E.K.B. v. City of Azusa

District Court, C.D. California·Decided September 29, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-01067·Unknown

Opinion

10 11 E.K.B., a minor, by and through his Case No. 2:23-CV-01067 SPG (JDEx) Guardian Ad Litem, Nakisha Mitchell; [District Judge: Sherilyn P. Garnett; 12 NAKISHA MITCHELL, individually Magistrate Judge: John D. Early] and as Administrator of the Estate of 13 Jerome Rory Barber, STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 14 PLAINTIFFS, ORDER

15 V. 16 CITY OF AZUSA, a public entity; 17 MICHAEL BERTELSON, a public employee; Does 1-10, Inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19

21 Pursuant to the Parties’ Stipulation (Dkt. 44) and for good cause shown, 22 the Court finds and orders as follows. 23 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 24 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 25 26 proprietary or private information for which special protection from public 27 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than pursuing this litigation may 28 be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the 1 Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties 2 acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all 3 disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from 4 public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that 5 are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. 6 2. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 7 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need 8 for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in 9 peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential 10 records for the following reasons. 11 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 12 privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy 13 therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess 14 protective procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 15 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. 16 Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while 17 “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal 18 19 claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent 20 significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); 21 Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace 22 officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not 23 inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 24 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that 25 uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the 26 safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 27 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 28 agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 1 information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney- 2 client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the 3 personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace 4 officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal 5 deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for 6 the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially 7 including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs 8 type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or 9 reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose 10 of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; 11 Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 12 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 13 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 14 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 15 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th 16 Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that such personnel file records are 17 restricted from disclosure by the public entity’s custodian of records pursuant 18 19 to applicable California law and that uncontrolled release is likely to result in 20 needless intrusion of officer privacy; impairment in the collection of third-party 21 witness information and statements and related legitimate law enforcement 22 investigations/interests; and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding 23 and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s 24 ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures that may be 25 required. 26 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the 27 same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is 28 contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled 1 release of officers’ compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los 2 Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 3 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order 4 preventing such, production of confidential records in the case can and will 5 likely substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in 6 candid self-critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid 7 information from witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the 8 safety of peace officers and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting 9 the privacy officers of peace officers, and preventing pending investigations 10 from being detrimentally undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or 11 confidential information – as can and often does result in litigation. 12 Plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so as to 13 preserve the respective interests of the parties without the need to further 14 burden the Court with such issues. Specifically, the parties jointly contend 15 that, absent this Stipulation and its associated Protective Order, the parties' 16 respective privilege interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this 17 Stipulation and its associated Protective Order may avoid such harm by 18 19 permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced risk that privileged 20 and/or sensitive/confidential information will become matters of public 21 record. 22 3. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF UNDER SEAL FILING 24 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 14.3, below, that 25 this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential 26 information under seal; Local Civil Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that 27 must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks 28 permission from the court to file material under seal. There is a strong 1 presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings and 2 records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive motions, good cause 3 must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana v. City and 4 County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips v. Gen. 5 Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. Sony 6 Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated 7 protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good 8 cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and legal 9 justification, must be made with respect to Protected Material that a party 10 seeks to file under seal.

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