In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00241-CR
EHVAN REYNA, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-420,635, Honorable Douglas H. Freitag, Presiding
February 27, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant, Ehvan Reyna, appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his community
supervision. By two issues, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by revoking his community supervision and violated his due process rights by not
considering the full range of punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2020, Appellant, while driving his vehicle between 81 and 91 mph on
University Avenue in Lubbock, Texas, struck a vehicle that was turning across University.
The collision forced the other vehicle into a nearby utility pole. The driver of that vehicle,
June Linker, died because of the crash. The speed limit in that portion of University was
45 mph. As a result of the accident, Appellant was charged with manslaughter.1 In
accordance with a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty, was convicted of the
offense, and was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration. The trial court suspended
Appellant’s sentence and placed him on community supervision for a period of ten years.
The first term of Appellant’s community supervision directed that he “[c]ommit no offense
against the laws of this or any other State or the United States.”
On May 12, 2022, less than two years after causing the death of Linker and
approximately six months after being placed on community supervision, Appellant was
arrested in Lubbock for the offense of reckless driving. The State filed a motion to revoke
community supervision alleging that Appellant had violated the terms of his community
supervision by committing the offense of reckless driving. At the hearing on the State’s
motion, Lubbock Police Department Officer Trey Mayer testified that at approximately
9:51 a.m. on May 12, he was positioned in the 5400 block of the Marsha Sharp Freeway.
Mayer’s location was approximately 100 feet from an EMS station that has no emergency
lights on the street that would let traffic on the access road know that an emergency
vehicle is entering the roadway. Mayer saw a vehicle approaching his location on the
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04.
2 access road and, using his laser, determined that the vehicle was travelling at 90 mph.
He initiated a traffic stop because the speed limit on the access road is 50 mph. Appellant
testified that he was speeding because he received a phone call from his fiancée that she
was having some medical issues and needed him to come pick her up from her job. At
the close of evidence, the trial court found the State’s allegation to be true and sentenced
Appellant to ten years’ incarceration. Appellant timely filed notice of appeal from the
resulting judgment.
Appellant presents two issues by his appeal. By his first issue, Appellant contends
that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Appellant’s community supervision.
By his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant
to ten years’ incarceration without considering the full range of punishment.
ISSUE ONE: REVOCATION OF APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY SUPERVISION
By his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
revoking his community supervision because the State failed to meet its burden to
establish that Appellant violated the terms of his community supervision.
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is under an abuse of
discretion standard. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “In
a revocation proceeding, the trial court has discretion to revoke community supervision
when a preponderance of the evidence supports one of the State’s allegations that the
defendant violated a condition of his community supervision.” Leonard v. State, 385
S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (op. on reh’g). In conducting this review, we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Garrett v. State, 619
3 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at
865. “The central issue to be determined in reviewing a trial court’s exercise of discretion
in a probation revocation case is whether the probationer was afforded due process of
law.” DeGay v. State, 741 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
“A person commits an offense [of reckless driving] if the person drives a vehicle in
wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 545.401(a). The Texas Supreme Court has indicated that “willful” and “wanton” conduct
includes “‘highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary
care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.’” Tarrant Cnty. v. Bonner,
574 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. 2019) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS § 34, 212, 214 (5th ed. 1984)).
In the present case, the evidence established that Appellant was driving at 90 mph
on an access road with a posted speed limit of 50 mph. Appellant sped past the entrance
to an EMS station that does not have an emergency light to warn drivers that an
emergency vehicle might be entering the roadway. This incident occurred less than two
years after Appellant caused the death of a motorist due to driving at a speed nearly twice
that of the posted speed limit. In that regard, Appellant acknowledged that June Linker
is dead because he was “driving fast,” and, because of that accident, he is aware that it
is difficult to stop at 90 mph if someone pulls out in front of you. Considering all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we do not conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by determining that a preponderance of the evidence established
that Appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by committing the offense 4 of reckless driving. We specifically note that the trial court need not turn a blind eye to
the fact that Appellant had recently caused the death of another motorist due to his
excessive speeding. The trial court could reasonably consider that accident to be a
relevant factor in determining whether the State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that Appellant committed the offense of reckless driving.
We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
ISSUE TWO: CONSIDERATION OF FULL RANGE OF PUNISHMENT
By his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him
to ten years’ incarceration without considering the full range of punishment. Appellant’s
contention is premised on the fact that the trial court stated, when rendering punishment,
that “the court sentences you according to the plea agreement to the underlying sentence
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00241-CR
EHVAN REYNA, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-420,635, Honorable Douglas H. Freitag, Presiding
February 27, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant, Ehvan Reyna, appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his community
supervision. By two issues, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by revoking his community supervision and violated his due process rights by not
considering the full range of punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2020, Appellant, while driving his vehicle between 81 and 91 mph on
University Avenue in Lubbock, Texas, struck a vehicle that was turning across University.
The collision forced the other vehicle into a nearby utility pole. The driver of that vehicle,
June Linker, died because of the crash. The speed limit in that portion of University was
45 mph. As a result of the accident, Appellant was charged with manslaughter.1 In
accordance with a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty, was convicted of the
offense, and was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration. The trial court suspended
Appellant’s sentence and placed him on community supervision for a period of ten years.
The first term of Appellant’s community supervision directed that he “[c]ommit no offense
against the laws of this or any other State or the United States.”
On May 12, 2022, less than two years after causing the death of Linker and
approximately six months after being placed on community supervision, Appellant was
arrested in Lubbock for the offense of reckless driving. The State filed a motion to revoke
community supervision alleging that Appellant had violated the terms of his community
supervision by committing the offense of reckless driving. At the hearing on the State’s
motion, Lubbock Police Department Officer Trey Mayer testified that at approximately
9:51 a.m. on May 12, he was positioned in the 5400 block of the Marsha Sharp Freeway.
Mayer’s location was approximately 100 feet from an EMS station that has no emergency
lights on the street that would let traffic on the access road know that an emergency
vehicle is entering the roadway. Mayer saw a vehicle approaching his location on the
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04.
2 access road and, using his laser, determined that the vehicle was travelling at 90 mph.
He initiated a traffic stop because the speed limit on the access road is 50 mph. Appellant
testified that he was speeding because he received a phone call from his fiancée that she
was having some medical issues and needed him to come pick her up from her job. At
the close of evidence, the trial court found the State’s allegation to be true and sentenced
Appellant to ten years’ incarceration. Appellant timely filed notice of appeal from the
resulting judgment.
Appellant presents two issues by his appeal. By his first issue, Appellant contends
that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Appellant’s community supervision.
By his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant
to ten years’ incarceration without considering the full range of punishment.
ISSUE ONE: REVOCATION OF APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY SUPERVISION
By his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
revoking his community supervision because the State failed to meet its burden to
establish that Appellant violated the terms of his community supervision.
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is under an abuse of
discretion standard. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “In
a revocation proceeding, the trial court has discretion to revoke community supervision
when a preponderance of the evidence supports one of the State’s allegations that the
defendant violated a condition of his community supervision.” Leonard v. State, 385
S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (op. on reh’g). In conducting this review, we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Garrett v. State, 619
3 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at
865. “The central issue to be determined in reviewing a trial court’s exercise of discretion
in a probation revocation case is whether the probationer was afforded due process of
law.” DeGay v. State, 741 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
“A person commits an offense [of reckless driving] if the person drives a vehicle in
wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 545.401(a). The Texas Supreme Court has indicated that “willful” and “wanton” conduct
includes “‘highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary
care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.’” Tarrant Cnty. v. Bonner,
574 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. 2019) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS § 34, 212, 214 (5th ed. 1984)).
In the present case, the evidence established that Appellant was driving at 90 mph
on an access road with a posted speed limit of 50 mph. Appellant sped past the entrance
to an EMS station that does not have an emergency light to warn drivers that an
emergency vehicle might be entering the roadway. This incident occurred less than two
years after Appellant caused the death of a motorist due to driving at a speed nearly twice
that of the posted speed limit. In that regard, Appellant acknowledged that June Linker
is dead because he was “driving fast,” and, because of that accident, he is aware that it
is difficult to stop at 90 mph if someone pulls out in front of you. Considering all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we do not conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by determining that a preponderance of the evidence established
that Appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by committing the offense 4 of reckless driving. We specifically note that the trial court need not turn a blind eye to
the fact that Appellant had recently caused the death of another motorist due to his
excessive speeding. The trial court could reasonably consider that accident to be a
relevant factor in determining whether the State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that Appellant committed the offense of reckless driving.
We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
ISSUE TWO: CONSIDERATION OF FULL RANGE OF PUNISHMENT
By his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him
to ten years’ incarceration without considering the full range of punishment. Appellant’s
contention is premised on the fact that the trial court stated, when rendering punishment,
that “the court sentences you according to the plea agreement to the underlying sentence
of ten years[’] confinement in the [I]nstitutional [D]ivision of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice.” Appellant contends that this statement “clearly shows” that the trial
court did not consider the full range of punishment.
A court’s arbitrary refusal to consider the entire range of punishment constitutes a
denial of due process. Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Whether a court’s sentencing comports with constitutional due process requirements is
reviewed de novo. See Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (due process claim contending trial court prejudged
punishment is conclusion of law reviewed de novo). Absent a clear showing of bias or
misconduct, we presume that the trial judge was neutral and detached. Brumit v. State,
206 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
5 In the present case, Appellant pleaded guilty by plea agreement to the second-
degree felony offense of manslaughter. The punishment range for a second-degree
felony is not more than 20 years or less than two, and a fine not to exceed $10,000. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33. The ten-year sentence imposed by the trial court is well within
the statutory range. Appellant agreed to this ten-year sentence in agreeing to the plea
bargain. See Grado, 445 S.W.3d at 740 (“In a negotiated plea bargain that contemplates
a particular offense of conviction and punishment to be imposed, a defendant is expressly
giving up a whole host of rights, including the right to be sentenced by a judge considering
the entire range of punishment . . . .”). The statement highlighted by Appellant was made
by the trial court at the revocation proceeding and after it had heard the evidence against
Appellant. See Sanchez v. State, 989 S.W.2d 409, 411–12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1999, no pet.) (finding similar statement not indicative that trial court failed to consider
entire range of punishment). Nothing in the record reflects that the trial court had
prejudged the sentence it imposed. Rather, the trial court stated that it made its ruling
“[b]ased upon the testimony and the evidence presented to the Court” at the revocation
hearing.
We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judy C. Parker Justice Do not publish. 6