Elisa Delboux Antunes v. Irene Martin et al.

Opinion

O 1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 United States District Court 7 Central District of California 8 9 ELISA DELBOUX ANTUNES, Case № 2:25-cv-05629-ODW (KSx) 10 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 12 DISMISS [25] 13 IRENE MARTIN et al.

14 Defendants.

15 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff Elisa Delboux Antunes brings this action against Defendants Irene 18 Martin, Director of Los Angeles Field Office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 19 Services (“USCIS”); Kristi Noem, Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland 20 Security (“DHS”); Angelica Alfonso-Royals, Acting Director of USCIS; Pam Bondi, 21 U.S. Attorney General; and Kash Patel, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation 22 alleging that USCIS’s denial of her petition to lift the conditions on her permanent 23 residence violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). (First Am. Compl. 24 (“FAC”), Dkt. No. 22.) Defendants now move to dismiss Antunes’s First Amended 25 Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. (Mot. Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”), Dkt. No. 25.) 26 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.1 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 Antunes is a citizen of Brazil. (FAC ¶ 1.) On January 27, 2022, she received 3 conditional residency status based on an approved Form I-130 Petition filed by her 4 U.S. citizen wife. (Id. ¶ 7.) On December 12, 2023, Antunes filed her Form I-751 5 Petition to Remove Conditions on Residency (“I-751”). (Id. ¶ 8.) On November 4, 6 2024, she filed her Form N-400 Application for Naturalization (“N-400”). (Id. ¶ 10.) 7 On March 19, 2025, USCIS interviewed Antunes. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) 8 On June 20, 2025, Antunes initiated this action to compel adjudication of her 9 then pending I-751 petition and N-400 application. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) On 10 August 19, 2025, USCIS denied Antunes’s I-751 petition. (FAC ¶ 14; Decl. Maureen 11 Killian-Larios ISO Mot. (“Killian-Larios Decl.”) Ex. 2 (“I-751 Decision”), Dkt. 12 No. 25-1.) USCIS determined that Antunes married her spouse “solely to obtain an 13 immigration benefit.” (I-751 Decision.) Thus, USCIS found that Antunes failed to 14 meet her burden to show that she entered into her marriage in good faith. (Id.) 15 USCIS’s decision indicated that Antunes “will have the opportunity to seek review of 16 this decision in removal proceedings before an immigration judge.” (Id.) 17 On September 10, 2025, USCIS denied Antunes’s N-400 application on the 18 grounds that Antunes’s marriage was not a “bona fide marriage” as it was “entered 19 solely for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.” (Killian-Larios Decl.” 20 Ex. 3 (“N-400 Decision”), Dkt. No. 25-1.)3 On September 18, 2025, USCIS issued a 21 Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and placed Antunes in removal proceedings. 22 (Killian-Larios Decl. Ex. 4 (“NTA”), Dkt. No. 25-1.)4 23 24

25 2 All factual references derive from the First Amended Complaint or attached exhibits, unless otherwise noted, and well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this 26 Motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 3 The Court incorporates by reference USCIS’s decision denying Antunes’s N-400 application. See 27 United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (permitting incorporation by reference 28 where “document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim”). 4 The Court incorporates by reference USCIS’s NTA. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. 1 On September 23, 2025, Antunes filed a First Amended Complaint, omitting 2 her unreasonable delay claims and challenging instead USCIS’s denial of her I-751 3 petition under the APA. (FAC ¶¶ 45–68.) Antunes seeks (1) declaratory relief under 4 the APA, (2) injunctive relief, and (3) attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal 5 Access to Justice Act. (Id., Prayer for Relief.) 6 Defendants move to dismiss Antunes’s First Amended Complaint under Federal 7 Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule” or “Rules”) 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). (Mot.) 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 10 Under Rule 12(b)(1), a district court must dismiss a complaint when the court 11 lacks subject matter jurisdiction, which includes when a plaintiff lacks constitutional 12 standing. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because standing . . . 13 pertain[s] to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, [it is] 14 properly raised in a motion to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(1).”). To satisfy Article III 15 standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has suffered an injury in fact that is 16 concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; 17 (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged actions of the defendant; and (3) it is 18 likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 19 favorable decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338–39 (2016); Lujan v. 20 Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The party attempting to invoke a 21 court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for establishing jurisdiction. See Sopcak 22 v. N. Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995). 23 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 24 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 25 legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable legal 26 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 27 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the “minimal notice 28 pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a)(2). Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 1 2003). Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 2 the pleader is entitled to relief.” The factual “allegations must be enough to raise a 3 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 4 555 (2007); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that a claim must be “plausible on its 5 face” to avoid dismissal). 6 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 7 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 8 experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A court is generally limited 9 to the pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the 10 complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City 11 of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly 12 accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable 13 inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 Ultimately, there must be sufficient factual allegations “to give fair notice and to 15 enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively,” and the “allegations that are 16 taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair 17 to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and 18 continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 20 leave to amend unless it is clear that any amendment could not save the complaint. 21 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 22 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court 23 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 24 could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 25 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 26 27 28 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review Antunes’s APA 3 challenge while removal proceedings are ongoing. (Mot. 9–13.)5 4 Under the APA, agency action is subject to judicial review only if it is made 5 reviewable by statute or constitutes a “final” action “for which there is no other 6 adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. For an agency action to be “final” 7 under the APA, it must: (1) “mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making 8 process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature”; and (2) “be one 9 by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal 10 consequences will flow.” S.F. Herring Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 946 F.3d 564, 11 577 (9th Cir. 2019). A district court does not have jurisdiction to hear an APA 12 challenge to an application to adjust status while removal proceedings are pending 13 against the applicant. Cabaccang v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 627 F.3d 14 1313, 1315–16 (9th Cir. 2010). 15 The Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to review Antunes’s challenge to 16 USCIS’s denial of her I-751 petition. The Ninth Circuit addressed a very similar issue 17 in Cabaccang. There, the Ninth Circuit held that USCIS’s denial of the plaintiffs’ 18 applications to adjust status was “not yet a final agency action” because the plaintiffs 19 still had the “right to renew their applications” before an immigration judge (“IJ”). Id. 20 at 1316. The court reasoned that, when USCIS places a noncitizen in removal 21 proceedings, the IJ could review USCIS’s decision de novo and “may completely 22 wipe away” USCIS’s prior decision. Id. (“The IJ then has unfettered authority to 23 modify or reverse USCIS’s denial of the [plaintiffs’] applications, regardless of 24 USCIS’s prior determination.”). 25 Here, there is no dispute that removal proceedings are currently pending against 26 Antunes. (See NTA.) Antunes will have the right to renew her application in removal 27

28 5 As the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court does not reach Defendants’ arguments under Rule 12(b)(6). 1 proceedings and the IJ presiding over Antunes’s removal proceedings will review 2 USCIS’s decision de novo. See Cabaccang, 627 F.3d at 1316. USCIS’s denial of 3 Antunes’s I-751 petition confirms this point. In its decision, USCIS clearly states that 4 Antunes “will have the opportunity to seek review of [USCIS’s] decision in removal 5 proceedings before an immigration judge.” (I-751 Decision.) Accordingly, USCIS’s 6 decision denying Antunes’s I-751 petition is not a “final agency action” for the Court 7 to review under the APA. See 627 F.3d at 1316 (“USCIS’s denial of the [plaintiffs’] 8 applications is not yet a final agency action because of the [plaintiffs’] right to renew 9 their applications before the IJ.”). 10 Antunes attempts to distinguish Cabaccang by arguing that USCIS’s denial of 11 her I-751 petition is “effectively final,” even if she “can renew her application in 12 removal proceedings. (Opp’n 4–5.) This argument distorts the rule of finality in the 13 administrative process and contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cabaccang. As 14 the Ninth Circuit noted, “[t]he imposition of an obligation or the fixing of a legal 15 relationship is the indicium of finality in the administrative process.” Cabaccang, 16 627 F.3d at 1315. Like in Cabaccang, “[h]ere, this indicum is lacking.” See id. As 17 Antunes will have the opportunity to seek review of USCIS’s decision in removal 18 proceedings before the IJ, USCIS’s decision denying her I-751 petition “is not yet” a 19 final agency decision. See id. at 1316. 20 Antunes also argues that jurisdiction vested at the time she filed her original 21 complaint on June 20, 2025. (Opp’n 3–5, Dkt. No. 26.) However, the Ninth Circuit 22 has expressly rejected this argument. See Cabaccang, 627 F.3d at 1317 (rejecting the 23 plaintiffs’ argument that “that jurisdiction vested with the filing of their original 24 complaint”). As the Ninth Circuit noted in Cabaccang, even though the plaintiffs 25 filed their lawsuit before USCIS began removal proceedings, the subsequent initiation 26 of removal proceedings renders the action non-final and deprives the district court of 27 jurisdiction. Id. (“[A]lthough jurisdiction is usually determined from the filing of the 28 relevant complaint, after-arising events can defeat jurisdiction by negating the 1 || ripeness of a claim.”). “To hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts simply by racing to the courthouse before the 3 || government initiates removal proceedings.” /d. 4 The same is true here. That Antunes initiated this action before USCIS placed 5 || her in removal proceedings does not mean that the Court’s jurisdiction vested and can 6 || never be defeated. See id. at 1317 (“[T]he pendency of removal proceedings now 7 || means [the plaintiffs’] claims are not ripe for judicial review.”). Accordingly, the 8 | Court lacks jurisdiction to review Antunes’s challenge of USCIS’s denial of her I-751 9 || petition under the APA. The Court finds Antunes’s remaining arguments for subject 10 || matter jurisdiction unpersuasive. 11 V. CONCLUSION 12 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to 13 || Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 25.) Specifically, the Court DISMISSES Antunes’s First Amended Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE and WITHOUT 15 | LEAVE TO AMEND. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. 16 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 March 11, 2026

OTIS D. GHT, II 33 UNITED STATES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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