Elizabeth S. v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 16, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05403
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 ELIZABETH S., CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05403-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. ORDER RE: SOCIAL SECURITY 12 DISABILITY APPEAL COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 13 SECURITY, 14 Defendant.

15 Plaintiff filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the denial 16 of her applications for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits and Disability Insurance 17 Benefits (DIB). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and Local Rule MJR 13, the 18 parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned. After considering the record, the Court 19 concludes that this matter must be reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 20 § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff applied for benefits on September 8, 2021. Administrative Record (AR) 17. Her 23 amended alleged date of disability onset is December 20, 2020. Id. Her requested hearing was 24 1 held before an Administrative Law Judge on January 18, 2024. AR 35–58. On April 19, 2024, 2 the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. AR 14–35. The Appeals Council 3 declined Plaintiff’s timely request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency action 4 subject to judicial review. AR 1–6. On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court

5 seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. 5. 6 II. STANDARD 7 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of 8 benefits if, and only if, the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by 9 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th 10 Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 In her opening brief, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in assessing (1) her subjective 13 symptom testimony, (2) several medical opinions, and (3) the lay witness evidence, and (4) in 14 finding she did not meet a Listing at step three of the sequential evaluation process. Dkt. 12.

15 A. Subjective Testimony 16 Plaintiff testified she has periodic auditory hallucinations during which she hears music 17 and voices. AR 77–78. Consequently, she oftentimes cannot hear things around her or control 18 her voice. AR 94. The hallucinations are triggered by stress, and she testified she cannot drive 19 because of them. AR 94–95. She also testified she experiences periodic forgetfulness and cannot 20 handle multiple tasks at once because of her anxiety medications. AR 92–93.1 21 22 23 1 Plaintiff also testified to having several symptoms arising from her back pain, which the ALJ rejected (see AR 24), 24 and Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s findings relevant to those symptoms (see Dkt. 12). 1 Where (as is the case here) the ALJ finds Plaintiff has presented evidence of one or more 2 impairments that could be reasonably expected to cause her alleged symptoms and there is no 3 affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must give specific, clear, and convincing reasons 4 for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)

5 (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). In so doing, “[t]he ALJ must state 6 specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that 7 conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. The Court is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ 8 asserts.” Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 9 Defendant argues the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s testimony in finding it was 10 inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and with her activities of daily living. Dkt. 19 at 11 8–11. 12 With respect to the objective medical evidence, “when objective medical evidence in the 13 record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as 14 undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in

15 original). But “an ALJ cannot insist on clear medical evidence to support each part of a 16 claimant’s subjective pain testimony.” Id. (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 17 2005)). 18 The ALJ found the medical evidence inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations for several 19 reasons. See AR 24. The ALJ noted that “other than contributing to a hearing issue, she does not 20 seem to find the auditory hallucinations disturbing, and they are barely mentioned in her 21 counseling records.” AR 25. This reasoning fails. Although hearing deficits are a primary 22 symptom of Plaintiff’s hallucinations, according to her testimony, this does not mean such 23 deficits are insignificant. To the contrary, Plaintiff testified she oftentimes cannot hear others or

24 1 control her voice (AR 94), which she reported at an appointment (AR 758), and the ALJ’s 2 findings are not to the contrary. 3 To the extent the ALJ dismissed Plaintiff’s hearing-related issues based on her 4 unchallenged step two finding that the record lacked evidence of any hearing-related impairment

5 (AR 20), this is also not a proper basis for rejecting the testimony. Although there are certain 6 evidentiary requirements for establishing a medically determinable impairment (20 C.F.R. § 7 404.1521), Plaintiff alleged that her hearing-related deficits were symptoms of her mental 8 impairments (which the ALJ found were sufficiently established). The ALJ found her severe 9 medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 10 symptoms—including her hearing-related limitations—so the ALJ could not reject Plaintiff’s 11 hearing-related allegations based on a paucity of corroborating hearing tests. See Burch, 400 F.3d 12 at 681. 13 As for the ALJ’s contention that Plaintiff’s hallucinations were seldom mentioned in the 14 treatment notes, this is belied by the record, where Plaintiff’s hallucinations are mentioned at

15 appointments. See AR 859, 866, 882, 888, 977. 16 The ALJ also noted most of the treatment notes discussing Plaintiff’s hallucinatory 17 symptoms involved Plaintiff’s financial stressors and stressors related to driving. AR 25. 18 Defendant contends this shows much of her symptoms were brought on by situational stressors, 19 rather than caused by her medically determinable impairments. Dkt. 19 at 9. But the record 20 reflects that it was stress generally which brought about her hallucinations. See AR 977. While 21 her primary stressors noted at appointments were finance- and transportation-related, this does 22 not mean she would not experience the hallucinations as a result of normal workplace stress. 23

24 1 Moreover, the ALJ did not find the RFC reduced such stressors or otherwise accounted for such 2 symptoms. 3 The ALJ also mentioned some mental status examination results where Plaintiff 4 displayed normal behavior, speech, judgment, and thought content. AR 25. The ALJ found such

5 results did “not support finding greater limitations.” Id. 6 With respect to Plaintiff’s daily activities, activities of daily living are a valid reason to 7 discount Plaintiff’s testimony if they are either transferrable to a work setting or inconsistent 8 with her alleged symptoms. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). 9 The ALJ found: 10 the claimant’s ability to act as the primary caregiver for both her small child, born in 2019, and the father she described as disabled, suggests that she retains at least 11 some work capacity (Testimony). The claimant describes her typical daily activity as waking at 8:00am, getting her small child ready, preparing breakfast and lunch, 12 getting the child down for a nap, doing household chores, cooking dinner, and going to bed at 9:00pm [AR 657]. The claimant’s broad range of day to day activities 13 undermine her complaints about complete incapacity.

14 AR 26. 15 However, contrary to the ALJ’s finding, Plaintiff indicated that her stepfather assists her 16 with completing her activities of daily living and watching her son, and she did not testify he was 17 disabled. See AR 87–88. Moreover, the daily routine described by the ALJ is not inconsistent 18 with Plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff did not indicate she was so incapacitated that she could do 19 nothing at all, nor did she testify that her hallucinations were a constant presence. See Ferguson 20 v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[The claimant] can both do nothing when he 21 has severe headaches and engage in his daily activities when he does not.”); Smolen v. Chater, 22 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (Plaintiff need not “be utterly incapacitated to be eligible 23 for benefits.”). 24 1 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations of difficulty focusing and staying on task were 2 “well-accommodated in the residual functional capacity’s limitations to simple tasks with simple 3 decisions and infrequent changes in the workplace, with limited interaction with others, and not 4 in a fast-paced environment.” AR 25. Although this was a reasonable translation of Plaintiff’s

5 relevant testimony into the RFC, it does not account for Plaintiff’s hallucination-related 6 symptomatic allegations. 7 In sum, the ALJ’s findings that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with the medical 8 evidence and her activities of daily living were not proper reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 9 testimony supported by substantial evidence. Defendant does not defend the remaining reasons 10 for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony given by the ALJ. The Court therefore finds the ALJ failed to 11 provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Because 12 Defendant does not contend such an error is harmless, the Court reverses. See Ferguson, 95 F.4th 13 at 1204. 14 B. Medical Opinion Evidence

15 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinions of Gary Sacks, PhD; 16 Adriana Taseva, MD; Karen Richard, LMHC; Renee Eisenhauer, MD; and Eugene Kester, PhD. 17 For applications, like Plaintiff’s, filed after March 27, 2017, ALJs need not “defer or give 18 any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to” particular medical opinions, 19 including those of treating or examining sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). 20 Rather, ALJs must consider every medical opinion in the record and evaluate each opinion’s 21 persuasiveness, considering each opinion’s “supportability” and “consistency,” and, under some 22 circumstances, other factors. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. §§ 23 404.1520c(b)–(c), 416.920c(b)–(c). Supportability concerns how a medical source supports a

24 1 medical opinion with relevant evidence, while consistency concerns how a medical opinion is 2 consistent with other evidence from medical and nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 3 404.1520c(c)(1), (c)(2); 416.920c(c)(1), (c)(2). 4 Examining psychologist Dr. Sacks completed an opinion in March 2022. AR 651–54. He

5 opined Plaintiff had marked limitations in adjusting to changes in routine and social function, as 6 well as a mild limitation in attention, concentration, and pace. AR 654. He indicated these 7 limitations were based on Plaintiff’s panic attacks and schizoaffective disorder. Id. 8 The ALJ found Dr. Sacks’ opinion unpersuasive for the following reasons: 9 This does not equate to a residual functional capacity, which regulations require must address the most the claimant can do on a sustained, function by function basis 10 (B10F; 20 CFR 416.945(a), 404.1545(a), SSR 96-8p). Moreover, Dr. Sacks’s opinion is unsupported by treatment records indicating preoccupation with driving 11 and public benefits, not underlying mental health symptoms, and near-normal mental status examination results, and is inconsistent with the opinions of the DDS 12 evaluators (B18F/39, 45, 66, 78).

13 AR 26–27. 14 This explanation is inadequate. Dr. Sacks’ medical opinion did not need to be expressed 15 as an RFC; a medical opinion need only opine on a claimant’s impairment-related limitations or 16 restrictions in work-related abilities (see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2)), which Dr. Sacks’ opinion 17 did. Furthermore, as discussed above with respect to Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, 18 the focus in the treatment notes on Plaintiff’s driving is consistent with her having stress-related 19 limitations.2 Similarly, near-normal mental status examinations do not necessarily show Plaintiff 20 was unlimited by panic attacks and schizoaffective episodes, as such symptoms are temporary 21

22 2 The ALJ’s allusion to Plaintiff’s “preoccupation with . . . public benefits” was an apparent reference to a finding made by the ALJ that Plaintiff engaged in counseling for the purpose of obtaining benefits (see AR 25, citing AR 23 987). Although the record reflects that Plaintiff started counseling in 2018 because she was applying for benefits, it also indicates she desired assistance with her symptoms. See AR 984. Moreover, the Defendant has not shown how 24 such a motive shows Plaintiff is less limited than found by Dr. Sacks. 1 and may not be captured by a mental status examination. Finally, assuming Dr. Sacks’ opinion 2 was inconsistent with the state agency consultants’ opinions,3 this alone is not a proper reason to 3 reject Dr. Sacks’ opinion, as the reasoning shows the consultants’ opinions are also inconsistent 4 with Dr. Sacks’ opinion, but the ALJ found those opinions persuasive.

5 In sum, the ALJ failed to provide proper reasons for rejecting Dr. Sacks’ medical 6 opinion. 7 C. Remaining Issues 8 The Court has found the ALJ erred in considering Plaintiff’s subjective testimony and the 9 opinion of Dr. Sacks. Plaintiff requests the ALJ remand for an award of benefits. Dkt. 12 at 19. 10 Such a remedy is only appropriate where it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 11 required to find the claimant disabled if the improperly discredited evidence were accepted as 12 true. See McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the Court finds the 13 record is not free from ambiguities, conflicts, and gaps, and therefore remands for further 14 proceedings. See Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017).

15 Having found reversible error, the Court declines to consider whether the ALJ erred in 16 assessing the medical opinions of Drs. Taseva, Kester, and Eisenhauer, and of LMHC Richard. 17 Instead, the ALJ is directed to reassess the medical evidence on remand, and, if appropriate, 18 reassess her RFC finding and her findings at step five of the sequential evaluation process. 19 Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that her mental impairments did not meet or 20 medically equal any of the Listings. See Dkt. 12 at 16–18. Her argument relies upon Dr. Sacks’ 21 opinion and her subjective testimony. See id. Having found error in the ALJ’s assessment of that 22 23 3 The ALJ confusedly found the state agency consultants’ opinions supported by Dr. Sacks’ opinion, although the 24 ALJ may have intended to find the opinions supported by their discussion of Dr. Sacks’ opinion. See AR 27. 1 evidence, the Court directs the ALJ to reevaluate her step three finding if appropriate based on 2 her reevaluation of that evidence. 3 Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s assessment of her stepfather’s statement. See Dkt. 12 4 at 15–16; AR 359–66. The ALJ was required to provide germane reasons for rejecting these

5 statements. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). The new regulations did not 6 remove the requirement that an ALJ consider a lay witness statement, and this requirement is the 7 genesis of the germane reasons standard. See Rhea L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:24-CV-870, 8 2024 WL 5244402, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 30, 2024) (citing Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; 20 9 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 404.1529(a); SSR 96-8p). 10 The ALJ asserted the statement was “not more persuasive” than other evidence in the 11 record. AR 27. Without some explanation as to why the statement was less persuasive than that 12 other evidence, this is not a germane reason for rejecting the statement. Although such an error 13 may be harmless where it is duplicative of properly-discounted subjective testimony, see Molina 14 v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1116–22 (9th Cir. 2012), the Court has found the ALJ has not properly

15 addressed Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. Thus, the ALJ must reassess the statement of 16 Plaintiff’s stepfather on remand. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court REVERSES and REMANDS the decision pursuant 19 to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this 20 Order. 21 Dated this 16th day of December, 2025. 22 A 23 David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge 24