Eleshia Heggins v. Department of Housing and Urban Development

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 1, 2024
DocketDA-0752-18-0540-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Eleshia Heggins v. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Eleshia Heggins v. Department of Housing and Urban Development) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eleshia Heggins v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ELESHIA HEGGINS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-18-0540-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND DATE: May 1, 2024 URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Don T. O’Bannon , Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the appellant.

Mary C. Merchant , Esquire, Sakeena M. Adams , Esquire, and Taylor L. Baronich , Esquire, Fort Worth, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the administrative judge’s analysis in sustaining the charge of lack of candor, we AFFIRM the initial decision. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the agency: (1) failed to prove its charge of falsification of time and attendance records; (2) failed to prove the third specification of the charge of lack of candor; and (3) failed to provide her with requested union representation or notify her of her right to union representation prior to her interview with agents of the agency’s Office of Inspector General. Petition for Review File, Tab 1. She does not challenge the administrative judge’s findings that she failed to prove her remaining affirmative defenses, that a nexus exists between her conduct and the efficiency of the service, and that the penalty of removal did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness. We have reviewed the appellant’s arguments regarding the agency’s failure to prove its charge of falsification, as well as her argument that the agency failed to provide her with her requested union representation or notice of her right to union representation, and affirm the administrative judge’s findings for the reasons set forth in the initial decision. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 51, Initial Decision (ID); see Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings 3

when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on the issue of credibility). We find the appellant’s argument regarding the third specification of the lack of candor charge to be without merit; however, we clarify the administrative judge’s analysis of this charge. An agency alleging lack of candor must prove (1) that the employee gave incorrect or incomplete information and (2) that she did so knowingly. Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17 (2016). The agency’s sustained specifications provided that the appellant “knowingly” provided incorrect information to agency officials. IAF, Tab 14 at 28-38. However, the administrative judge found that, for each sustained specification, the appellant supplied incorrect information to agency officials and, in doing so, “intended to deceive” the agency. ID at 11-14. Although lack of candor “necessarily involves an element of deception,” “intent to deceive” is not a separate element of the offense, as it is for falsification. Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d 1280, 1284-85 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It was not necessary for the administrative judge to find the appellant’s conduct intentional to sustain the lack of candor charge. ID at 11-14; see Prouty v. General Services Administration, 122 M.S.P.R. 117, ¶ 16 (2014) (observing that the Board is required to review the agency’s decision on an adverse action solely on the grounds invoked by the agency). Any error that the administrative judge made in her findings was not prejudicial to the appellant, however, because a finding of intent implicitly includes a finding that the appellant’s conduct was knowing. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (providing that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of the initial decision). Accordingly, the administrative judge properly found that the agency proved its charge of lack of candor. ID at 11-16. We affirm the initial decision, as modified herein. 4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703

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Related

Andrew Ludlum v. Department of Justice
278 F.3d 1280 (Federal Circuit, 2002)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Eleshia Heggins v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eleshia-heggins-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development-mspb-2024.