F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 7 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
WILLIAM ELEFANT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1467 (D.C. No. 97-WM-2728) METROPOLITAN STATE COLLEGE (D. Colo.) OF DENVER,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , PORFILIO , and EBEL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. William Elefant appeals from the dismissal with prejudice of his complaint
against Metropolitan State College of Denver (“Metropolitan”) for discrimination.
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
I.
Mr. Elefant, appearing pro se, filed his complaint alleging age and sex
discrimination on December 26, 1996. On January 26, 1997, Metropolitan
specially appeared and moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (4), and (5). Specifically, Metropolitan alleged that it
“is not a legal entity capable of suit,” citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-50-101, which
places Metropolitan under the control of the trustees of the state colleges in
Colorado (“trustees”) and empowers the trustees to be a party to all suits and
contracts of the denominated colleges. See Appellant’s App. at 10. Because
Mr. Elefant had not served the trustees, Metropolitan further alleged lack of
personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of
process.
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Elefant argued that
section 23-50-101 did not provide that Metropolitan was not amenable to suit,
citing a Colorado federal district court case denying a similar motion. He
requested the court deny the motion to dismiss and allow him to proceed with the
prosecution of his claims, stating that “[i]f the Court finds that the service of
-2- process must be made on any person” other than the person served, he would do
so. Id. at 21. Metropolitan later amended its motion to request dismissal without
prejudice. The magistrate judge to whom the motion was referred recommended
denying the motion to dismiss, noting that the authority offered by Metropolitan
was “not particularly enlightening,” and that the federal courts had determined
that Metropolitan is a statutory employer for Title VII purposes. Id. at 32.
Because the magistrate judge was “unable to find any authority which requires
that the board of trustees be substituted for [Metropolitan] as defendant in this
action,” he concluded that Mr. Elefant could properly maintain his Title VII and
ADEA claims against the college. Id. at 32-33.
The district court disagreed, concluding that Metropolitan was not an entity
capable of being sued because “[n]owhere in the statutes is [Metropolitan] given
distinct legal status, recognized as an official state agency, or . . . given any
authority to sue or be sued.” Id. at 56-58. Citing Roberts v. State Board of
Agriculture , 998 F.2d 824, 826 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1993), the court dismissed the
suit with prejudice. In his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Elefant, inter alia ,
(1) brought to the court’s attention the fact that Metropolitan had amended its
motion to one for dismissal without prejudice; (2) asked the court to allow him to
add the trustees as defendants and serve them within a reasonable period of time
instead of dismissing the complaint; and (3) demonstrated to the court that
-3- Metropolitan had, as sole plaintiff and in its own name, brought suit in the courts,
which indicated it is a legal entity capable of suing and being sued. See
Appellant’s App. at 60-61, 66. The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration without further analysis. See id. at 85.
II.
On appeal, Mr. Elefant alleges both substantive and procedural error. That
is, he asserts that the district court erred in concluding that Metropolitan is not an
entity amenable to suit and that the court also erred by dismissing the complaint
instead of allowing him to amend to add the trustees as a party. Significantly,
Metropolitan does not address Mr. Elefant’s substantive argument that his case is
distinguishable from Roberts and the other case authority relied on by the district
court because the legislature has granted the trustees authority to delegate their
power over college personnel matters, including the power to contract and appoint
and terminate professors, to the chief executive officer of the college and, in turn,
to whomever the chief executive officer delegates. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 23-5-117 (1999). Mr. Elefant implicitly argues that, by empowering the
delegation of the trustees’ authority to contract to Metropolitan officials, the
legislature has also necessarily endowed Metropolitan with the right to sue and be
sued on those employment contracts. Mr. Elefant’s argument is not without
support. Cf. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co. , 259 U.S. 344,
-4- 390-91 (1922) (stating that equitable considerations also control whether an
unincorporated entity may be sued in its own name; noting that statutes created a
“self-acting body with great funds to accomplish their purpose,” and that the
union was capable of committing torts; and holding that unincorporated labor
union was therefore suable in tort); Clark v. Grand Lodge of Bhd. of R.R.
Trainmen , 43 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Mo. 1931) (noting that even though
unincorporated association had no express statutory right to sue, statutes that
authorized it to make insurance contracts by necessary implication also granted it
legal capacity to be sued on those contracts). The ramifications of concluding
that a college is or is not a legal entity capable of suing or being sued are serious
and long-reaching. Because we reverse on other grounds, we postpone resolution
of the issue to a case in which it has been thoroughly briefed.
In regard to Mr. Elefant’s procedural argument, Metropolitan implies that
dismissal was his fault because he had plenty of time to amend but did not. See
Appellee’s Br. at 17. We disagree. Clearly, Mr. Elefant was awaiting the court’s
permission to amend his complaint to add and serve the trustees. The grant of
leave to amend the pleadings is within the discretion of the trial court, see
Ketchum v. Cruz ,
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 7 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
WILLIAM ELEFANT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1467 (D.C. No. 97-WM-2728) METROPOLITAN STATE COLLEGE (D. Colo.) OF DENVER,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , PORFILIO , and EBEL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. William Elefant appeals from the dismissal with prejudice of his complaint
against Metropolitan State College of Denver (“Metropolitan”) for discrimination.
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
I.
Mr. Elefant, appearing pro se, filed his complaint alleging age and sex
discrimination on December 26, 1996. On January 26, 1997, Metropolitan
specially appeared and moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (4), and (5). Specifically, Metropolitan alleged that it
“is not a legal entity capable of suit,” citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-50-101, which
places Metropolitan under the control of the trustees of the state colleges in
Colorado (“trustees”) and empowers the trustees to be a party to all suits and
contracts of the denominated colleges. See Appellant’s App. at 10. Because
Mr. Elefant had not served the trustees, Metropolitan further alleged lack of
personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of
process.
In his response to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Elefant argued that
section 23-50-101 did not provide that Metropolitan was not amenable to suit,
citing a Colorado federal district court case denying a similar motion. He
requested the court deny the motion to dismiss and allow him to proceed with the
prosecution of his claims, stating that “[i]f the Court finds that the service of
-2- process must be made on any person” other than the person served, he would do
so. Id. at 21. Metropolitan later amended its motion to request dismissal without
prejudice. The magistrate judge to whom the motion was referred recommended
denying the motion to dismiss, noting that the authority offered by Metropolitan
was “not particularly enlightening,” and that the federal courts had determined
that Metropolitan is a statutory employer for Title VII purposes. Id. at 32.
Because the magistrate judge was “unable to find any authority which requires
that the board of trustees be substituted for [Metropolitan] as defendant in this
action,” he concluded that Mr. Elefant could properly maintain his Title VII and
ADEA claims against the college. Id. at 32-33.
The district court disagreed, concluding that Metropolitan was not an entity
capable of being sued because “[n]owhere in the statutes is [Metropolitan] given
distinct legal status, recognized as an official state agency, or . . . given any
authority to sue or be sued.” Id. at 56-58. Citing Roberts v. State Board of
Agriculture , 998 F.2d 824, 826 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1993), the court dismissed the
suit with prejudice. In his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Elefant, inter alia ,
(1) brought to the court’s attention the fact that Metropolitan had amended its
motion to one for dismissal without prejudice; (2) asked the court to allow him to
add the trustees as defendants and serve them within a reasonable period of time
instead of dismissing the complaint; and (3) demonstrated to the court that
-3- Metropolitan had, as sole plaintiff and in its own name, brought suit in the courts,
which indicated it is a legal entity capable of suing and being sued. See
Appellant’s App. at 60-61, 66. The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration without further analysis. See id. at 85.
II.
On appeal, Mr. Elefant alleges both substantive and procedural error. That
is, he asserts that the district court erred in concluding that Metropolitan is not an
entity amenable to suit and that the court also erred by dismissing the complaint
instead of allowing him to amend to add the trustees as a party. Significantly,
Metropolitan does not address Mr. Elefant’s substantive argument that his case is
distinguishable from Roberts and the other case authority relied on by the district
court because the legislature has granted the trustees authority to delegate their
power over college personnel matters, including the power to contract and appoint
and terminate professors, to the chief executive officer of the college and, in turn,
to whomever the chief executive officer delegates. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 23-5-117 (1999). Mr. Elefant implicitly argues that, by empowering the
delegation of the trustees’ authority to contract to Metropolitan officials, the
legislature has also necessarily endowed Metropolitan with the right to sue and be
sued on those employment contracts. Mr. Elefant’s argument is not without
support. Cf. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co. , 259 U.S. 344,
-4- 390-91 (1922) (stating that equitable considerations also control whether an
unincorporated entity may be sued in its own name; noting that statutes created a
“self-acting body with great funds to accomplish their purpose,” and that the
union was capable of committing torts; and holding that unincorporated labor
union was therefore suable in tort); Clark v. Grand Lodge of Bhd. of R.R.
Trainmen , 43 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Mo. 1931) (noting that even though
unincorporated association had no express statutory right to sue, statutes that
authorized it to make insurance contracts by necessary implication also granted it
legal capacity to be sued on those contracts). The ramifications of concluding
that a college is or is not a legal entity capable of suing or being sued are serious
and long-reaching. Because we reverse on other grounds, we postpone resolution
of the issue to a case in which it has been thoroughly briefed.
In regard to Mr. Elefant’s procedural argument, Metropolitan implies that
dismissal was his fault because he had plenty of time to amend but did not. See
Appellee’s Br. at 17. We disagree. Clearly, Mr. Elefant was awaiting the court’s
permission to amend his complaint to add and serve the trustees. The grant of
leave to amend the pleadings is within the discretion of the trial court, see
Ketchum v. Cruz , 961 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir.1992), but “leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Refusing leave to amend
is generally justified only upon a showing of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
-5- motive, . . . repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, . . . [or] futility of amendment.”
Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The district court gave no reason for
denying Mr. Elefant’s request for leave to amend, and there is nothing in the
record justifying the denial. Our concept of justice requires allowing a pro se
plaintiff to timely amend to add a proper party when there is no prejudice to the
opposing parties. Further, our rule requiring courts to liberally construe pro se
pleadings and hold them to less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers applies to all proceedings involving pro se litigants. See Hall v.
Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 110 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Reynoldson v.
Shillinger , 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that pro se plaintiffs are
often unaware of technical pleading requirements and stating that if “‘it is at all
possible that the party against whom the dismissal is directed can correct the
defect in the pleading . . . , the court should dismiss with leave to amend’”). The
district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Elefant’s request to amend and
in dismissing his complaint with prejudice.
-6- The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is REVERSED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge
-7-