Eisenberg v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

654 F. Supp. 125, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2951, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1351
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 18, 1987
Docket83-2681-Civ-Zloch
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 654 F. Supp. 125 (Eisenberg v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eisenberg v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 125, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2951, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1351 (S.D. Fla. 1987).

Opinion

OMNIBUS ORDER AND PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT

ZLOCH, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE having come before the Court upon various Motions of the parties, and the Court having heard oral argument, having heard the evidence presented at trial, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is

ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant, Air Line Pilots Association’s, (“ALPA”) Motion For Partial Summary Judgment dated May 9, 1986, and Defendants, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”), Retirement Board of The Retirement Plan For Pilots of Trans World Airlines, Inc., (“Retirement Board”), and Retirement Plan For Pilots of Trans World Airlines, Inc.’s, (“Retirement Plan”) Motion For Partial Summary Judgment dated May 20, 1986, be and the same are hereby DENIED, without prejudice;

2. The Court having reserved judgment on Defendants ALPA, TWA, Retirement Board and Retirement Plan’s Motions For Directed Verdict at the close of the Plaintiff’s case, which Motions were renewed upon the close of all the evidence, the Motions For Directed Verdict as to Counts II, III, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X be and the same are hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

In determining the test that governs this Court with regard to the consideration and granting of a directed verdict, this Court first looks to the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Southern Railroad, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943), wherein the Court defined the standard as follows:

When the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, the Court should determine the proceeding by non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise in accordance with the applicable practice without submission to the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict. By such direction of the trial, the result is saved *127 from the mischance of speculation over legally unfounded claims. 320 U.S. at 479-480, 64 S.Ct. at 234.

In applying and interpreting the Brady standard as applied to cases arising within the Eleventh Circuit, this Court is bound by Kaye v. Pawnee Const. Co., Inc., 680 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir.1982), which adopted the test announced by the Fifth Circuit in the case of Boeing Company v. Shipmen, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1969), wherein the test was stated as follows:

On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all of the evidence — not just that evidence which supports the non-mover’s case — but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury____ There must be conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question.

Following the teachings and instructions of the Eleventh Circuit, this Court now turns to a legal analysis of each count contained in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, along with the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented by the parties in light of the Defendants’ Motions For Directed Verdict and finds as follows:

(a) As to Count I of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court adopts the standards regarding a union’s duty of fair representation (“DFR”) enunciated in Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1981). Citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), Del Casal noted that a breach of the DFR occurs only when a union’s conduct toward a member is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.

With regard to this three-pronged test, no evidence has been presented demonstrating any discriminatory conduct by ALPA. On the contrary, Plaintiff Eisenberg’s own trial testimony establishes he was in no way singled out for different treatment by the Union. The Court, therefore, grants ALPA’s Motion For Directed Verdict as to Count I as to any allegations of discriminatory conduct by ALPA.

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence with regard to ALPA’s alleged bad faith or arbitrary conduct, and, therefore, the Court denies ALPA’s Motion For Directed Verdict as to Count I as to the issues of bad faith or arbitrary conduct as set forth in the Del Casal test;

(b) As to ALPA, upon review of the Plaintiff’s claims as set forth in the Second Amended Complaint, together with the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial and other submissions filed thereto, it is clear that Plaintiff’s state law claims for Misrepresentation and Promissory Estoppel, Conspiracy and Fraud are all disputes which arose out of his employment relationship with TWA and/or his relationship with ALPA and that his claims for entitlement to a pension disability retirement benefit emanated from the collective bargaining relationship and agreements reached therefrom between TWA and ALPA. As such, it is clear that the duties and obligations running from one party to another arose solely by virtue of the provisions of the Railway Labor Act (45 ÍJ.S.C. Section 151 et seq., hereinafter RLA) and the agreements entered into by ALPA and TWA. This was made absolutely clear by the United States Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944) when Chief Justice Stone writing on behalf of the Court and interpreting the RLA, stated at page 202, 65 S.Ct. at 231:

*128 We hold that the language of the Act to which we have referred, read in light of the purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them.

Thus, any causes of action arising out of Plaintiffs relationship with ALPA must arise under the RLA. As such, this Court finds that Plaintiffs state law claims are so inextricably intertwined and identical in substance to Plaintiffs claim that ALPA breached its duty of fair representation, that they are preempted by the RLA. Andrews v.

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Related

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Sinicropi
887 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. New York, 1995)
Eisenberg v. Trans World Airlines
875 F.2d 872 (Eleventh Circuit, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
654 F. Supp. 125, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2951, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1351, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eisenberg-v-trans-world-airlines-inc-flsd-1987.