1 WO MH 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Randy Carl Eiland, No. CV-23-00926-PHX-MTL (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Dwayne Sigmon, 13 Defendant.
15 On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff Randy Carl Eiland, who is confined in the Saguaro 16 Correctional Center (SCC), filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a July 14, 2023 Order, the 18 Court denied the deficient Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because it 19 did not comply with Rule 3.4 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court gave 20 Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint and either pay the required fees or file a 21 complete in forma pauperis application. 22 On August 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint and a second 23 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a December 1, 2023, Order, the Court 24 granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed and dismiss the First Amended Complaint with 25 leave to amend. Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on January 25, 2024 (Doc. 26 12). The Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 If the Court determines that a pleading can be cured by the allegation of other facts, 2 a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the 3 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 II. Second Amended Complaint 5 In his one-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his Fourteenth 6 Amendment due process rights were violated when Defendant Dwayne Sigmon, a unit 7 manager at SCC, issued him a disciplinary ticket for failing to report to the medical 8 department. Plaintiff is seeking money damages. 9 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Sigmon summoned Plaintiff to his office on 10 February 3, 2021, and told him to report to the medical department. When Plaintiff asked 11 Sigmon why he had to go to the medical department, Sigmon said he did not know. 12 Plaintiff responded that he “wouldn’t be reporting to medical, as [he was] refusing any 13 medical treatment, etc. at this time per Idaho policy.” (Doc. 12 at 3.) Sigmon “got really 14 mad” and began to yell at Plaintiff, telling him he “w[ould] go to medical right this 15 minute.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff again refused, at which point Sigmon stated, “Idaho inmates 16 are going to learn who is BOSS around here real quick like.” (Id.) Sigmon then had 17 Plaintiff handcuffed and placed in the segregation unit. Plaintiff received a Restrictive 18 Housing Order from Defendant Sigmon and was issued a disciplinary ticket for disobeying 19 an order. Plaintiff’s disciplinary ticket stated, “On 02/03/21 at approximately 1545 hrs 20 inmate Eiland, Randy #117287 was given a directive to report to medical at which he 21 refused directive given. Inmate Eiland, Randy #117287 stated he wasn’t going to medical 22 because he doesn’t do things for staff conv[enie]nce.” (Id.) Plaintiff remained in 23 segregation until February 8, 2021, when he was released by SCC’s Chief of Security 24 “because of the retaliatory act committed by Defendant Sigmon for placing [Plaintiff] 25 within the [SCC] Segregation unit for exercising [his] right to refuse medical service.” (Id.) 26 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Sigmon violated his right to refuse medical treatment by 27 issuing a retaliatory disciplinary ticket. (Id.) 28 . . . . 1 III. Failure to State a Claim 2 Plaintiff has a constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse 3 medical care. See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) 4 (“[A] competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 5 unwanted medical treatment.”); Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) 6 (“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects a person’s 7 rights . . . to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and to receive sufficient information to 8 exercise these rights intelligently.”). He also has a substantive due process right to be free 9 from retaliation for exercising that right. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111 (3d 10 Cir. 1990), cited with approval in Benson, 304 F.3d at 885. Plaintiff’s allegations do not 11 state a claim on either basis. According to the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant 12 Sigmon ordered Plaintiff to report to the medical department. Sigmon did not order 13 Plaintiff to receive treatment of any kind, and he was expressly unaware of the reason 14 Plaintiff had been summoned to the medical department.
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1 WO MH 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Randy Carl Eiland, No. CV-23-00926-PHX-MTL (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Dwayne Sigmon, 13 Defendant.
15 On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff Randy Carl Eiland, who is confined in the Saguaro 16 Correctional Center (SCC), filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a July 14, 2023 Order, the 18 Court denied the deficient Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because it 19 did not comply with Rule 3.4 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court gave 20 Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint and either pay the required fees or file a 21 complete in forma pauperis application. 22 On August 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint and a second 23 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a December 1, 2023, Order, the Court 24 granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed and dismiss the First Amended Complaint with 25 leave to amend. Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on January 25, 2024 (Doc. 26 12). The Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 If the Court determines that a pleading can be cured by the allegation of other facts, 2 a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the 3 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 II. Second Amended Complaint 5 In his one-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his Fourteenth 6 Amendment due process rights were violated when Defendant Dwayne Sigmon, a unit 7 manager at SCC, issued him a disciplinary ticket for failing to report to the medical 8 department. Plaintiff is seeking money damages. 9 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Sigmon summoned Plaintiff to his office on 10 February 3, 2021, and told him to report to the medical department. When Plaintiff asked 11 Sigmon why he had to go to the medical department, Sigmon said he did not know. 12 Plaintiff responded that he “wouldn’t be reporting to medical, as [he was] refusing any 13 medical treatment, etc. at this time per Idaho policy.” (Doc. 12 at 3.) Sigmon “got really 14 mad” and began to yell at Plaintiff, telling him he “w[ould] go to medical right this 15 minute.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff again refused, at which point Sigmon stated, “Idaho inmates 16 are going to learn who is BOSS around here real quick like.” (Id.) Sigmon then had 17 Plaintiff handcuffed and placed in the segregation unit. Plaintiff received a Restrictive 18 Housing Order from Defendant Sigmon and was issued a disciplinary ticket for disobeying 19 an order. Plaintiff’s disciplinary ticket stated, “On 02/03/21 at approximately 1545 hrs 20 inmate Eiland, Randy #117287 was given a directive to report to medical at which he 21 refused directive given. Inmate Eiland, Randy #117287 stated he wasn’t going to medical 22 because he doesn’t do things for staff conv[enie]nce.” (Id.) Plaintiff remained in 23 segregation until February 8, 2021, when he was released by SCC’s Chief of Security 24 “because of the retaliatory act committed by Defendant Sigmon for placing [Plaintiff] 25 within the [SCC] Segregation unit for exercising [his] right to refuse medical service.” (Id.) 26 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Sigmon violated his right to refuse medical treatment by 27 issuing a retaliatory disciplinary ticket. (Id.) 28 . . . . 1 III. Failure to State a Claim 2 Plaintiff has a constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse 3 medical care. See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) 4 (“[A] competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 5 unwanted medical treatment.”); Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) 6 (“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects a person’s 7 rights . . . to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and to receive sufficient information to 8 exercise these rights intelligently.”). He also has a substantive due process right to be free 9 from retaliation for exercising that right. See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111 (3d 10 Cir. 1990), cited with approval in Benson, 304 F.3d at 885. Plaintiff’s allegations do not 11 state a claim on either basis. According to the Second Amended Complaint, Defendant 12 Sigmon ordered Plaintiff to report to the medical department. Sigmon did not order 13 Plaintiff to receive treatment of any kind, and he was expressly unaware of the reason 14 Plaintiff had been summoned to the medical department. Since a visit to the medical 15 department is not tantamount to medical treatment, a disciplinary action premised on 16 Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with Sigmon’s order did not violate Plaintiff’s due process 17 rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Due Process Clause. 18 IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend 19 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Second Amended Complaint, the 20 Court will dismiss his Second Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given 21 if a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 22 Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 23 particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. 24 Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). 25 Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding 26 whether justice requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 27 Plaintiff has made multiple efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable 28 to do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further 1 | opportunities to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will dismiss 2| Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 3| ITIS ORDERED: 4 (1) The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) is dismissed for failure to state 5 | aclaim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 6| accordingly. 7 (2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 8 | dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 9 (3) The docket shall reflect that the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) 10 | and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), has considered whether an appeal 11 | of this decision would be taken in good faith and finds Plaintiff may appeal in forma 12 | pauperis. 13 Dated this 7th day of May 2024. 14 Wichad T. gibuade Michael T, Liburdi 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28