a teacher asking his students exactly what they wanted out of life and this hellion dude in black leather, you know the kind your mother would never let you go out with, well he writes M-O-R-E across his paper. Well, that’s what I want out of life. More. There’s got to be more in life than college, marriage and kids. Gross. I want to mix with the socially elite, not these crappy lowlives I can wrap around my finger. I would really like a challenge, but one I can overcome, which I will anyway regardless of how devious or good my opponent is. Take it as it comes, though, and I will, but I will overcome.
(App. at 109-10.)
It is well-settled that, “[w]hile it is true that habeas relief cannot be granted simply ‘on the basis of a perceived error of state law,’ when an error rises to the level of depriving the defendant of fundamental fairness in the trial process, the claim is remediable on a petition for habeas corpus relief.” Serra, 4 F.3d at 1354 (citation omitted). Although the trial judge and the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the diary entry and letter excerpt were properly admitted to show Turpin’s motives and state of mind (app. at 165), the magistrate judge determined that this evidence was erroneously admitted because it was not evidence of “similar acts,” and because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The magistrate judge concluded, however, that the admission of this evidence did not render Turpin’s trial fundamentally unfair. The district court agreed that this evidence was erroneously admitted, but further held that the admission of this evidence deprived Turpin of her due process right to fundamental fairness in the trial process.
In reviewing the district court’s holding, we must first address the threshold issue of whether the Commonwealth has waived its right to argue that the letter excerpt and diary entry were properly admitted. In United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir.1981), we held that “a party shall file objections [to the magistrate’s report and recommendation] with the district court or else waive right to appeal.” We explained that this rule “comports with judicial efficiency and ‘will often save the parties the expense and difficulty of appeal.’” Id. Since the Commonwealth did not present any objection to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings of fact and recommendation, Turpin contends that the Commonwealth has waived its right to contest the magistrate judge’s determination that the diary entry and letter excerpt were improperly admitted.
Although the magistrate judge proposed that the secondary issue of the admissibility of the writings be resolved in Turpin’s favor, [1400]*1400he nonetheless concluded that the Commonwealth should prevail on its motion for summary judgment. If we were to require a party in the Commonwealth’s position to present objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed adverse resolution of a secondary issue, we would force that party to articulate objections to a recommendation that it prevail. Such a requirement would only frustrate the judicial economy and litigant expense policies that underlie the Walters rule. We therefore hold that the Commonwealth has not waived its right to argue that the letter excerpt and diary entry were properly admitted.12
We agree with the Supreme Court of Kentucky that these writings were properly admitted. With a few exceptions that are not material here, Kentucky has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, Ky. R.Evid. 404(b) provides for the admission of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” if offered to prove, inter alia, motive. The prosecution argued at trial that Turpin had been motivated in part by her desire to collect the proceeds of Michael’s life insurance policy. The letter excerpt hence was relevant to the issue of Turpin’s motive, because the letter strongly suggested that Turpin had been envious of the prosperity that followed the death of her acquaintance’s husband. The diary entry likewise was relevant to Turpin’s motive, because it plainly displayed Turpin’s longings for wealth. These writings accordingly were admissible under Rule 404(b).13
Moreover, we are unable to conclude that Rule 403 required the exclusion of these writings. A trial judge enjoys “very substantial discretion in ‘balancing’ probative value on the one hand and ‘unfair prejudice’ on the other[.]” United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 216, 233 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 963, 111 S.Ct. 1590, 113 L.Ed.2d 654 (1991) (citation omitted). Indeed, in reviewing the trial judge’s balancing under Rule 403, “the appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, giving ‘the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.’ ” Id. (quoting 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 403[03] (1982)). That Turpin’s letter excerpt and diary entry were written before her husband’s murder does erode their probative value to some extent. Given, however, the critical importance of the issue of motive in Turpin’s trial, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his “very substantial discretion” by determining that the probative value of these writings was not “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Turpin contends, however, that the prosecutor in fact cited these writings as evidence of her character during his cross-examination of her parents and during his closing argument. Here, we note that the line between inadmissible evidence of character and admissible evidence of motive is sometimes less than clear. Evidence of a person’s motives is sometimes mistaken for evidence of the propensities those motives have created. Turpin’s diary entry provides an example of this fact; although she claims its mention of her “ability to manipulate people” is impermissible character evidence, that evidence was an integral part of the evidence of her longings for power and wealth. In any event, Turpin’s contention does not alter our holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting these writings. An appellate court “must evaluate the validity of the [trial] court’s ruling in light of the information available to the trial judge at the time of his ruling[,]” Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982), and we see no reason why the trial judge should have [1401]*1401known that the prosecutor might refer to this evidence in an arguably improper manner.
Finally, we note that neither the letter excerpt nor the diary entry were inadmissible hearsay. The letter excerpt was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove that Turpin’s friend indeed drove a Porsche and lived in Manhattan. Ky.R.Evid. 801(c). The diary entry was not inadmissible hearsay because it was a party admission, Ky.R.Evid. 801A(b)(l), and because it was a statement of Turpin’s then-existing state of mind, Ky. R.Evid. 803(3).
IY.
Turpin’s remaining four arguments, which were rejected by the magistrate judge and the district court, are insubstantial. The first of these arguments concerns the arrest of one of the jurors who heard her case. After the jury found Turpin guilty, but before it had recommended her sentence,14 one of the jurors, Kenneth Redmon, was arrested for the Kentucky law crime of conspiracy to promote gambling. Turpin moved for a mistrial upon learning of Redmon’s arrest. The trial judge held a hearing, in which he carefully questioned Redmon about his ability to remain impartial. Redmon replied that his arrest would not affect his impartiality. The judge then questioned each of the other jurors on Turpin’s panel individually about their impartiality and about whether they might discount Redmon’s views because of his arrest. Each juror replied that he or she was entirely unaffected by the fact of Red-mon’s arrest. Thus assured of each of the jurors’ impartiality, the trial judge denied Turpin’s motion for a mistrial. Turpin now argues that the denial of her motion violated her constitutional rights to an impartial jury and due process of law.
The trial judge’s finding that each of the jurors remained impartial after Redmon’s arrest is a factual finding, Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984), and thus is presumed correct unless Turpin proves otherwise by convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Turpin has presented no evidence to rebut this presumption, and her unsupported speculations about possible juror bias provide no occasion for habeas corpus relief.
Turpin next argues that her trial was fundamentally unfair because she and Brown had to exercise jointly the twelve peremptory challenges allotted to them. In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278-79, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that, “[b]ecause peremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by the Constitution, it is for the State to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise.” (Citations omitted.) Thus, “the ‘right’ to peremptory challenges is ‘denied or impaired’ only if the defendant does not receive that which state law provides.” Id. Kentucky law provides that jointly tried criminal defendants may be forced to exercise jointly their peremptory challenges. Dunbar v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 852, 853-54 (Ky.1991). Turpin’s “right” to peremptory challenges therefore was not impaired by the fact that she had to exercise them with Brown.
Turpin next argues that she was denied due process of law when the trial judge refused to excuse for cause prospective jurors Kenneth Saunier, Brenda Crank, and Ed Baker. During voir dire, Saunier and Crank each stated that, based upon their prior knowledge of Turpin’s case, they thought Turpin likely was guilty. Baker stated that he might be influenced by the fact that his supervisor thought Turpin was guilty. When questioned by the trial judge, however, each of these individuals stated that he or she could impartially consider Turpin’s case. When the trial judge accordingly refused to strike these individuals for cause, Turpin peremptorily struck each of them.
As noted earlier, a state court’s determinations as to juror impartiality are presumptively correct, and can be rebutted only by convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); [1402]*1402Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 2892. Moreover, because such a determination “is essentially one of credibility,” it is entitled to “special deference.” Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036, 104 S.Ct. at 2891. Here, Turpin has not presented sufficient evidence to carry her heavy burden. That the prospective jurors heard about Turpin’s case before trial is not itself cause for rejecting the trial judge’s determination, since “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). Turpin has presented no other evidence that the trial judge’s determinations as to the impartiality of these prospective jurors were erroneous. Her argument that the trial judge somehow impaired her due process rights by failing to strike these persons for cause therefore is without merit.
Finally, Turpin argues that her due process rights were violated by the trial judge’s refusal to instruct the jury on the Kentucky law offense of “hindering prosecution or apprehension in the first degree.” This offense is defined as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of hindering prosecution or apprehension in the first degree when, with the intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another whom he knows is being sought in connection with the commission of a capital offense or Class A felony, he renders assistance to such person.
Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 520.120(1). In support of her argument, Turpin cites Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2389-90, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). In Beck, the Supreme Court suggested that the due process rights of a defendant in a capital case may be violated if the jury is not given a lesser included offense instruction. Id.
Turpin’s argument is meritless. Hindering prosecution or apprehension falls under Chapter 520 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which bears the title, “Escape and Other Offenses Relating to Custody.” As its title and description suggest, the offense of hindering prosecution or apprehension concerns events occurring after, and thus separately from, the commission of another predicate crime. This offense accordingly is wholly distinct from, and is not a lesser included offense of, the crime of capital murder. The trial judge’s refusal to submit a hindering prosecution or apprehension instruction to the jury therefore did not violate Beck. Indeed, the trial judge scrupulously adhered to the teachings of Beck, as he instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of second degree manslaughter and reckless homicide.
The district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus is REVERSED.