HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE ELISABETH REHN, an individual, Case No. 2:23-cv-01609-RAJ Plaintiff, ORDER v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a lawful municipal corporation in the State of Washington; RILEY CAULFIELD; YOUNGHUN KIM; SETH WAGNER; JOHN DUUS; AND
Defendants. I. INTRODUCTION THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. # 57, Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Continue Trial, Dkt. # 62, Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Appeal Frivolous, Dkt. # 64, and Defendants’ Motion to Permit Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Filing, Dkt. # 70. The Court has reviewed the motions, the submissions in support of and in opposition to the motions, and the balance of the record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Continue Trial and DENIES the remaining motions. This case arises from officers Riley Caufield, Younghun Kim, and Seth Wagner’s (the “Officer Defendants”) mistaken entry into Plaintiff Elisabeth Rehn’s apartment. The specific facts are set out in more detail in the Court’s July 1, 2025 order. See Dkt. # 56. In that order, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Ms. Rehn’s police practices expert, Sue Peters. Id. at 5–8. The Court also granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, including denying Defendants’ motion based on qualified immunity. Id. at 16–17. Defendants timely appealed the denial of qualified immunity. Dkt. # 59. The trial in this case is currently set for February 9, 2026. Dkt. # 55. Currently before the Court are several motions resulting from the July 1, 2025 order. First, on July 15, 2025, Ms. Rehn filed a motion to reconsider the Court’s order excluding Ms. Peters’s expert testimony. Dkt. # 57. Second, on August 12, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to stay or continue the trial pending resolution of their appeal. Dkt. # 62. Third, on August 19, 2025, Ms. Rehn filed a motion to certify Defendants’ appeal as frivolous. Dkt. # 64. Fourth, on October 16, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for leave to respond to Ms. Rehn’s supplemental filing. Dkt. # 70. The supplemental filing attached a copy of Defendants’ opening brief filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dkt. # 69. A. Motion for Reconsideration Ms. Rehn argues the Court’s order excluding Ms. Peters’s expert testimony constitutes manifest error because it misapplied Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Daubert, and other cases interpreting Daubert in the context of non-scientific experts. Dkt. # 57. Defendants argue the Court “properly excluded Ms. Peters because she failed to satisfy the reliability requirement when she did ‘not explain how her knowledge or experience supports her stated opinions.’” Dkt. 60 at 3 (quoting Dkt. # 56). “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored.” LCR 7(h). “The court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” Id. “The term ‘manifest error’ is ‘an error that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the record.’” Gaskill v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 11-cv- 5847, 2012 WL 13026638, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2012) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 622 (9th ed. 2009)). Much of Ms. Rehn’s arguments appear to conflate reliability (the basis for the Court’s order excluding Ms. Peters) with relevance and qualification. For example, Ms. Rehn argues Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is “primarily about relevance, not methodology” and that the Court “discount[ed] Ms. Peters’s 29 years of experience.” Dkt. # 57 at 4. The very cases cited by Ms. Rehn confirm, however, that reliability is a distinct and necessary requirement for admission of expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (stating Rules of Evidence “assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”); United States v. Holguin, 51 F.4th 841, 854 (9th Cir. 2022) (“A district court must distinguish an expert’s qualifications from the reliability of the expert’s principles and methods.”) (emphasis in original). While Ms. Rehn is correct that an expert may testify based on personal knowledge and experience, the trial court must nevertheless assess the reliability of that expert’s opinion by considering factors such as “whether the expert’s experience supports the expert’s conclusions; whether the expert’s reasoning is circular, speculative, or otherwise flawed; or whether the expert’s reasoning is adequately explained.” Holquin, 51 F.4th 841 at 855 (internal citations omitted). The Court found Ms. Peters’s expert report “does not satisfy the reliability requirement of Evidence Rule 702 because it does not explain how her knowledge or experience supports her stated opinions.” Dkt. # 56 at 7. Critically, Ms. Peters’s expert opinion centers on the Officer Defendants’ alleged failure to engage in “necessary investigative steps” and “basic police practices of address verification,” but her report never explains her own knowledge or experience with police address verification. Id. The Court therefore cannot determine that her knowledge or experience reliably supports her conclusions. This was an accurate application of the trial court’s gate-keeping role under Rule 702, Daubert, and its progeny, and was not manifest error. Ms. Rehn is also incorrect that the Court excluded Ms. Peters’s opinions “solely because she did not analyze ‘relevant policy, training, or best practices.’” Dkt. # 57 at 4. As explained above and in the Court’s order, the Court excluded Ms. Peters’s opinions because she failed to provide any connection between her law enforcement experience (primarily as a major crimes detective) and her opinion that Defendants failed to engage in proper address verification protocol when responding to a 911 call. Discussing relevant policy, training, or best practices was only one of many ways Ms. Peters could have satisfied the reliability requirement of Rule 702. The ultimate issue was that Ms. Peters provided no foundation to link her expertise to her opinions in this case. B. Motion to Stay and Motion to Certify Appeal Frivolous Next, Defendants ask the Court to stay or continue the current February 9, 2026 trial date pending resolution of their appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. # 62. Defendants argue it is an inefficient use of judicial resources to proceed with the currently scheduled trial while the issue of qualified immunity is on appeal. Id. Ms. Rehn responds that she “agrees that a stay should be granted if the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the individual defendants’ interlocutory appeals.” Dkt. # 63 at 2. She argues, however, that the Ninth Circuit will not accept jurisdiction because Defendants’ appeal is frivolous. Id. Ms. Rehn separately filed a motion asking this Court to certify that the appeal is frivolous. Dkt. # 64. In qualified immunity cases, appellate courts “typically have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the denial of summary judgment.” Estate of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2021). The scope of appellate review in such cases is limited. Id. “Any portion of a district court’s summary judgment order that, though entered in a qualified immunity case, determines only a question of evidence sufficiency, i.e., which fa
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HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE ELISABETH REHN, an individual, Case No. 2:23-cv-01609-RAJ Plaintiff, ORDER v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a lawful municipal corporation in the State of Washington; RILEY CAULFIELD; YOUNGHUN KIM; SETH WAGNER; JOHN DUUS; AND
Defendants. I. INTRODUCTION THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. # 57, Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Continue Trial, Dkt. # 62, Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Appeal Frivolous, Dkt. # 64, and Defendants’ Motion to Permit Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Filing, Dkt. # 70. The Court has reviewed the motions, the submissions in support of and in opposition to the motions, and the balance of the record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Continue Trial and DENIES the remaining motions. This case arises from officers Riley Caufield, Younghun Kim, and Seth Wagner’s (the “Officer Defendants”) mistaken entry into Plaintiff Elisabeth Rehn’s apartment. The specific facts are set out in more detail in the Court’s July 1, 2025 order. See Dkt. # 56. In that order, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of Ms. Rehn’s police practices expert, Sue Peters. Id. at 5–8. The Court also granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, including denying Defendants’ motion based on qualified immunity. Id. at 16–17. Defendants timely appealed the denial of qualified immunity. Dkt. # 59. The trial in this case is currently set for February 9, 2026. Dkt. # 55. Currently before the Court are several motions resulting from the July 1, 2025 order. First, on July 15, 2025, Ms. Rehn filed a motion to reconsider the Court’s order excluding Ms. Peters’s expert testimony. Dkt. # 57. Second, on August 12, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to stay or continue the trial pending resolution of their appeal. Dkt. # 62. Third, on August 19, 2025, Ms. Rehn filed a motion to certify Defendants’ appeal as frivolous. Dkt. # 64. Fourth, on October 16, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for leave to respond to Ms. Rehn’s supplemental filing. Dkt. # 70. The supplemental filing attached a copy of Defendants’ opening brief filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dkt. # 69. A. Motion for Reconsideration Ms. Rehn argues the Court’s order excluding Ms. Peters’s expert testimony constitutes manifest error because it misapplied Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Daubert, and other cases interpreting Daubert in the context of non-scientific experts. Dkt. # 57. Defendants argue the Court “properly excluded Ms. Peters because she failed to satisfy the reliability requirement when she did ‘not explain how her knowledge or experience supports her stated opinions.’” Dkt. 60 at 3 (quoting Dkt. # 56). “Motions for reconsideration are disfavored.” LCR 7(h). “The court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” Id. “The term ‘manifest error’ is ‘an error that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the record.’” Gaskill v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 11-cv- 5847, 2012 WL 13026638, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2012) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 622 (9th ed. 2009)). Much of Ms. Rehn’s arguments appear to conflate reliability (the basis for the Court’s order excluding Ms. Peters) with relevance and qualification. For example, Ms. Rehn argues Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is “primarily about relevance, not methodology” and that the Court “discount[ed] Ms. Peters’s 29 years of experience.” Dkt. # 57 at 4. The very cases cited by Ms. Rehn confirm, however, that reliability is a distinct and necessary requirement for admission of expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (stating Rules of Evidence “assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”); United States v. Holguin, 51 F.4th 841, 854 (9th Cir. 2022) (“A district court must distinguish an expert’s qualifications from the reliability of the expert’s principles and methods.”) (emphasis in original). While Ms. Rehn is correct that an expert may testify based on personal knowledge and experience, the trial court must nevertheless assess the reliability of that expert’s opinion by considering factors such as “whether the expert’s experience supports the expert’s conclusions; whether the expert’s reasoning is circular, speculative, or otherwise flawed; or whether the expert’s reasoning is adequately explained.” Holquin, 51 F.4th 841 at 855 (internal citations omitted). The Court found Ms. Peters’s expert report “does not satisfy the reliability requirement of Evidence Rule 702 because it does not explain how her knowledge or experience supports her stated opinions.” Dkt. # 56 at 7. Critically, Ms. Peters’s expert opinion centers on the Officer Defendants’ alleged failure to engage in “necessary investigative steps” and “basic police practices of address verification,” but her report never explains her own knowledge or experience with police address verification. Id. The Court therefore cannot determine that her knowledge or experience reliably supports her conclusions. This was an accurate application of the trial court’s gate-keeping role under Rule 702, Daubert, and its progeny, and was not manifest error. Ms. Rehn is also incorrect that the Court excluded Ms. Peters’s opinions “solely because she did not analyze ‘relevant policy, training, or best practices.’” Dkt. # 57 at 4. As explained above and in the Court’s order, the Court excluded Ms. Peters’s opinions because she failed to provide any connection between her law enforcement experience (primarily as a major crimes detective) and her opinion that Defendants failed to engage in proper address verification protocol when responding to a 911 call. Discussing relevant policy, training, or best practices was only one of many ways Ms. Peters could have satisfied the reliability requirement of Rule 702. The ultimate issue was that Ms. Peters provided no foundation to link her expertise to her opinions in this case. B. Motion to Stay and Motion to Certify Appeal Frivolous Next, Defendants ask the Court to stay or continue the current February 9, 2026 trial date pending resolution of their appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. # 62. Defendants argue it is an inefficient use of judicial resources to proceed with the currently scheduled trial while the issue of qualified immunity is on appeal. Id. Ms. Rehn responds that she “agrees that a stay should be granted if the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the individual defendants’ interlocutory appeals.” Dkt. # 63 at 2. She argues, however, that the Ninth Circuit will not accept jurisdiction because Defendants’ appeal is frivolous. Id. Ms. Rehn separately filed a motion asking this Court to certify that the appeal is frivolous. Dkt. # 64. In qualified immunity cases, appellate courts “typically have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the denial of summary judgment.” Estate of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2021). The scope of appellate review in such cases is limited. Id. “Any portion of a district court’s summary judgment order that, though entered in a qualified immunity case, determines only a question of evidence sufficiency, i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial . . . is not appealable.” Id. at 730–31 (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, appellate courts “may properly review a denial of qualified immunity where a defendant argues . . . that the facts, even when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show no violation of a constitutional right, or no violation of a right that is clearly established in law.” Ames v. King County, 846 F.3d 340, 347 (9th Cir. 2017). When defendants appeal a denial of qualified immunity and the “district court find[s] that the defendants’ claim of qualified immunity is frivolous or has been waived, the district court may certify, in writing, that defendants have forfeited their right to pretrial appeal, and may proceed with trial.” Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992). “An appeal is frivolous ‘when the result is obvious or the appellant’s arguments are wholly without merit.’” Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Glanzman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1989)). Here, Defendants’ appeal is properly limited to legal questions related to the denial of qualified immunity, and is not frivolous. Defendants argue “the Court and Plaintiff defined the breadth of the Fourth Amendment right at issue too broadly” and there is no clearly established law that prohibited the Officer Defendants’ entry into Ms. Rehn’s home under the circumstances. Dkt. # 65 at 2. Interpretation of the scope of the Fourth Amendment right at issue and whether there was clearly established law governing the defendants’ actions are appropriate questions of law for an interlocutory appeal. See Ames, 846 F.3d at 347. Defendants also argue that “in denying the Officer Defendants’ qualified immunity at summary judgment, the Court did not examine the constitutional liability for each individual officer.” Dkt. # 65 at 2–3. Whether the trial court followed the correct analytical framework in assessing qualified immunity likewise presents a legal question that can be addressed on an interlocutory appeal. See Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding district court’s analysis “fell short of the fact- intensive inquiry” required by qualified immunity precedent). Moreover, based on a review of Defendants’ response brief, the Court finds that Defendants’ arguments on appeal are made in good faith and are not frivolous. Ms. Rehn’s arguments to the contrary go to the ultimate merits of Defendants’ appeal, but does not establish that the appeal is unfounded. Accordingly, the Court denies Ms. Rehn’s motion to certify the appeal as frivolous. Turning to Defendants’ motion to stay, Ms. Rehn’s response to that motion states she “agrees that a stay should be granted if the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the individual defendants’ interlocutory appeals.” Dkt. # 63 at 2. Ms. Rehn’s only argument that the Court of Appeals would decline jurisdiction is that the appeal is frivolous. Because the Court does not find the appeal frivolous, and because it agrees with Defendants that a stay will promote efficient use of judicial resources, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to stay. Finally, Ms. Rehn filed a notice of supplemental authority attaching a copy of Defendant’s opening brief filed on appeal. Dkt. # 69. Defendants filed a motion to permit a response to this supplemental filing. Dkt. # 70. Because the Court finds Defendants’ motion to stay and Ms. Rehn’s motion to certify may be resolved without additional briefing, the Court denies the motion to permit a response as moot. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Continue Trial, Dkt. # 62, and ORDERS that the trial date and all remaining pretrial deadlines are STAYED pending disposition of the appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. # 57, Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Appeal Frivolous, Dkt. # 64, and Defendants’ Motion to Permit Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Filing, Dkt. # 70. Dated this 28th day of October, 2025.
A
The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge