Electric Candy Mach. Co. v. Empire Cream Separator Co.

161 F. 552, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5123
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedMay 16, 1908
StatusPublished

This text of 161 F. 552 (Electric Candy Mach. Co. v. Empire Cream Separator Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Electric Candy Mach. Co. v. Empire Cream Separator Co., 161 F. 552, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5123 (D.N.J. 1908).

Opinion

CROSS, District Judge.

The complainant is the owner of letters patent No. 618,428, which were issued to William J. Morrison and John C. Wharton January 31, 1899, for a “candy machine.” The pleadings are in the usual form. The first claim only of the patent is involved. It is as follows:

“1. The combination, in a candy-machine, of a rotative, perforated vessel, A, A', A", C, C', and a heating attachment, or burner, m, substantially as shown and for the purpose set forth.”

The defendant has rested its case upon the complainant’s proofs, and consequently is restricted in its defense to a denial of infringement. Narrowed still farther, the substantial question for decision is whether the scope of claim 1 in the complainant’s patent is so narrowed and limited by the use of reference letters therein that it embraces that particular form of construction only which is shown in the diagram to which the letters refer. On the part of the complainant, it is maintained that there are but two elements in the claim, a rotative perforated vessel, and a heating attachment or burner; while the defendant claims that the flange of the rotative vessel which is indicated in the claims, drawings, and specifications by the letter A" is either an additional element, or an essential feature of the first element, with which, regarded in either way, the defendant has dispensed, and consequently has not infringed the patent in suit. This, as I understand the argument of complainant’s counsel, is the only material defense; but, whether or not I am right in this assumption, it is in fact, in my judgment, the only substantial difference, if any, between the two machines. In an application for a preliminary injunction, based upon ex parte affidavits, I was in doubt whether or not the defendant’s insistment was correct, and, consequently, for that and other reasons, denied the complainant’s application. It may properly be stated at this point that the validity of the complainant’s patent was upheld in Electric Candy Company v. Morris (C. C.) 156 Fed. 972, in which case it was also held to be a pioneer invention in the sense in which that expression is defined in Westinghouse v. Boyden Brake Co., 170 U. S. 537, 18 Sup. Ct. 707, 42 L. Ed. 1136, viz.:

[553]*553“A device of sucli novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art as distinguished from mere improvement or perfection of what had gone before.”

Tending in the same direction is the testimony of the complainant’s expert, who says that he knows of no candy machine which has the dements of claim 1 upon which the patent in suit is an improvement.

I have already said that in my judgment the only substantial difference, if any, between the machine of the complainant and the defendant, is that the former has the flange, A", which the latter has not. There are, however, some immaterial differences of construction which will now be considered, and, first, the bottom of the complainant’s revolving vessel is concave in form, while in the defendant’s it is flat, but in the latter the upper part is convex, with the result that the interior of the sugar holding vessel is substantially of the same shape in both, and in either case the bulk of the sugar is held in the center of the vessel as remote as may be from the zone of intensest heat over the circle of gas burners beneath. Moreover, in both, the sugar, as held by the receptacle, is comparatively thin over the burners, so that it may be readily and rapidly melted, after which it is thrown by centrifugal force outwardly to and through the small apertures or perforations in the edge of the revolving vessel. The portion thus melted and thrown out is immediately replaced by unmelled sugar from the mass in the center of the vessel, and this process is constantly repeated while the machine is in operation. In both machines the circle of perforations is located at the outer limits of the sugar-containing vessel, into which the sugar is fed at the top, through a passage shaped like an inverted funnel. This form of opening is used to prevent the sugar from being thrown out at the top of the vessel by its rapid revolution. The transposition of the upper and lower parts of the sugar-containing vessel just referred to is, in my opinion, a manifest evasion. Another but unimportant difference in mechanical construction consists in the fact that the upper and lower parts of the containing vessel are held together, in the case of the patented machine, by clamps, and in the defendant’s by bolts. These are plainly mechanical equivalents. Again, the means of rotating the vessels is different. It should be noted, however, that claim 1 does not specify the mechanism which might be adopted for that purpose. It is true that in the specifications, foot power is referred to; but it is added that such power might be replaced by any other suitable power. So, also, the perforations in the two machines, although similarly located, differ somewhat in shape. In the drawings of the patent they are shown as small triangular apertures, while in the defendant’s machine they are narrow slits as if made by a very fine saw. In either case, however, they perform substantially the same function in the same way. Then, too, the claim in question does not restrict the openings to any particular size or shape. The vessel is said to be “perforated,” and perforations may be of manifold sizes and shapes. Furthermore, the patentees in their specifications say:

“We do not confine ourselves to the exact construction of the machine as shown in the drawings, as it is obvious that various forms might be given to the essential parts,”

[554]*554We come then to a consideration of the question whether or not the flange, A", is so described by letters of reference in the claim as to constitute it either an element by itself or an essential part of an element. The function of the flange, if any it has, is evidently insignificant and unimportant. The specifications, after speaking of the melted sugar as being thrown by the centrifugal force of the revolving vessel through the perforations, adds: “Thence along the flanged part, A", to. the extreme edge of the rotative vessel.” This is the only reference made to the flange, simply as a flange, and it is apparent that no function is ascribed to it. Complainant’s expert, testifying upon this point, says:

“It is evident that flange A" has a variety of functions, although none are specified or even mentioned in the specifications of the patent. It is clear, however, that the flange, A", strengthens the curved portion' of the rotating vessel and enables it to retain its shape in spite of the centrifugal forces developed during rotation. A second function is to furnish a means for attaching the cylinder, A', to the rotating vessel, and, thirdly, being always hot during the operation of the machine, the temperature being about the melting point of sugar, it would, if the speed of rotation is low, keep the streams of candy issuing from the perforations in the circumference of the vessel sufficiently warm so that they might continue to stretch during the passage across the flange A", whether narrow or wide, to the receptacle beyond. In case of very rapid rotation this third function would so nearly disappear as to be inappreciable.”

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Related

Electric Candy Machine Co. v. Morris
156 F. 972 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri, 1905)
City of Boston v. Allen
91 F. 248 (First Circuit, 1898)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
161 F. 552, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 5123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/electric-candy-mach-co-v-empire-cream-separator-co-njd-1908.