Elinor Homes Co. v. St. Lawrence

113 A.D.2d 25, 494 N.Y.S.2d 889, 1985 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 52047
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided November 4, 1985·Published·Cited by 18 cases

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Rubin, J.

The primary issue on this appeal is whether the Treasurer of the County of Rockland is mandated by the Real Property Tax Law to accept the title owners’ tender of payment of a tax sale certificate acquired by the County of Rockland at a tax sale for unpaid 1979 real property taxes (including relevied 1978 school taxes) levied against his land when no simultaneous tender of payment was made for two additional outstanding tax sale certificates acquired by the county at subsequent, successive tax sales for unpaid 1980 and 1981 taxes levied against the same parcel.

Petitioners are property owners who have been delinquent in the payment of real property taxes for three successive years. The intervenor, the County of Rockland (county), enforces the collection of unpaid taxes by administrative tax sale pursuant to Real Property Tax Law article 10. At such a tax sale, the County Treasurer must sell so much of each parcel as will be sufficient to pay the amount due on said parcel as specified in the notice of sale (see, Real Property Tax Law § 1006 [1]), which includes the unpaid taxes for the year advertised, the 5% added pursuant to Real Property Tax Law § 936, interest thereon, and the expense chargeable against the parcel (see, Real Property Tax Law § 1002 [2]). At each sale, the County Treasurer furnishes the purchaser with a tax sale certificate, describing the parcel purchased, the amount paid thereon, and the time when the purchaser will be entitled to a deed. In the event the lands described in the certificate are not redeemed, the purchaser may take a conveyance [27] of the lands as provided in Real Property Tax Law, article 10, title 1, or foreclose his lien pursuant to article 11, title 2 (see, Real Property Tax Law § 1006 [2]). Pursuant to Real Property Tax Law § 1008 (3) the board of supervisors of a county* may by resolution authorize and direct the County Treasurer to purchase lands at the tax sale, without competitive bidding, for the gross amount due thereon. The purpose behind such authorization, which excludes third-party bidders, is to allow counties to prevent abuses resulting from competitive bidding by unscrupulous tax sale speculators (33 Opns St Comp, 1977, p 154). Rockland County has apparently opted to conduct tax sales without competitive bidding and the Treasurer purchases for the county all property sold at a tax sale for unpaid taxes.

At a tax sale conducted in October 1979, properties owned by petitioners were sold by the County Treasurer to the County of Rockland for delinquent State, county and town taxes levied for the year 1979 and the relevied 1978 school taxes. For each parcel sold, the county was furnished with a tax sale certificate. Thereafter, the county acquired tax sale certificates for the same parcels when said parcels were again sold for unpaid real property taxes at the tax sales held for the years 1980 and 1981.

In 1982, petitioner Elinor Homes Company (Elinor Homes) tendered payment of the oldest of the three tax sale certificates acquired by the county for the purpose of redemption. The County Treasurer refused the tender, advising Elinor Homes that, in order to redeem its property, all three tax sale certificates for said parcel must be paid in full. Based on the Treasurer’s refusal to accept Elinor Homes’ tender, the other petitioners did not tender payment of the 1979 tax sale certificates on their respective parcels.

Thereafter, petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against the County Treasurer to compel said official to accept payment for the 1979 tax sale certificates acquired by the county, contending that there is no provision in the Real Property Tax Law which requires the owner to simultaneously pay all outstanding tax sale certificates on a specific parcel before exercising the right of redemption. By judgment dated April 1, 1982, Special Term granted the petition to the extent, inter alia, of directing the Treasurer to [28] accept petitioners’ payments for redemption of the certificates acquired by the county at the 1979 tax sale and afforded petitioners 20 days from the date of service of said judgment with notice of entry to make their payments.

Subsequently, the County of Rockland moved for leave to intervene in the proceeding for the purpose of perfecting an appeal. The motion was granted by order dated August 16, 1983. Special Term cited the county’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding and the County Treasurer’s refusal to take an appeal as the factors warranting intervention.

Addressing this procedural issue first, petitioners contend on their cross appeal from the order dated August 16, 1983, that Special Term abused its discretion in granting the county’s motion to intervene because the application was not timely and the supporting papers failed to show, in accordance with the requirements of CPLR 1012, that the county’s interests are inadequately represented by the County Treasurer and that the county may be bound by the judgment.

Petitioners’ reliance on the requirements for granting intervention in an action pursuant to CPLR 1012 is misplaced. CPLR 7802 (d) is the specific provision governing intervention in CPLR article 78 proceedings. CPLR 7802 (d) states that a court "may allow other interested persons to intervene”. This subdivision grants the court broader power to allow intervention in an article 78 proceeding than is provided pursuant to either CPLR 1012 or 1013 in an action (see, Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure [NY Legis Doc, 1958, No. 13], at 398; Matter of Helms v Diamond, 76 Misc 2d 253, 255; Matter of Muccioli v Board of Stds. & Appeals, 42 Misc 2d 1088, 1089). The court has discretion to allow intervention in a CPLR article 78 proceeding at any time, provided the movant is an interested person (see, Siegel, NY Prac § 564 [1978]). Here, the county was the owner of the tax sale certificates in question and the owner of the funds in the custody of the County Treasurer (see, County Law § 550 [2]). Under the circumstances, the county was clearly an interested person. Moreover, the county’s motion to intervene was made before the respondent Treasurer’s time to appeal expired. It appears that petitioners delayed in serving upon the respondent Treasurer the judgment dated April 1, 1982 with notice of entry, which would have started the clock running on the time to file a notice of appeal, because serving the Treasurer also would have started the clock running on the time afforded by said judgment to [29] tender payment to the County Treasurer. Consequently, petitioners cannot be heard to complain that the motion was untimely. The interest of the county having been established, the motion to intervene was properly granted.

Turning to the substantive issue, we conclude that petitioners do not have a statutory right to redeem their respective lands from the 1979 tax sales unless payment for the certificates issued at said sales to the county together with payment for all outstanding certificates acquired by the county at subsequent, successive tax sales, plus interest and penalties allowed by law, is tendered to the County Treasurer (see, Culspar, Inc. v County of Essex, 119 Misc 2d 4, 9; 1980 Opns St Comp No. 80-567, p 160; 1970 Opns St Comp No. 70-813, unreported).

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Elinor Homes Co. v. St. Lawrence, 113 A.D.2d 25, 494 N.Y.S.2d 889, 1985 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 52047 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985).

113 A.D.2d 25 (Elinor Homes Co. v. St. Lawrence) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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