NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0324n.06
Case No. 23-2100
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jul 25, 2024 ) ELEANORE KUE, et al., KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN SAMUEL NORTH, et al., ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendants-Appellees. ) ) OPINION
Before: GRIFFIN, NALBANDIAN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. After a months-long investigation into His Healing
Hands, a medical clinic in Lansing, for over-prescribing controlled substances, Michigan
prosecutors declined to press charges. The clinic’s owners and operators, Dr. Eleanore Kue and
her husband Simon, were not happy about this investigation. So they sued, alleging among other
things violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and malicious prosecution. But
because their complaint fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation, the district court
dismissed the case on the pleadings. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.
I.
A.
Dr. Eleanore Kue ran an urgent-care clinic called His Healing Hands in Lansing, Michigan
(the “Clinic”). In 2019, Michigan State Police in the Diversion Investigation Unit (DIU) started
investigating whether Kue was overprescribing controlled prescription medications to Clinic No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
patients. Officer Brett Brice, a member of the DIU, stated in his search warrant affidavit1 that he
noticed “several red flags of overprescribing or prescribing outside the scope of legitimate medical
practice.” R.34-2, Clinic Search Warrant, p.6, PageID 244. This was based in part on a tip from
a local pharmacist and on information about Kue’s prescribing history gathered from Michigan’s
Automated Prescription System (MAPS). MAPS showed that “the top three drugs prescribed by
Dr. Eleanore Kue in order are Clonazepam (Klonopin) 1mg tablet, Alprazolam 1mg tablet, and
Tramadol HCL 50mg tablet,” three Schedule IV controlled substances. Id.; see also Drug
Enforcement Administration, Controlled Substances - Alphabetical Order, 6, 8, 20 (last updated
April 15, 2024), https://perma.cc/QRQ8-EYEX. Brice also spoke to a Blue Cross Blue Shield
investigator who explained that Kue’s ratio of payments for prescriptions versus payments for
office visits was “unusual”—Blue Cross Blue Shield paid $133,000 for Kue’s prescriptions but
only $23,000 for her office visits. See id. at pp.6–7, PageID 244–45.
On top of this, Brice visited His Helping Hands four times as an undercover agent. He
observed what he thought was suspicious behavior by both the patients and Dr. Kue herself.
Officers Benjamin Garrison and Thomas Proffitt also visited the Clinic undercover.
In December 2019, a Michigan state court judge approved search warrants for Kue’s home
and the Clinic. Officers executed the warrants the next day. Officers additionally obtained
warrants to freeze two bank accounts associated with Kue. Despite all this, the county prosecutor
declined to press charges against Kue and dropped the civil forfeiture proceedings against Kue and
1 At the Rule 12(c) stage, “a court may consider exhibits attached to the complaint, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir. 2016).
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the Clinic. The Michigan Board of Medicine, however, investigated Kue and placed her on
probation for one year and fined her $2,000 for medical negligence.
B.
Believing themselves wronged by this whole ordeal, Eleanore and Simon Kue sued under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.2
They sued the Michigan State Police troopers and others,3 asserting that Defendants (1) failed to
support the search warrants with probable cause, (2) subjected them to malicious prosecution,
(3) violated their substantive due process rights, (4) conspired to violate their civil rights, and
(5) tortiously interfered with a business relationship.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c). In response, Plaintiffs moved to amend under Rule 15(a), which permits amendments
“when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion,
faulting them for failing to “file a substantive response to the Rule 12(c) Motion” and instead
“seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint.” R.58, Order, p.1, PageID 495. “It’s time to get a
direct and substantive response to Rule 12(c) Motion on the pleadings as they have stood” for
several months, the court declared. Id. at p.2, PageID 496. “If [P]laintiffs’ position is that they
can’t defend the existing pleading and can only survive if they are permitted to amend, then they
should say that. On the other hand, if they think the pleading can be defended in its current form,
they should say that and explain why.” Id.
2 His Healing Hands Urgent Care Center, Inc., is also a plaintiff. 3 This includes Troopers Samuel North, Brett Brice, Benjamin Garrison, Scott Josephs, and Thomas Proffitt. Plaintiffs also sued Janice Waldmiller, Jamie Ousley, Debra Gagliardi, Forest Pasanski, Eric St. Onge, and Lindsey Malocu. But these parties were voluntarily dismissed. See Appellants Br. at 18 n.85; Appellees Br. at 4 n.3. So only the Michigan State Police troopers remain.
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So Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing it should
not be granted and, in the alternative, their motion should be construed as a Rule 56(c) motion—a
motion for summary judgment—to allow the district court to consider their proposed amended
complaint. The district court again denied Plaintiffs’ motion: “The Court closely examined
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Amended Complaint” and “[n]one of these allegations sufficiently
demonstrate that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.” R.62,
Op. and Order, pp.16–17, PageID 565–66.4 In the same opinion and order, the district court
granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Plaintiffs failed to state
plausible claims for relief on all counts, and the court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claim. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II.
Though they present various issues, Plaintiffs’ claims come within two broad questions:
(1) whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend, and (2) whether the
court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The parties first ask us
to evaluate the denial of the motion to amend, then to review the grant of judgment on the
pleadings. But, as explained below, these two broad questions essentially merge into one.
To see how, consider the standard for reviewing a denial of a motion to amend. Though a
“court’s order denying a Rule 15(a) motion to amend is usually reviewed for an abuse of
discretion,” Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010),
4 The district court said the “new material consist[ed] only of inconsequential nit-picks; more possible innocent explanations for Kue’s behavior; and additional conclusory assertions that Defendants made falsified or misleading statements or omissions.” R.62, pp.16–17, PageID 565– 66.
4 No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
“we review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint based on a finding
that ‘the amendment would be futile,’” Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, Inc., 97 F.4th 403, 409
(6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Baaghil v. Miller, 1 F.4th 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2021)). Applying that here,
recall that the district court reviewed the proffered amendment and concluded that “[n]one of these
allegations [contained in the proposed amended complaint] sufficiently demonstrate that
Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.” R.62, p.17, PageID 566.
The court rejected the proposed amended complaint because it changed nothing. In fewer words,
it rejected it because it was futile. When the denial is based on futility, we will uphold the decision
if “the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Riverview Health, 601
F.3d at 512.
This connects the first issue to the second: “When a district court dismisses a case under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), we review de novo using the same standard as a dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6).” Boyle v. Ford Motor Co., No. 23-1452, 2024 WL 1406401, at *2 (6th Cir.
Apr. 2, 2024) (citing Moderwell v. Cuyahoga County, 997 F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2021)); see also
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). So though our case
deals with Rule 12(c), the standard is the same. It should be apparent by now that our inquiry into
whether the amended complaint would be futile merges—indeed, entirely overlaps—with the Rule
12(c) question. If Plaintiffs can’t make out a plausible claim, then the district court neither erred
in denying their motion to amend the complaint nor, more importantly, in granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
So this case is entirely governed by the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. “To avoid dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6)”—and therefore 12(c)—“a plaintiff must allege facts that, when taken as true, ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’ and that rises ‘above the speculative level.’” Bray, 97
5 No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
F.4th at 410 (quoting Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). We “must construe the complaint in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all of the factual allegations as true, and determine
whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would
entitle him to relief.” Ohio v. United States, 849 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
“But we need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” JPMorgan
Chase Bank, 510 F.3d at 581–82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
One more thing informs our legal analysis here—Defendants argue that they are protected
by qualified immunity. This requires us to ask two questions in any order: “First, taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right? Second, is the right clearly established?” Rhodes v. Michigan,
10 F.4th 665, 672 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th
Cir. 2006)).
Because the court dismissed this case under a 12(c) motion, we ask “whether the complaint
plausibly alleged a constitutional violation.” Myers v. City of Centerville, 41 F.4th 746, 759 (6th
Cir. 2022). So “if the complaint fails to allege facts plausibly showing the violation of a
constitutional right (regardless of whether that right was clearly established), granting qualified
immunity is appropriate on the pleadings,” and the “assertion of qualified immunity, by itself, does
not change that.” Id. To be sure, we’ve suggested that determining whether the contours of a right
are clearly established may be a little trickier on a motion to dismiss before factual development.
See Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 765 (6th Cir. 2021). But we are also cognizant that “the
Supreme Court has consistently stated that one of the goals of qualified immunity is not only to
6 No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
help defendants avoid unnecessary trials but also to allow defendants to avoid pre-trial discovery
where the lawsuit is ‘insubstantial.’” Id. at 763 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808
(1982)).
With that background in mind, we can cut to the crux of this case—did Plaintiffs plausibly
allege a constitutional violation for each count? The long and short of it is that they did not.
III.
Plaintiffs primarily argue that Defendants violated their constitutional rights under the
Fourth Amendment when they executed search warrants not supported by probable cause. With
qualified immunity, “our precedent offers a complete defense against” the claim that a search or
seizure lacked probable cause “when officers relied on a magistrate judge’s warrant.” Novak v.
City of Parma, 33 F.4th 296, 305–06 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But this
defense has two exceptions.” Id. at 306. “The first covers cases when an officer provides false
information to obtain a warrant.” Id. (citation omitted). The second “applies if ‘the warrant is so
lacking in indicia of probable cause, that official belief in the existence of probable cause is
unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Yancey v. Carroll County, 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989)); see
also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012). Defendants obtained warrants from
a state court judge before searching the Clinic and the Kues’ home.5 So Plaintiffs must show one
of the exceptions applies.
5 As Plaintiffs note, the affidavit supporting the search warrant for the Clinic, R.34-2, and that supporting the search warrant for the Kue’s home, R.34-3, are “[i]dentical,” Appellants Br. at 11 n.54, so we use the search warrant for the Clinic as an example when we discuss the contents of both warrants.
7 No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
First, the false-information exception. Plaintiffs must allege that “officers knowingly or
recklessly made false statements or significant omissions” that were material or necessary to
finding probable cause. Novak, 33 F.4th at 306. Plaintiffs’ initial complaint failed to plausibly
allege any false statements or omissions because it contained only conclusory accusations. See,
e.g., R.1, Compl., p.4, PageID 4 (alleging that “unlawful search warrants were issued,” and
“Defendants . . . executed the unlawful search warrants”). And even if we look at Plaintiffs’
proposed amended complaint, we still don’t see enough.
For example, Plaintiffs state, “Brice’s statement that Xanax [a.k.a. Alprazolam],
Klonopin[,] and Tramadol were the ‘top drugs that Dr. Kue was prescribing’ was false and
inaccurate” because “non-controlled substance medications were the top drugs that she was
prescribing.” R.54-3, Proposed Am. Compl., p.16, PageID 456 (emphasis omitted). But if you
look at Brice’s statement in context, discussing data in MAPS—“an electronic system for
monitoring schedule 2, 3, 4, and 5 controlled substances,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7333a
(emphasis added)—it is not false or inaccurate because it is talking about controlled substances
often prescribed by Kue, not all drugs. See R.34-2, p.6, PageID 244. Similarly, Plaintiffs fail to
allege any omissions that would be material or necessary to the finding of probable cause. Though
they assert many omissions in the search warrant affidavit, see R.54-3, pp.15–16, 20–22, 25,
PageID 455–56, 460–62, 465, we find none convincing. Viewed in the context of the whole search
warrant, these appear to be, as the district court called them, “inconsequential nit-picks.” R.62,
p.16, PageID 565. Plaintiffs, for instance, fault Brice for not including “specific numbers” about
the tip from the pharmacist, omitting information about non-controlled substances prescribed by
Kue, and not discussing whether undercover officers claimed they had anxiety during undercover
visits. R.54-3, pp.14–16, 21, 25, PageID 454–56, 461, 465.
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As to the specific numbers, Brice provided nearly a full page of details surrounding the tip
he received from the pharmacist, including the names of multiple individuals who received
prescriptions on a consistent basis and information from a Blue Cross Blue Shield investigator.
See R.34-2, p.6, PageID 244. Similarly, the context of the controlled and non-controlled drugs
shows that Brice did not omit this information; he simply limited his report to controlled
substances. See id. And the disputed discussions of anxiety with Clinic staff were not material to
the Clinic’s prescription patterns. See id. at pp.7–9, PageID 245–47.
What’s more, as the district court correctly noted, Plaintiffs’ assertions “essentially
collapse[] to an argument that Brice refused to list out potentially innocent explanations for Kue’s
prescribing history and behavior.” R.62, p.10, PageID 559. “But probable cause does not require
officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts.” District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018). The “relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is
‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal
acts.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)). Indeed, probable cause “does
not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed
to support a conviction.” Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972)).
In all, the search warrant affidavit was lengthy and detailed, containing multiple examples
of “red flags.” R.62, p.9, PageID 558. Simply pointing out a few pieces of information that could
have also been included cannot show reckless omissions or falsehoods. After all, “we judge a
warrant affidavit ‘on the adequacy of what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or on what a critic
might say should have been added.’” United States v. Moore, 999 F.3d 993, 998 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 975 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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Second, the lacking-indicia exception. As the discussion above indicates, the search
warrant did not lack any indicia of probable cause. On the contrary, it contained ample evidence.
To recap, the warrant included data from MAPS showing a high number of prescriptions for
controlled substances, an unusual ratio of prescriptions payments to office visits, suspicious
statements by patients at the Clinic observed by officers while undercover, and officers’ own
ability to obtain prescriptions and refills after brief appointments. See R.62, p.9, PageID 558
(summarizing the evidence contained in the search warranted). “Time and again the Supreme
Court has emphasized that ‘probable cause is not a high bar’ to clear.” United States v. Christian,
925 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57). At bottom, the
district court was correct to conclude that “the warrants were not ‘so lacking in the indicia of
probable cause’ that no reasonably competent officer” would have relied on them. R.62, p.10,
PageID 559 (quoting Novak, 33 F.4th at 306). The district court was therefore correct to reject
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim on the pleadings.
Plaintiffs next bring a malicious-prosecution claim. To plead a successful malicious-
prosecution claim, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that a criminal prosecution was initiated against
the plaintiff,” and that the defendants were involved in the decision to prosecute; “(2) that the state
lacked probable cause for the prosecution; (3) that the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty
because of the legal proceeding; and (4) that the criminal proceeding was ‘resolved in the
plaintiff’s favor.’”6 Jones v. Clark County, 959 F.3d 748, 756 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sykes v.
6 The court’s holding in Jones on this fourth part was overruled by Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022), but Thompson did not affect the other factors.
10 No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also Lester v. Roberts, 986 F.3d 599, 606
(6th Cir. 2021). We can quickly dispose of this claim because Plaintiffs stumble at step one—they
admit they were never criminally prosecuted. See R.1, p.5, PageID 5; R.54-3, p.34, PageID 474.
So there is no basis for a malicious-prosecution claim without, as the name implies, a prosecution.
But Plaintiffs argue that, even if they were never criminally prosecuted, Defendants
maliciously pursued civil forfeiture and administrative medical licensing proceedings against
them. See Appellants Br. at 46–49. But these are not “criminal proceeding[s].” Sykes, 625 F.3d
at 308–09 (repeating the need for a “criminal proceeding” at each of the four steps of the test); see
also Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 144 S. Ct. 1745, 1749 (2024) (“To prevail on [a malicious-
prosecution] claim, he had to show (among other things) that the officers brought criminal charges
against him without probable cause.”); Novak, 33 F.4th at 307 (discussing “criminal[]
prosecut[ion]); Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 875–76 (6th Cir. 2020). And Plaintiffs cite
no case expanding malicious prosecutions to these areas.7
C.
Plaintiffs next bring a substantive-due-process claim as an alternative to their malicious-
prosecution claim. They argue that if the court finds that their malicious-prosecution claim fails,
then Defendants “will avoid liability for their actions because they do not fit precisely within the
contours of a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim. If that is so, then this Court should
proceed to analyze these actions on the DIU’s part under the substantive due process ‘shocks the
7 The closest Plaintiffs get is quoting a Supreme Court case calling “a forfeiture proceeding” “quasi-criminal in character.” Appellants Br. at 46–47, 47 n.155 (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965)). But there appear to be no cases allowing a malicious-prosecution claim to proceed based on civil forfeiture. So this one case is not enough to establish Plaintiffs’ point.
11 No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
conscience’ standard. . . .” Appellants Br. at 51. But, like their malicious-prosecution claim, this
fails out of the gate.
The Supreme Court has established that “the substantive due process framework is
inappropriate where another constitutional amendment encompasses the rights asserted.” Partin
v. Davis, 675 F. App’x 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 125 (1992)). Indeed, the Court has repeatedly explained that “[w]here a particular
Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular
sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive
due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273
(1994) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989)); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). The explicit textual
source here is the Fourth Amendment. So that is the legal provision governing their claim, not the
Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs thus fail to plausibly allege a cognizable substantive-due-
process claim.
D.
The last federal claim Plaintiffs present is that Defendants are liable for conspiracy to
violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights. “To prevail on a civil conspiracy claim,” Plaintiffs “must show that
(1) a ‘single plan’ existed,” (2) Defendants “‘shared in the general conspiratorial objective’ to
deprive” Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, and (3) “an overt act was committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy” that injured Plaintiffs. Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1985)).
But Plaintiffs again present conclusory accusations on this count. In their proposed
amended complaint, Plaintiffs say, “Defendants’ motivation in doing so was (1) to establish a
12 No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
positive case history and ‘make a name’ for the newly minted Detectives in the DIU and (2) justify
the continued existence of the DIU, an underperforming and unproductive task force, by securing
a prosecution at any cost,” and that “[e]ach of the Defendants took overt acts in furtherance of this
outcome, as detailed herein.” R.54-3, p.44, PageID 484. The original complaint’s allegations are
even more sparse. See R.1, p.13, PageID 13. Still, even if we had more, the claim would fail
because Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. See Umani v. Mich.
Dep’t of Corr., 432 F. App’x 453, 462 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that in the context of a
conspiracy claim, for the plaintiff “to defeat defendants’ claim for qualified immunity, he must
first establish that a constitutional right was violated”); see also Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t, 330
F. App’x 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2009). So when a plaintiff “has failed to allege facts or to provide
evidence sufficient to establish” that a constitutional “violation was committed by the defendants,
his conspiracy claim . . . also fails.” Umani, 432 F. App’x at 462. As discussed, Plaintiffs did not
plausibly make such a showing.
E.
Plaintiffs last contend that the district court erred in not exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over their state-law tortious interference claim. We review a decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. Morrow v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
Davidson Cnty., No. 22-5232, 2023 WL 5237332, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2023) (citing Gamel v.
City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010)). With no viable grounds for reversal of the
federal law claims, however, this claim fails. Seeing no path forward for the federal claims, the
district court did not abuse its discretion. See Golf Vill. N., LLC v. City of Powell, 14 F.4th 611,
624 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining the “fundamental principle that declining to exercise supplemental
13 No. 23-2100, Kue v. North
jurisdiction over an action with no remaining federal claims is not an abuse of discretion” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
IV.
For the above reasons, we affirm.