Elizabeth N. Ioor v. Commissioner of Social Security, sued as Frank Bisignano

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedMarch 6, 2026
Docket1:25-cv-00142
StatusUnknown

This text of Elizabeth N. Ioor v. Commissioner of Social Security, sued as Frank Bisignano (Elizabeth N. Ioor v. Commissioner of Social Security, sued as Frank Bisignano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Elizabeth N. Ioor v. Commissioner of Social Security, sued as Frank Bisignano, (N.D. Ind. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA FORT WAYNE DIVISION

ELIZABETH N. IOOR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CAUSE NO. 1:25-cv-00142-ALT ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) SECURITY, sued as Frank Bisignano,1 ) Commissioner of the Social Security ) Administration, ) ) Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Elizabeth N. Ioor appeals to the district court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application under the Social Security Act (the “Act”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF 1). Because Ioor’s sole argument on appeal is unpersuasive, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Ioor applied for DIB and SSI in September 2022, alleging disability as of July 1, 2022. (ECF 10 Administrative Record (“AR”) 22, 237-50).2 Ioor’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 22, 81-82, 100-01). On January 31, 2024, administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Meredith Jacques conducted an administrative hearing, at which Ioor, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AR 44-80). On March 20, 2024, the ALJ

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security in May 2025, and thus, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), he is automatically substituted for his predecessor as the defendant in this suit. See La’Toya R. v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-cv-01564-JMS-TAB, 2025 WL 1413807, at *n.2 (S.D. Ind. May 15, 2025).

2 The AR page numbers cited herein correspond to the ECF-generated page numbers displayed at the top center of the screen when the AR is open in ECF, rather than the page numbers printed in the lower right corner of each page. rendered an unfavorable decision to Ioor, concluding that she was not disabled because she could perform her past relevant work, as well as a significant number of light-exertional jobs in the national economy, despite the limitations caused by her impairments. (AR 22-37). The Appeals Council denied Ioor’s request for review (AR 6-9), and the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481. On March 26, 2025, Ioor filed a complaint in this Court appealing the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF 1). Ioor advances just one argument in this appeal: that the ALJ failed to

adequately account for her migraine headaches in the residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment. (ECF 19 at 9-14). On the date of the Commissioner’s final decision, Ioor was thirty-eight years old (AR 237), had a high school education (AR 268), and had past relevant work experience as a customer food representative, hand pinner, and molding machine operator (AR 35; see also AR 269). In her application, Ioor alleged that she is disabled due to the following conditions: asthma, restrictive lung disease, seizures, migraines, kidney stones, depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideations. (AR 267). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Section 405(g) of the Act grants this Court the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and

transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner . . . , with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court’s task is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The decision will be reversed “only if [it is] not supported by substantial evidence or if the Commissioner applied an erroneous legal standard.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). To determine if substantial evidence exists, the Court “review[s] the entire administrative record, but do[es] not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Id. (collecting cases). “Rather, if the findings of the Commissioner . . . are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive.” Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “In other words, so long as, in light of all the evidence, reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant]

is disabled, we must affirm the ALJ’s decision denying benefits.” Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 1996). III. ANALYSIS A. The Law Under the Act, a claimant seeking DIB or SSI must establish that she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also id. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D). The Commissioner evaluates disability claims pursuant to a five-step evaluation process, requiring the ALJ to consider sequentially whether: (1) the claimant is presently employed [in substantial gainful activity]; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s impairment meets or equals any impairment listed in the regulations as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity; (4) the claimant's [RFC] leaves [her] unable to perform [her] past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Pufahl v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 446, 452-53 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted); see also Sevec v. Kijakazi, 59 F.4th 293, 298 (7th Cir. 2023); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. “Between the third and fourth steps, the ALJ determines the claimant’s [RFC], which is the claimant’ maximum work capability.” Pufahl, 142 F.4th at 453 (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a), 416.920(e), 416.945(a). “The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps.” Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 332, 336 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). “At step five, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that there are significant numbers of jobs in the

national economy for someone with the claimant’s abilities and limitations.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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Elizabeth N. Ioor v. Commissioner of Social Security, sued as Frank Bisignano, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/elizabeth-n-ioor-v-commissioner-of-social-security-sued-as-frank-innd-2026.