Egharevba v. Central SDHC FHA LLC

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 25, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01869
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Krislyn EGHAREVBA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1869-AGS-DDL

4 ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION Plaintiff, 5 TO PROCEED IN FORMA vs. PAUPERIS (ECF 2); 6 (2) DENYING MOTION FOR

7 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING CENTRAL SDHC FHA LLC, et al., ORDER (ECF 3); AND (3) 8 Defendants. DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 9 LEAVE TO AMEND 10 11 Plaintiff Krislyn Egharevba, proceeding without an attorney, has sued the Central 12 San Diego Housing Commission, one of its attorneys, and two of its employees based on 13 civil-rights theories under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She seeks to waive the filing fee and to have 14 a temporary injunction ordering the Housing Commission to restore her housing she was 15 recently evicted from. Her request to waive the filing fee is granted, but her complaint must 16 be dismissed. 17 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 18 Parties instituting a civil action in a federal district court must typically pay filing 19 fees of $405. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) ($350 filing fee); District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, 20 § 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2023) ($55 administrative fee). But if granted the right to proceed 21 in forma pauperis, a plaintiff can proceed without prepaying those fees. Rodriguez v. Cook, 22 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Egharevba here has an average monthly income of 23 “$2,439” from various public-benefit programs. (ECF 2, at 2.) She claims she has no 24 money on hand, no assets of value, and four children under the age of 12 in her care, in 25 addition to being “seven months pregnant” and “homeless” because of her eviction. (Id. 26 at 2–5.) Although plaintiff failed to properly itemize her monthly expenses, she claims they 27 match her income and that she “struggles to maintain the bare minimum” standard of living 28 1 for her and her children. (See id. at 4–5.) Going forward, plaintiff is admonished to make 2 sure she provides the Court with all requested information, but the declaration suffices to 3 show that she cannot pay the filing fee. See Blount v. Saul, No. 21-CV-0679-BLM, 4 2021 WL 1561453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2021) (“[A] party need not be completely 5 destitute to proceed IFP.”). The motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 6 SCREENING 7 When reviewing an IFP motion, the court must also screen the complaint and 8 dismiss it if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim,” or seeks monetary relief 9 from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In addition, and 10 critically for this case, “[i]f the court determines at anytime that it lacks subject matter 11 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 12 Egharevba claims that defendants “removed” her from her “home” “without proper 13 notice, without a meaningful hearing, and while a petition for a writ of supersedeas and 14 appeal were still pending in state court.” (ECF 1, at 5.) She alleges that this wrongful 15 eviction violated her constitutional rights to due process, to equal protection, and to be free 16 from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 5–7.) In 17 attachments to the complaint, Egharevba provides additional details, including the orders 18 of eviction from state court (ECF 1-2, at 10, 14, 24) and a recounting of the eviction itself, 19 performed by sheriff’s deputies (ECF 1-2, at 5). 20 The Court cannot hear her federal claims, however, due to the Rooker-Feldman 21 doctrine. Rooker-Feldman bars lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a 22 direct appeal from a state-court decision, as well as “over the de facto equivalent of such 23 an appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); see generally 24 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. 25 Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). “To determine whether an action functions as a de facto 26 appeal, we pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.” Cooper, 27 704 F.3d at 777–78 (cleaned up). “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker–Feldman 28 1 when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed 2 by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Id. at 778. And an 3 injunction to undo her state-court ordered eviction is exactly the relief Egharevba seeks: 4 she requests “immediate reinstatement to [her] home.” (ECF 1, at 7); see Bianchi v. 5 Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Rooker-Feldman bars 6 jurisdiction when the “relief [plaintiff] seeks” would include “undoing the decision of the 7 state court” (cleaned up)). 8 That’s not all the relief she requests, though, as she also seeks “compensatory and 9 punitive damages.” (ECF 1, at 7.) But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine includes claims for 10 other relief that are “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.” Doe & 11 Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Feldman, 12 460 U.S. at 482 n.16). Claims are “inextricably intertwined” if “the district court must hold 13 that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. at 1030. Since 14 all of Egharevba’s claims are based on the premise that she was wrongfully evicted, any 15 damages awarded by this Court would require a finding that the state court was wrong to 16 order the eviction. And so, this Court is barred from hearing her claims under Rooker- 17 Feldman. See Kotab v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 2:24-cv-00324-MMD-NJK, 2024 WL 18 1744705, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 23, 2024) (holding that to “provide Plaintiff with the relief 19 he seeks” arising from a state-court eviction order “would require this Court to analyze the 20 state courts’ alleged legal errors and void the original order and the appeal, which is 21 squarely barred by Rooker-Feldman”). Since this Court lacks jurisdiction over the case, it 22 also denies Egharevba’s request for a temporary restraining order seeking, among other 23 things, to prevent “Defendants from enforcing the eviction or obstructing access to the 24 property” and “[a]n order of reinstatement into possession” of the property. (See ECF 3, 25 at 6); Kotab, 2024 WL 1744705, at *2 (denying a similar motion for injunctive relief due 26 to jurisdiction being barred by Rooker-Feldman). 27 Given plaintiff’s unrepresented status, and despite the Court’s concerns that she will 28 1 unable to address Rooker-Feldman concerns to permit her to challenge her eviction in 2 ||federal court, the Court grants Egharevba leave to amend her complaint. After all, a 3 ||““district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is 4 || absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 5 || Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). 6 CONCLUSION 7 Thus, the Court orders as follows: 8 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and the filing 9 || fee is waived. 10 2. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice due to lack of 11 jurisdiction. But plaintiff is granted leave to amend. 12 3. By August 29, 2025, plaintiff must file any amended complaint. The amended 13 ||}complaint must be complete by itself without reference to any previous version of her 14 || pleading; defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint 15 || will be considered waived. If Egharevba fails to timely amend, the Court will enter a final 16 || Order dismissing this civil action. 17 || Dated: July 25, 2025 18 Z i f 19 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28