Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMay 22, 2018
DocketCivil Action No. 2017-0121
StatusPublished

This text of Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Federal Bureau of Investigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, (D.D.C. 2018).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:17-cv-00121 (TNM) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Electronic Privacy Information Center, or EPIC, challenges the way that the Federal

Bureau of Investigation has responded to its Freedom of Information Act request for records

related to Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. EPIC questions the adequacy of

the FBI’s search for responsive records, the propriety of the FBI’s withholdings and redactions,

and the accuracy of the FBI’s segregability determination. But because the FBI has shown that it

conducted an adequate search and that it properly withheld and redacted non-segregable records

under FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and 7(A), the FBI’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be

granted and EPIC’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

EPIC’s FOIA request states generally that it “seeks records pertaining to the FBI’s

investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.” EPIC’s FOIA

Request 1, attached to Mot. Summary J. Decl. of David M. Hardy (Hardy Decl.) as Ex. A. It

provides several pages of background to the request, explaining EPIC’s interest in Russian cyber

attacks on the Republican National Committee, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Id. at 1-5. It then makes itemized records

requests for:

(1) All records, including but not limited to, memos, reports, guidelines, procedures, summaries, and emails pertaining to the FBI’s investigation of Russian-sponsored cyber attack on the RNC, DNC, and DCCC. (2) All records of communications to the RNC, DNC, and DCCC regarding the threat of Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election. (3) All records of communications with other federal agencies regarding Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election. (4) All records including, but not limited to, memos, reports, guidelines, and procedures pertaining to the FBI’s procedure to notify targets of cyber attacks.

Id. at 6. The FBI searched for responsive records, but withheld all records responsive to

Items 1-3 and heavily redacted some records responsive to Item 4. The FBI seeks

summary judgment, arguing that it conducted an adequate search; that its withholdings

and redactions are necessary to protect an ongoing investigation, to protect classified

information, and to protect intelligence sources and methods; and that it has released all

reasonably segregable information to EPIC. EPIC also seeks summary judgment,

arguing that the FBI has not made an adequate showing on any of these issues.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must show that “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). FOIA

requires federal agencies to “disclose information to the public upon reasonable request unless

the records at issue fall within specifically delineated exemptions.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FBI,

522 F.3d 364, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (creating a disclosure

obligation only where a request “reasonably describes” the records sought). Thus, a FOIA

defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it shows that there is no genuine dispute about

2 whether “each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is

unidentifiable or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection requirements.” See Weisberg v.

Dep’t of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Courts decide the “vast majority” of FOIA

cases on motions for summary judgment. See Brayton v. Office of United States Trade Rep., 641

F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

To show that any unproduced documents are exempt from FOIA, an agency may file

“affidavits describing the material withheld and the manner in which it falls within the

exemption claimed.” King v. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Courts

review the applicability of FOIA exemptions de novo but give “substantial weight to detailed

agency explanations” of national security concerns related to FOIA disclosures. Id.

To show that any unproduced documents are unidentifiable, a defendant must show “a

good faith effort to [] search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably

expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby v. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68

(D.C. Cir. 1990). In other words, the defendant must “demonstrate beyond material doubt that

its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Nation Magazine v.

Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The touchstone of the analysis is the

reasonableness of the search, not the records produced. See Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 580

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he adequacy of a search is determined not by the fruits of the search, but

by the appropriateness of [its] methods.”); Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(“[A] search, under FOIA, is not unreasonable simply because it fails to produce all relevant

material.”).

An agency may exercise discretion in crafting its search to meet this standard, and does

not have to search every system if additional searches are unlikely to produce any marginal

3 return. See Campbell v. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Searching for

records requires “both systemic and case-specific exercises of discretion and administrative

judgment and expertise,” and is “hardly an area in which the courts should attempt to micro-

manage the executive branch.” Schrecker v. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 662 (D.C. Cir.

2003). To prove the reasonableness of its search, an agency can submit a “reasonably detailed

affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all

files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.” Oglesby, 920

F.2d at 68. Agency declarations enjoy “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted

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Campbell v. United States Department of Justice
164 F.3d 20 (D.C. Circuit, 1998)
Mays v. Drug Enforcement Administration
234 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Circuit, 2000)
Schrecker v. United States Department of Justice
349 F.3d 657 (D.C. Circuit, 2003)
Sussman v. United States Marshals Service
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Juarez v. Department of Justice
518 F.3d 54 (D.C. Circuit, 2008)
Larson v. Department of State
565 F.3d 857 (D.C. Circuit, 2009)
Hodge v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
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Cucci v. Drug Enforcement Administration
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Mobley v. Central Intelligence Agency
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