Eirich v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Worcester

Connecticut Superior Court

Eirich v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Worcester

8 Conn. Super. Ct. 166, 8 Conn. Supp. 166, 127 Conn. 252, 1940 Conn. Super. LEXIS 62

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedApril 2, 1940

DocketFile 56217

StatusPublished

This text of 8 Conn. Super. Ct. 166 (Eirich v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Worcester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Eirich v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Worcester, 8 Conn. Super. Ct. 166, 8 Conn. Supp. 166, 127 Conn. 252, 1940 Conn. Super. LEXIS 62 (Colo. Ct. App. 1940).

Pincite

Opinion

*167 WYNNE, J.

The court is unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of plaintiff’s brief. There is no ambiguity m the language of the exemption clause. Its purpose seems clear. Suicide is expressly exempted. The reason for this is obvious. In deaths resulting from poisoning or asphyxiation it could be claimed in nearly every case that the deceased had not intended self-destruction. It is apparent from the language of the contract that such deaths were, therefore, deliberately eliminated from the provisions of the policy. For the sake of argument it might be suggested that the term “drowning” had been included with “poisoning” and “asphyxiation.” It becomes clear at once that such an accident policy would not be practical. There are too many cases of accidental drowning. Therefore, such an exemption would be unreasonable to include within the terms of an offered policy. Not so “poisoning” and “asphyxiation” which are relatively less frequent as hazards of daily life against which an insured might seek protection. In the court’s mind the employment of the unqualified terms of “poisoning” and “asphyxiation” in the clause which had already listed “self-destruction” negatives any idea that circumstances or intent would make the slightest difference.

The language is so clear and unequivocal that judgment must be, and therefore is, entered for the defendant.

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*167 WYNNE, J.

The court is unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of plaintiff’s brief. There is no ambiguity m the language of the exemption clause. Its purpose seems clear. Suicide is expressly exempted. The reason for this is obvious. In deaths resulting from poisoning or asphyxiation it could be claimed in nearly every case that the deceased had not intended self-destruction. It is apparent from the language of the contract that such deaths were, therefore, deliberately eliminated from the provisions of the policy. For the sake of argument it might be suggested that the term “drowning” had been included with “poisoning” and “asphyxiation.” It becomes clear at once that such an accident policy would not be practical. There are too many cases of accidental drowning. Therefore, such an exemption would be unreasonable to include within the terms of an offered policy. Not so “poisoning” and “asphyxiation” which are relatively less frequent as hazards of daily life against which an insured might seek protection. In the court’s mind the employment of the unqualified terms of “poisoning” and “asphyxiation” in the clause which had already listed “self-destruction” negatives any idea that circumstances or intent would make the slightest difference.

The language is so clear and unequivocal that judgment must be, and therefore is, entered for the defendant.

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Bluebook (online)

8 Conn. Super. Ct. 166, 8 Conn. Supp. 166, 127 Conn. 252, 1940 Conn. Super. LEXIS 62, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eirich-v-state-mutual-life-assurance-co-of-worcester-connsuperct-1940.