Electronics Corporation of America v. Honeywell, Inc.

First Circuit

Electronics Corporation of America v. Honeywell, Inc.

487 F.2d 513

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit

DecidedMarch 4, 1974

Docket73-1260

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 487 F.2d 513 (Electronics Corporation of America v. Honeywell, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Electronics Corporation of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 487 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1974).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

After argument and studying the briefs, we have come to the conclusion that we cannot improve on the thoughtful opinion of the district court, 358 F. Supp. 1230 (D.Mass.1973). We therefore affirm on the basis of that opinion. We add only two comments. The first is that appellant makes the pillar of its claim for punitive damages, fees, and costs, despite absence of any proof of actual damages, our statements in the prior case, Electronics Corporation of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 428 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1970), that material misrepresentations “will damage” and that in a two-firm market “harm is sufficiently apparent” when such misrepresentations are made. While we cannot fault appellant for seizing on this language, we do not recant. When we spoke of the inevitability of harm we were not addressing the availability of damages but of relief. Because appel- *514 lee’s harmful conduct was discontinued and no actual damage was shown no further relief is indicated. Our second comment is that in relying on the district court opinion, we do not indicate necessary agreement with its conclusion that palming off is not an essential element of a Lanham Act claim. We say this only because such a stance is not necessary for the decision of this appeal.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

After argument and studying the briefs, we have come to the conclusion that we cannot improve on the thoughtful opinion of the district court, 358 F. Supp. 1230 (D.Mass.1973). We therefore affirm on the basis of that opinion. We add only two comments. The first is that appellant makes the pillar of its claim for punitive damages, fees, and costs, despite absence of any proof of actual damages, our statements in the prior case, Electronics Corporation of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 428 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1970), that material misrepresentations “will damage” and that in a two-firm market “harm is sufficiently apparent” when such misrepresentations are made. While we cannot fault appellant for seizing on this language, we do not recant. When we spoke of the inevitability of harm we were not addressing the availability of damages but of relief. Because appel- *514 lee’s harmful conduct was discontinued and no actual damage was shown no further relief is indicated. Our second comment is that in relying on the district court opinion, we do not indicate necessary agreement with its conclusion that palming off is not an essential element of a Lanham Act claim. We say this only because such a stance is not necessary for the decision of this appeal.

Affirmed.

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487 F.2d 513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/electronics-corporation-of-america-v-honeywell-inc-ca1-1974.

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