Eliza Ramos v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 3, 2025
Docket7:22-cv-09109
StatusUnknown

This text of Eliza Ramos v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. (Eliza Ramos v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eliza Ramos v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------X ELIZA RAMOS, Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER -against- 22Civ. 09109 (NSR)(JCM) AMF BOWLING CENTERS, INC., Defendant. --------------------------------------------------------------X PlaintiffEliza Ramos (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on April 21, 2022 against AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging, inter alia, injuries that occurred due to Defendant’s negligence in the ownership, leasing, operation, maintenance, control, and management of the premises known as 47 Tarrytown Road. (Docket No. 1-1 ¶¶ 7-8). Defendant removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. (Docket No. 1). Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to determine the reasonableness of fees in connection with the depositions of Plaintiff’s witnesses, Meghan Bishop, MD and Brandon Erickson, MD, (Docket No. 30), accompanied by a declaration of counsel, (Docket No. 31), and a memorandum of law in support of the motion, (Docket No. 32) (together, “Motion”). Plaintiff filed a declaration of counsel in opposition to the Motion, (Docket No. 33), accompanied by a memorandum of law, (Docket No. 34). For the reasons set forth below, the Court awards Dr. Bishop a fee of $1,000 and Dr. Erickson a fee of $2,000. I. BACKGROUND On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff served an Expert Witness Disclosure, identifying Dr. Bishop as Plaintiff’s treating physician and medical expert. (Docket No. 31 ¶ 5). Dr. Bishop’s fee schedule requested a $7,500 flat fee and $2,000 per hour for any deposition exceeding one hour. (Id. ¶ 6). Dr. Bishop required pre-payment of $7,500 for her appearance prior to her deposition, (id. ¶ 7), which Plaintiff’s counsel paid to avoid any discovery delays because Defendant would not agree to pay the fee in advance, (Docket No. 33 ¶ 12). Dr. Bishop’s deposition, taken virtually via Zoom videoconference on August 29, 2025, lasted one and a half hours,1 and she 0F also had a thirty-minute “prep meeting” with Plaintiff’s counsel on the morning of her deposition. (Docket No. 31 ¶ 10). Her invoice for serving as an expert witness totals $7,500. (Docket No. 31-1). Dr. Erickson is Plaintiff’s treating orthopedic surgeon at Northwell Orthopedics. (Docket No. 33 ¶ 4). He was not retained as a litigation expert and his testimony concerned his treatment and observations as a fact witness. (Id.). Dr. Erickson’s deposition, taken virtually via Zoom videoconference on September 4, 2025, lasted approximately one and a half hours.2 (Docket No. 1F 31 ¶ 12). His invoice for serving as a non-expert witness totals $4,000 for two hours of record review ($2,000) and a two-hour deposition ($2,000). (Docket No. 31-2). Plaintiff’s counsel did not question either Dr. Bishop or Dr. Erickson at their respective depositions. (Docket No. 33 ¶ 5). Defendant requests that the Court award each witness a deposition fee of $1,000, inclusive of preparationtime. (Docket No. 32 at 5).3 Plaintiff submits 2F “that a more reasonable framework would set compensation at $1,000 per hour for deposition testimony and $750 per hour for preparation time.”(Docket No. 33 ¶ 10).

1 Dr. Bishop’s deposition began at 10:05 a.m. and concluded at 11:35 a.m. (Docket No. 31-6 at 2, 53).

2 Dr. Erickson’s deposition began at 12:16 p.m. and concluded at 1:53 p.m. (Docket No. 31-7 at 2, 48). 3 All page number citations herein refer to the page number assigned upon electronic filing unless otherwise noted. II. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that “[u]nless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery ...pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i). Generally, in determining the reasonableness of a proposed expert

fee, courts consider: (1) the witness’s area of expertise, (2) the education and training that is required to provide the expert insight that is sought, (3) the prevailing rates for other comparably respected available experts, (4) the nature, quality and complexity of the discovery responses provided, (5) the cost of living in the particular geographic area, (6) the fee being charged by the expert to the party who retained him, (7) fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters, and (8) any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the interests implicated byRule 26. Polidora v. D’Agostino & Assocs., 19-CV-1290 (AJN)(BCM), 2022 WL 443791, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2022); see also Adams v. Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Ctr., No. 00 Civ. 9377 (SHS), 2002 WL 1401979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002); Marin v. United States, No. 06 Civ. 552 (SHS), 2008 WL 5351935, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2008). Flat fees for experts are generally considered unreasonable. See Mendez-Caton v. Caribbean Fam. Health Ctr., 340 F.R.D. 60, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2022). “Because the touchstone of the inquiry is reasonableness, an expert witness generally may not ‘request a flat fee for deposition testimony regardless of the number of hours actually spent.’” Polidora, 2022 WL 443791, at *2 (quoting Marin, 2008 WL 5351935, at *1) (denying a request for a $7,500 flat fee, requesting an hourly rate, and declining to determine the reasonable rate of compensation prior to the deposition). As there must be some “reasonable relationship between the services rendered and the renumeration” to an expert, a flat fee “runs counter to this principle.” Ajasin v. Ortiz,19-CV-6814 (RA)(JLC), 2021 WL 1437551, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2021)(citation and internal quotations omitted). III. DISCUSSION As a threshold matter, Plaintiff correctly asserts that Defendant is responsible for reimbursing Plaintiff for reasonable expert fees pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E). (Docket No. 34 at

4). However, the fact that Plaintiff advanced Dr. Bishop’s $7,500 fee in full because Defendant would not remit payment in advance does not factor into the reasonableness analysis. Courts in the Second Circuit have observed that Rule 26 and the case law interpreting it make clear “that the parties seeking court intervention to determine a reasonable fee for an expert deposition should do so retrospectively—that is, after the deposition has taken place. [Rule 26] clearly contemplates that a court order will be issued subsequent to the deposition, as it requires a court to order payment of a ‘reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery.’” Conte v. Newsday, Inc., No. CV 06-4859 (JFB)(ETB), 2011 WL 3511071, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(E)) (emphasis in original); see also AP Links, LLC v. Russ,

CV-09-5437 (JS)(AKT), 2015 WL 9050298, at *1-*2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015); Trombetta v. Novocin, Civil Action No. 18 Civ. 993 (RA)(SLC), 2023 WL 2575242, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2023); Kent v. Starline Cab Corp., No. 03 Civ. 6140 (LAK), 2004 WL 251064, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Korabik v. Arcelormittal Plate LLC
310 F.R.D. 205 (E.D. New York, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Eliza Ramos v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eliza-ramos-v-amf-bowling-centers-inc-nysd-2025.