Eileen L. Dutra v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 24, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01145
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EILEEN L. DUTRA, No. 2:24-CV-1145-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brought this action for judicial 19 review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 20 Final judgment was entered on September 15, 2025. See ECF No. 17. Pending before the Court 21 in this closed case is Plaintiff’s counsel’s unopposed motion for an award of fees and costs under 22 the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) in the amount of $6,499.60. See ECF No. 18. Defendant 23 has filed a statement of non-opposition. See ECF No. 19. 24 Because this Court issued a remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 25 405(g), Plaintiff is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes. See Flores v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 562 (9th 26 Cir. 1995). Under the EAJA, an award of reasonable attorney’s fees is appropriate unless the 27 Commissioner’s position was “substantially justified” on law and fact with respect to the issues 28 on which the court based its remand. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see id. at 569. No presumption 1 arises that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified simply because the 2 Commissioner did not prevail. See Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988). The 3 Commissioner’s position is substantially justified if there is a genuine dispute. See Pierce v. 4 Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988). The burden of establishing substantial justification is on the 5 government. See Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 In determining substantial justification, the Court reviews both the underlying 7 governmental action being defended in the litigation and the positions taken by the government in 8 the litigation itself. See Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987), disapproved on 9 other grounds, In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1990). For the government’s position to be 10 considered substantially justified, it must establish substantial justification for both the position it 11 took at the agency level as well as the position it took in the district court. See Kali v. Bowen, 12 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1998). Where the underlying government action was not substantially 13 justified, it is unnecessary to determine whether the government’s litigation position was 14 substantially justified. See Andrew v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1988). “The nature 15 and scope of the ALJ’s legal errors are material in determining whether the Commissioner’s 16 decision to defend them was substantially justified.” Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (9th 17 Cir. 1996) (citing Flores, 49 F.3d at 570). If there is no reasonable basis in law and fact for the 18 government’s position with respect to the issues on which the court based its determination, the 19 government’s position is not “substantially justified” and an award of EAJA fees is warranted. 20 See Flores, 42 F.3d at 569-71. A strong indication the government’s position was not 21 substantially justified is a court’s “holding that the agency’s decision . . . was unsupported by 22 substantial evidence. . . .” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). 23 Here, the Commissioner has filed a response to counsel’s motion indicating that it 24 does not have any opposition. See ECF No. 19. Therefore, the Court finds that the 25 Commissioner has not met the burden of establishing that its position was substantially justified 26 and that, for this reason, an award of fees under the EAJA is warranted. Further, the Court has 27 reviewed the record and finds that Plaintiff’s position was substantially justified. 28 / / / 1 Under the EAJA, the Court may award “reasonable attorney’s fees,” which are set 2 at the market rate. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The party seeking an award under the EAJA 3 bears the burden of establishing the fees requested are reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 4 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. 5 § 2412(d)(1)(B) (“A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall . . . submit to the 6 court an application for fees and other expenses which shows . . . the amount sought, including an 7 itemized statement from any attorney . . . stating the actual time expended”). The Court has an 8 independent duty to review the evidence and determine the reasonableness of the fees requested. 9 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 436-47. Finally, fees awarded under the EAJA are payable directly 10 to the client, not counsel. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010). 11 Here, as indicated above, the Commissioner does not object to the fees requested 12 by counsel – $6,499.60. Given the amount of work involved with obtaining the remand in this 13 case, the Court finds this amount to be reasonable. 14 Counsel is not normally entitled to direct receipt of fees under the EAJA, so that 15 the government may offset the payment with the plaintiff’s debt. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 16 586, 598 (2010). Since the decision in Ratliff, many courts in this district have authorized 17 payment of fees under the EAJA directly to Plaintiff’s counsel. See e.g., Nobles v. Berryhill, 18 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172075 (E.D. Cal. 2017), Alvarado v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 U.S. 19 Dist. LEXIS 118354 (E.D. Cal. 2018), Blackwell v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. 35744 (E.D. Cal 2011). 20 These payments directly to counsel are based upon the government’s discretionary ability to 21 reject assignment of any claims against it to third parties under the Anti-Assignment Act. See 22 United States v. Kim, 806 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2015). This discretionary ability to reject 23 assignment of claims “applies to an assignment of EAJA fees in a social security appeal.” 24 Yesipovich v. Colvin, 166 F.Supp.3d 1000, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015). As the government has not 25 challenged an assignment, it may still offset any of Plaintiff’s debt, and may discretionally reject 26 the assignment, EAJA fees will be made payable to counsel. 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 2 1. Plaintiff's unopposed motion for award of fees under the EAJA, ECF No. 3 | 18,1s GRANTED in full. 4 2. Plaintiff is awarded $6,499.60 in attorney’s fees, payable to Plaintiff's 5 || counsel subject to any offset of debts. 6 7 | Dated: March 24, 2026 Svc 8 DENNIS M. COTA 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28