1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELIZABETH M. VOSS, No. 2:26-cv-01949-DC-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, ORDER COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 15 (Doc. No. 3) Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Elizabeth M. Voss’s motion for a temporary 18 restraining order. (Doc. No. 3.) In her motion, Plaintiff seeks a court order restraining “Murray B. 19 Weaver, Trustee, his agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert with him, from selling, 20 disposing of, removing, transferring, damaging, or destroying any personal property of Plaintiff at 21 608 ½ Sutter Street, Folsom, California 95630, pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction . . . 22 .” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that her personal property will be destroyed by the end of the 23 business day on May 27, 2026. (Id.) For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion for a 24 temporary restraining order will be denied. 25 BACKGROUND 26 This action arises from an unlawful detainer action filed by Murray B. Weaver (“Mr. 27 Weaver”) against Plaintiff’s business, Studio On Sutter, LLC, for the property located at 608 ½ 28 Sutter Street, Folsom, California 95630 (the “Property”) on February 5, 2026, in the Superior 1 Court of California, County of Sacramento (“Sacramento County Superior Court”). (Doc. No. 1 at 2 3, 4.) Plaintiff alleges that on April 8, 2026, judgment was entered against Studio on Sutter, LLC, 3 and a writ of possession for the Property was issued in the state court action. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff 4 alleges that on April 28, 2026, the Sacramento County Sheriff executed the writ and locked 5 Plaintiff out of the Property. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges her personal property remains within the 6 Property and includes “business equipment, client records, healthcare provider materials, personal 7 belongings, and the physical contents of a studio.” (Doc. No. 3-1 at 7.) 8 On May 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court alleging civil rights violations 9 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Sacramento County Superior Court; Defendant 10 Jane Doe 1, the supervising clerk in the Carol Miller Justice Center; and Does 1 through 20, clerk 11 employees of the Carol Miller Justice Center. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges four claims 12 against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) First Amendment – Right to Petition the Courts; 13 (2) Fourteenth Amendment – Procedural Due Process; (3) Fourteenth Amendment – Equal 14 Protection; and (4) Fourteenth Amendment – Property. (Id. at 6–8.) On that same day, Plaintiff 15 filed a motion for a temporary restraining order in this court to prevent Mr. Weaver from 16 destroying her personal property located at the Property. (Doc. No. 3.) 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo and to prevent 19 irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose 20 Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). The standard governing the issuing 21 of a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a 22 preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 23 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a 24 likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the 25 absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; 26 and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 27 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a showing on all four of 28 these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 Courts within the Ninth Circuit may also consider a request for a temporary restraining 2 order using a “sliding scale” approach in which “a stronger showing of one element may offset a 3 weaker showing of another.” Id. at 1131–35. “[W]hen plaintiffs establish that the balance of 4 hardships tips sharply in their favor, there is a likelihood of irreparable injury, and the injunction 5 is in the public interest, they need only show ‘serious questions’ on the merits.” Where Do We Go 6 Berkeley v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 32 F.4th 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing All. for the Wild 7 Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135). Nevertheless, injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may 8 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 9 U.S. at 22. 10 ANALYSIS 11 As an initial matter, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against a party that is not named in 12 this action. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing Mr. Weaver, her former landlord, 13 from destroying Plaintiff’s personal property that is currently located at the Property. (Doc. No. 3 14 at 2.) A court may not issue injunctive relief against a person who is not a party to the action 15 before it. See Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 16 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969). Mr. 17 Weaver is not a named party in this action, and therefore the court cannot grant the requested 18 injunctive relief. See Washington v. Muela, No. 25-cv-03057-JSC, 2025 WL 1883824, at *4 19 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 8, 2025) (declining to enjoin parties who were not named in the action); Westlake 20 Fitness LLC v. Cnty. of Ventura, No. 21-cv-00770-CBM, 2021 WL 971148, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21 29, 2021) (same). 22 Even if Plaintiff had named Mr. Weaver as a defendant in this action, Plaintiff has not 23 demonstrated that she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. “The propriety of a 24 temporary restraining order, in particular, hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury [] 25 that must be imminent in nature.” Gish v. Newsom, No. 20-cv-00755-JGB-KK, 2020 WL 26 1979970, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020) (citing Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d. 716, 725 27 (9th Cir. 1999); Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988)). 28 “Harm is irreparable if it cannot be adequately compensated or corrected at a later date by legal 1 remedies or monetary damages.” Donaghey v. Moorpark Bellingham Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2 No. 22-cv-08524-DSF-MAA, 2023 WL 9318509, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2023) (citing Cal. 3 Pharma. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2009)). Generally, the “possibility 4 that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the 5 ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Sampson v. 6 Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (citation omitted).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELIZABETH M. VOSS, No. 2:26-cv-01949-DC-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 14 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, ORDER COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 15 (Doc. No. 3) Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Elizabeth M. Voss’s motion for a temporary 18 restraining order. (Doc. No. 3.) In her motion, Plaintiff seeks a court order restraining “Murray B. 19 Weaver, Trustee, his agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert with him, from selling, 20 disposing of, removing, transferring, damaging, or destroying any personal property of Plaintiff at 21 608 ½ Sutter Street, Folsom, California 95630, pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction . . . 22 .” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that her personal property will be destroyed by the end of the 23 business day on May 27, 2026. (Id.) For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion for a 24 temporary restraining order will be denied. 25 BACKGROUND 26 This action arises from an unlawful detainer action filed by Murray B. Weaver (“Mr. 27 Weaver”) against Plaintiff’s business, Studio On Sutter, LLC, for the property located at 608 ½ 28 Sutter Street, Folsom, California 95630 (the “Property”) on February 5, 2026, in the Superior 1 Court of California, County of Sacramento (“Sacramento County Superior Court”). (Doc. No. 1 at 2 3, 4.) Plaintiff alleges that on April 8, 2026, judgment was entered against Studio on Sutter, LLC, 3 and a writ of possession for the Property was issued in the state court action. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff 4 alleges that on April 28, 2026, the Sacramento County Sheriff executed the writ and locked 5 Plaintiff out of the Property. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges her personal property remains within the 6 Property and includes “business equipment, client records, healthcare provider materials, personal 7 belongings, and the physical contents of a studio.” (Doc. No. 3-1 at 7.) 8 On May 27, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court alleging civil rights violations 9 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Sacramento County Superior Court; Defendant 10 Jane Doe 1, the supervising clerk in the Carol Miller Justice Center; and Does 1 through 20, clerk 11 employees of the Carol Miller Justice Center. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges four claims 12 against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) First Amendment – Right to Petition the Courts; 13 (2) Fourteenth Amendment – Procedural Due Process; (3) Fourteenth Amendment – Equal 14 Protection; and (4) Fourteenth Amendment – Property. (Id. at 6–8.) On that same day, Plaintiff 15 filed a motion for a temporary restraining order in this court to prevent Mr. Weaver from 16 destroying her personal property located at the Property. (Doc. No. 3.) 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo and to prevent 19 irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose 20 Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). The standard governing the issuing 21 of a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a 22 preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 23 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a 24 likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the 25 absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; 26 and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 27 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a showing on all four of 28 these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 Courts within the Ninth Circuit may also consider a request for a temporary restraining 2 order using a “sliding scale” approach in which “a stronger showing of one element may offset a 3 weaker showing of another.” Id. at 1131–35. “[W]hen plaintiffs establish that the balance of 4 hardships tips sharply in their favor, there is a likelihood of irreparable injury, and the injunction 5 is in the public interest, they need only show ‘serious questions’ on the merits.” Where Do We Go 6 Berkeley v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 32 F.4th 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing All. for the Wild 7 Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135). Nevertheless, injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may 8 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 9 U.S. at 22. 10 ANALYSIS 11 As an initial matter, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against a party that is not named in 12 this action. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing Mr. Weaver, her former landlord, 13 from destroying Plaintiff’s personal property that is currently located at the Property. (Doc. No. 3 14 at 2.) A court may not issue injunctive relief against a person who is not a party to the action 15 before it. See Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 16 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969). Mr. 17 Weaver is not a named party in this action, and therefore the court cannot grant the requested 18 injunctive relief. See Washington v. Muela, No. 25-cv-03057-JSC, 2025 WL 1883824, at *4 19 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 8, 2025) (declining to enjoin parties who were not named in the action); Westlake 20 Fitness LLC v. Cnty. of Ventura, No. 21-cv-00770-CBM, 2021 WL 971148, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21 29, 2021) (same). 22 Even if Plaintiff had named Mr. Weaver as a defendant in this action, Plaintiff has not 23 demonstrated that she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. “The propriety of a 24 temporary restraining order, in particular, hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury [] 25 that must be imminent in nature.” Gish v. Newsom, No. 20-cv-00755-JGB-KK, 2020 WL 26 1979970, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020) (citing Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d. 716, 725 27 (9th Cir. 1999); Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988)). 28 “Harm is irreparable if it cannot be adequately compensated or corrected at a later date by legal 1 remedies or monetary damages.” Donaghey v. Moorpark Bellingham Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2 No. 22-cv-08524-DSF-MAA, 2023 WL 9318509, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2023) (citing Cal. 3 Pharma. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2009)). Generally, the “possibility 4 that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the 5 ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Sampson v. 6 Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (citation omitted). 7 Here, Plaintiff asserts she faces irreparable harm because her personal property located at 8 the Property “will be permanently disposed of by end of business [May 27, 2026]” without court 9 intervention. (Doc. No. 3 at 13.) However, an exhibit Plaintiff attached to her complaint, an email 10 from Mr. Weaver to Plaintiff on May 13, 2026, is inconsistent with her assertion. (Doc. No. 1 at 11 10.) 12 In that email, Mr. Weaver notified Plaintiff that she could temporarily enter the Property 13 to retrieve her personal property over a two-day period. (Id.) Mr. Weaver gave Plaintiff the option 14 to choose the two days in which she planned to retrieve her property. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff 15 was given an opportunity to access and retrieve her personal property without court intervention. 16 Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that “[o]nce [her] property is gone no court order can restore 17 it.” (Doc. No. 3 at 13.) But Plaintiff does not explain why she cannot replace any of her 18 equipment, records, or the physical contents of a studio. Nor does Plaintiff explain why she 19 cannot later obtain compensation through money damages should she prevail on her underlying 20 claims. 21 In short, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm, as required by the 22 second Winter factor to obtain injunctive relief. Because Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of 23 irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, the court need not conduct an analysis of the remaining 24 Winter factors. See A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Becerra, 901 F.3d 1166, 1167 25 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “plaintiff [must] make a showing on all four prongs to obtain a 26 preliminary injunction”); see also Williams v. Lobel Fin. Corp., 673 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1106 (C.D. 27 Cal. 2023) (“Where a plaintiff has not made the minimum showing of irreparable injury, it is not 28 necessary for the Court to decide whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits.”) (citing 1 | Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, 2 | Plaintiffs motion for temporary restraining order will be denied. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons explained above: 5 1. Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 3) is 6 DENIED. 7 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. : 10 | Dated: _ May 28, 2026 oes os Dena Coggins 1] United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28