Eisenhart, D. v. Wellspan Health

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Eisenhart, D. v. Wellspan Health

2025 Pa. Super. 222

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedOctober 1, 2025

Docket1681 MDA 2024

StatusPublished

This text of 2025 Pa. Super. 222 (Eisenhart, D. v. Wellspan Health) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Eisenhart, D. v. Wellspan Health, 2025 Pa. Super. 222 (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Pincite

Opinion

J-A15029-25

2025 PA Super 222

DONNA L. EISENHART : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : WELLSPAN HEALTH D/B/A : No. 1681 MDA 2024 WELLSPAN YORK HOSPITAL :

Appeal from the Order Entered October 17, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No: 2017-SU-002937

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 1, 2025

Appellant, Donna L. Eisenhart, appeals an order of the Court of Common

Pleas of York County (trial court) denying her petition to reinstate her case,

which had been dismissed with prejudice due to inactivity. She argues in this

appeal that the trial court erred in denying reinstatement because she did not

receive timely notice of either the proposed termination, or the order of

termination. We find merit in Appellant’s contention, as the record does not

support the trial court’s ruling that the notices were indeed sent to Appellant

in accordance with the applicable procedural rules. We therefore vacate the

order on review and remand the case for further proceedings.

On October 27, 2017, Appellant commenced a premises liability action

by filing a writ of summons. The defendant/Appellee, Wellspan Health, d/b/a/ ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A15029-25

Wellspan York Hospital, was timely served with the writ. On December 21,

2017, the trial court ordered the parties to submit a joint case management

plan for approval within nine months of the writ’s filing date. The parties

untimely filed a joint case management plan on May 23, 2019, about 18

months after the writ was filed.

The parties stated in the management plan that the case would be ready

for trial by December 30, 2019. However, there was minimal docket activity

for nearly two years, at which point Appellant’s counsel filed a change of

address form on January 10, 2022.

Another two and a half years then elapsed in which there was no docket

activity. On June 10, 2024, the Prothonotary of York County filed a notice of

proposed termination. Two copies of the notice, correctly addressed to each

party’s counsel, were entered into the record. A docket entry dated June 10,

2024, reads, “Notice of Proposed Termination of Case.” The copies of the

notices entered into the record advised the parties’ counsel that the action

would be terminated with prejudice within 30 days, on or before July 10, 2024,

unless a Statement of Intention to Proceed was timely filed.

No such statement was filed within the 30-day period, and on July 15,

2024, the trial court entered an order of termination with prejudice. On that

date, the prothonotary made an entry on the docket which reads, “Case

Terminated Per Local Rule 230.2.” Months later, on October 9, 2024,

Appellant filed a “petition to open judgment of non-pros,” which the trial court

treated as a petition to reinstate her case, under Pa.R.Civ.P. 230.2(d)(1).

-2- J-A15029-25

Appellant’s counsel averred in an affidavit attached to the petition that

he did not receive the notice of proposed termination, or the order of

termination, either by mail, electronically, or any other means. According to

counsel, he did not learn of the case’s dismissal until he conducted a routine

check of the case docket on October 3, 2024.

Appellant then argued in relevant part that her case should be reinstated

because the case docket included no entry showing that a notice of proposed

termination, or the order of termination with prejudice, was ever sent in the

manner required by the rules of procedure. Appellant therefore contended

that termination was improper, as the 30-day period for filing a statement of

intention to proceed, and the 60-day period for seeking reinstatement, could

not begin to run until the respective notice requirements were satisfied.

The trial court rejected Appellant’s claim that the record contained no

evidence that the notices were ever sent. The trial court reasoned that the

record included copies of those notices, which bore the correct mailing address

of Appellant’s counsel. According to the trial court, it could be presumed from

the docket notations and documents in the record that the prothonotary

mailed the notices to Appellant’s counsel, and that the notices were delivered

to counsel’s mailing address. See Trial Court Memorandum Order,

10/17/2024, at 4.

On October 21, 2024, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, again

asserting that reinstatement was mandatory because the filing period for a

motion to reinstate could not begin to run for lack of sufficient notice. The trial

-3- J-A15029-25

court denied the motion on October 23, 2024, without receiving a response

from Appellee.

Appellant timely appealed the trial court’s order denying reinstatement

of her case, and she now ostensibly raises three issues which concern the

validity of the notice of proposed termination, and the notice of the

termination order:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Petition to Reinstate Case and Motion for Reconsideration of same when neither party’s counsel had ever received the Notice of Proposed Termination or the termination Order, there was no record on the docket that either of those documents were ever mailed, and under Trimble v. Rodriguez, 200 A.3d 566 (Pa. Super. 2018)[(unpublished memorandum)], where there is no docket entry attesting to service, the existence of counsel’s address on a termination notice does not support a presumption that the notice was ever mailed.

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Petition to Reinstate Case and Motion for Reconsideration of same when the docket contained no Rule 236 Notice and under Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. v. Limberis, 301 A.3d 902 (Pa. Super. 2023) [unpublished memorandum], when no Rule 236 notice is given with an order terminating a case for inactivity, the period for filing a motion to reinstate is “never triggered,” and reinstatement was thus mandatory under Rule 230.2(d)(2).

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Petition to Reinstate Case and Motion for Reconsideration of same when [Appellee’s] counsel agreed that he had never received the Notice of Proposed Termination or the Termination Order, but the [trial] court issued its rulings on both motions without even waiting to receive [Appellee’s] responses to those motions.

-4- J-A15029-25

Appellant’s Brief, at 3-4 (issues reordered).1

For ease of disposition, Appellant’s grounds for relief will be condensed

into two dispositive issues. First, we will address the sufficiency of the notice

of proposed termination; we will then address the sufficiency of notice as to

the order of termination.

Under Pa.R.Civ.P. 230.2(a), courts “shall [annually] initiate proceedings

to terminate cases in which there has been no activity of record for two years

or more[.]” The parties to such cases must then be sent notice of the

proposed termination either by mail or electronic service:

(b) Notice of Proposed Termination.

(1) For each case identified pursuant to subdivision (a), the court shall serve a notice of proposed termination on counsel of record, and on the parties if not represented, 30 days prior to the date of the proposed termination.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI