IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-KA-00393-SCT
ELIZABETH ANN BOZARD a/k/a ELIZABETH A. JONES a/k/a ELIZABETH BOZARD a/k/a ELIZABETH A. BOZARD
v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/26/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STEVE S. RATCLIFF, III TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: BENTLEY E. CONNER JOHN JAMIL McNEIL
TREMARCUS D’RAY KESHON ROSEMON BRAD MARSHALL HUTTO
ASHLEY RIDDLE ALLEN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN K. BRAMLETT, JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/06/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A Madison County jury convicted Elizabeth Bozard1 of felony evasion but acquitted
1 The record reveals that Bozard obtained a divorce before the events of this case and now goes by “Elizabeth Jones.” Since the record primarily uses “Bozard,” however, we do as well.
her of aggravated assault on a law-enforcement officer. She now appeals, raising sufficiency of the evidence as her sole issue. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. After dark on July 5, 2023, Officer Joseph Magro with the Madison Police Department initiated a traffic stop on a Pontiac Vibe in Madison, Mississippi, at Main and Grandview. He noticed that the vehicle did not display a state-issued, registered tag. Instead, the license plate read “PRIV4T3.” Magro activated his blue lights, and the driver stopped just short of the I-55 on-ramp for northbound traffic.
¶3. Magro then approached the passenger side of the vehicle and asked for identification. Bozard said she did not need a driver’s license or a tag. Magro ordered Bozard out of the car and offered to let her off with a warning if she responded to the officer. During the stop, Officer Curt Chism arrived as backup for Magro. He approached Bozard’s vehicle on the other side. Chism then reached into the car and advised her not to leave as Bozard was releasing her emergency brake and shifting the transmission into first gear. Bozard willingly disregarded direct orders from law-enforcement officers not to flee the scene.
¶4. Bozard chose to flee. She proceeded onto the on-ramp at I-55 and passed another vehicle. Magro and Chism pursued her in their separate vehicles as Bozard headed north. Magro testified that Bozard never exceeded the speed limit, but she would not stop. Now northbound on I-55 , Magro attempted to slow Bozard down and maneuvered in front of her while Chism positioned himself to her right; however, Bozard passed Magro’s vehicle by
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driving on the shoulder of the road. Bozard never drove more than sixty-five miles per hour although Chism exceeded the speed limit to catch up to her. More officers in vehicles joined the pursuit. Bozard led the officers north on I-55 from Exit 108 to Exit 112 before she exited the interstate, heading west toward Gluckstadt.
¶5. After departing the interstate at Exit 112, Bozard unlawfully ran a red light and forced another car out of her way. She circled back to I-55, heading southbound this time. Officer Christian Venzen and Officer Karlin Givens joined the pursuit in Gluckstadt. Venzen clocked Bozard at sixty-two miles per hour in the chase according to his dash camera. By this point in the pursuit, other law-enforcement officers arrived to lay spike strips in Bozard’s path southbound on I-55 in their effort to make her to stop by puncturing her tires.
¶6. Bozard then ran over a spike strip near Exit 110. Venzen positioned his vehicle beside Bozard to her left while Chism followed behind her, and another officer got in front of Bozard as all traveled southbound on I-55. Bozard then slowed down to approximately forty- eight miles per hour. However, she attempted to escape the officers by slipping between Venzen and the officer in front of her. She ran into the car driven by Venzen, causing his vehicle to go into the median. Her collision with Venzen occurred near Exit 109. Although witness testimony differed as to whether Bozard had hit a second spike strip when they collided, some of Bozard’s tires were flat when she hit the car Venzen drove. Bozard did not stop until after hitting a third spike strip.
¶7. Bozard exited the car, landing face-down on the ground, which she disputed was the
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cause of a mark on her face. She put her hands above her head. In the course of her arrest, the officers struggled to control her but finally managed to subdue and arrest her.
¶8. A Madison County grand jury indicted Bozard for felony evasion and aggravated assault of a law-enforcement officer.
¶9. At trial, Magro, Chism, Venzen, and Givens all relayed the above-described events. The jury received photographs and videos depicting the events.
¶10. Bozard testified in her own defense and introduced her intake report, which stated that she was a thirty-seven-year-old unemployed female at the time of the offense. She testified that she joined the Army at age seventeen. She testified that her military occupational specialty in the Army was military police. She said she took part in multiple deployments to foreign countries and sustained injuries. She also said she was awarded a Purple Heart and received an honorable discharge after five years.
¶11. According to Bozard, Magro pulled her over for pausing too long at a green light; she claimed she did not hear anything about a car tag until her initial appearance. Bozard said that she knew she would be arrested when Magro ordered her out of the car, so she proceeded to secure her property by fleeing to avoid incurring expenses for vehicle storage. She further stated that she hoped the officers would just follow her.
¶12. Bozard admitted passing a law-enforcement officer on the shoulder of the road and running the red light. When questioned about the collision with the car driven by Venzen, Bozard testified that as she attempted to go between the cars, the driver’s side of her car
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accidentally hit the passenger side of the car Venzen drove and that she did not intend for her car to strike the car driven by Venzen. She reiterated that she had intended to go between the cars, not run Venzen off the road, maintaining that the collision was purely accidental.
¶13. The jury convicted Bozard of felony evasion but acquitted her of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. The trial court then sentenced her to ten years in prison for felony evasion. Bozard appeals and contests the sufficiency of the evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14. This Court uses a de novo standard of review when reviewing sufficiency of the evidence. Toler v. State, 404 So. 3d 100, 106 (Miss. 2024) (citing Turner v. State, 387 So. 3d 1009, 1012 (Miss. 2024)). In performing this analysis, this Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine[s] whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Robinson v. State, 384 So. 3d 505, 511 (Miss. 2024)). Therefore, the “benefit of all favorable inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence” belongs to the State. Moody v. State, 421 So. 3d 1236, 1239 (Miss. 2025) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Williams v. State, So. 3d 1122, 1129 (Miss. 2020)).
¶15. This Court has further clarified the nature of this review:
Should the facts and inferences considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,” the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render. However, if a review of the evidence reveals that it is of such quality and weight that, “having in mind the beyond
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a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,” the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient.
Williams v. State, 35 So. 3d 480, 485 (Miss. 2010) (citations omitted) (quoting Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288 (Miss. 2017)).
ANALYSIS
¶16. Bozard argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for felony evasion because the State failed to offer evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that she “operated her vehicle with reckless or willful disregard for the safety of people or property, or with extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Bozard claims that her driving was grossly negligent at worse and that the evidence was only sufficient to prove simple evasion. She asks this Court to reverse her conviction and sentence for felony evasion and to remand for resentencing on simple evasion, a lesser-included offense of felony evasion. This Court holds, however, that the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction and affirms.
¶17. Mississippi Code Section 97-9-72 defines simple evasion and felony evasion:
(1) The driver of a motor vehicle who is given a visible or audible signal by a law enforcement officer by hand, voice, emergency light or siren directing the driver to bring his motor vehicle to a stop when such signal is given by a law enforcement officer acting in the lawful performance of duty who has a reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver in question has committed a crime, and who willfully fails to obey such direction shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .
(2) Any person who is guilty of violating subsection (1) of this section by operating a motor vehicle in such a manner as to indicate a reckless or
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willful disregard for the safety of persons or property, or who so operates a motor vehicle in a manner manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, shall be guilty of a felony[.]
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-72 (Supp. 2025). This Court has not been called upon to consider what constitutes “a reckless or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property” or “a manner manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” Id.
¶18. One might understand how a reasonable juror might infer that Bozard’s actions would not amount to felony evasion if she had initially fled the scene but shortly stopped again without leading officers on a dangerous chase. However, Bozard did more than simply flee and stop soon after, and the jury found that Bozard’s actions went well beyond simple evasion and met the legal standard for sufficiency of the evidence. This Court is unwilling to second guess a jury of Bozard’s peers.
¶19. This Court has defined reckless conduct several times. In Barnes v. State, this Court held that “reckless driving means the commission of conscious acts or omissions which the driver knows or should know create an unreasonable risk or injury or damage. That which is necessary is that the driver should realize the strong probability of harm likely to ensure.” Barnes v. State, 249 Miss. 482, 162 So. 2d 865, 866 (1964).
¶20. This Court has further explained the difference between recklessness and negligence:
The terms ‘willful,’ ‘wanton,’ and ‘reckless’ have been applied to that degree of fault which lies between intent to do wrong, and the mere reasonable risk of harm involved in ordinary negligence. These terms apply to conduct which is still merely negligent, rather than actually intended to do harm, but which is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if
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harm was intended. The usual meaning assigned to do [sic] terms is that the actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in reckless disregard of the risk known to him, or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to consequences, amounting almost to a willingness that harm should follow.
Maldonado v. Kelly, 768 So. 2d 906, 910 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Maye v. Pearl River Cnty., 758 So. 2d 391, 394 (Miss. 1991)).
¶21. This Court has addressed acts that meet the criteria for felony evasion one other time.2 In Watts v. State, the defendant stopped at a roadblock in Marion, Mississippi. Watts v. State, 78 So. 3d 901, 902 (Miss. 2012). Officers asked for Watts’s driver’s license and commented on the smell of alcohol emanating from the vehicle; in response, Watts fled the road block. Id. Two officers began pursuit, but Watts refused to stop, leading the officers from Marion to Meridian, Mississippi, at high speeds. Id. Watts stopped after losing control of his car and crashing into a tree. Id. A grand jury later indicted Watts for felony fleeing, and a jury convicted him. Id. Watts argued that the State failed to prove that law enforcement possessed reasonable suspicion, but this Court found the evidence of the police chase sufficient to support his conviction. Id. at 904.
¶22. Here, the jury heard the following: Bozard fled from a traffic stop and led officers on a chase northbound on I-55 and then back southbound on I-55 for a similar distance. She did
2 The Court of Appeals has analyzed several of these cases. See generally Rowell v.
State, 347 So. 3d 231 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022); see also Chisholm v. State, 298 So. 3d 1046 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020); Carter v. State, 227 So. 3d 416 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
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not stop for any law-enforcement officer, all of whom had blue lights flashing. She ran a red light, passed cars on the shoulder of the road, struck a police officer’s vehicle, and did not stop until she ran over the third set of spike strips set out by law enforcement.
¶23. Given that this Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” Toler, 404 So. 3d at 106 (citing Robinson, 384 So. 3d at 511), and that “reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,” this Court holds that the evidence is sufficient. Williams, 35 So. 3d at 485 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843).
¶24. The evidence clearly shows that this chase revealed acts extremely dangerous to the people of Mississippi and “of unreasonable character in reckless disregard of the risk known to [her] or so obvious that [she] must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” Maldonado, 768 So. 2d at 910 (emphasis added) (quoting Maye, 758 So. 2d at 394). Bozard’s conduct was extremely dangerous and exhibited recklessness. Specifically, she put her own life, the lives of other motorists, the lives of the police officers pursuing her, and the lives of the police officers who set out spike strips at risk. Everything could have easily been avoided. Rather, Bozard displayed “a conscious indifference to consequences, amounting almost to a willingness that harm should follow.” Id. (quoting Maye, 758 So. 2d at 394). Her actions created an unreasonable risk of fatal consequences for the same reason. Miller v. State, 422 So. 3d 961, 966 (Miss. 2025)
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(citing Nelson v. State, 361 So. 2d 343, 344 (Miss. 1978)).
¶25. The evidence is more than sufficient to show that a reasonable juror could find that Bozard acted with “reckless or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property” or “in a manner manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” § 97-9-72(2). We affirm Bozard’s conviction and sentence.
CONCLUSION
¶26. Bozard’s needlessly put the lives of everyone in danger when she participated in a dangerous attempt to evade law enforcement. She put the lives of the police officers, the public, and herself in danger by engaging in a chase with law enforcement on a public roadway, which she could have and should have easily avoided. Therefore, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support her conviction. We affirm.
¶27. AFFIRMED.
KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.