Egan, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

236 F.2d 343, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2017, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 5304
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJuly 16, 1956
Docket15440_1
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 236 F.2d 343 (Egan, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Egan, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 236 F.2d 343, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2017, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 5304 (8th Cir. 1956).

Opinion

WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.

Egan, Inc., a taxpayer corporation, petitioner herein, seeks reversal of the decision of the Tax Court entered May 9, 1955, (unreported) upholding determination of the Commissioner that the corporation was availed of in 1948 for the purpose of preventing the imposition of surtax upon its sole stockholder, Henry G. Egan, through the medium of permitting earnings or profits to accumulate instead of being distributed, and sustaining surtax imposed under Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. Sec. 102(a) and (c). 1

*344 The Commissioner’s position was that the business carried on by the Petitioner had always consisted in selling Chevrolet cars and trucks under a sale franchise agreement with Chevrolet Motor Division of General Motors Corporation which was terminated on October 31, 1948, and petitioner received no more cars or trucks to sell and therefore had no business need for the large surplus of more than $750,000 it had accumulated from profits, but retained it for the purpose of preventing the imposition of surtax on its only stockholder, Mr. Egan.

The petitioner’s claims were presented in its petition to the Tax Court for redetermination of deficiency as follows:

“During the year ended December 31, 1948, until on or about October 31, 1948, and for many years prior thereto petitioner had held a franchise to purchase and sell new Chevrolet automobiles and trucks. On or about October 31, 1948, petitioner lost said franchise. The loss of said franchise substantially destroyed the earning power of petitioner until such time as it could secure another like franchise or develop a new line of business. Petitioner was unable to secure another like franchise to purchase and sell new automobiles and trucks during the part of the year 1948 remaining after its said loss. As of December 31, 1948 it was imperative that petitioner conserve its assets for such new operations as it might undertake. It would have been unwise, improvident and unbusinesslike for petitioner to have declared a dividend in the year 1948 for the reason that it had completely lost its principal sources of income. In the normal course of events all of said funds would have been needed and required to commence new operations. The avoidance of the surtax to the stockholders was not a factor or a consideration in the failure to pay dividends. Petitioner did not distribute any of its earnings for the year ended December 31, 1948, for the reason that it was essential that the same be retained by it.”

In its Findings of Fact and Opinion the Tax Court presents a complete summary of the matters stipulated by the parties and of the evidence contained in some 200 pages of narrative and the grounds upon which its decision was rendered in favor of the Commissioner ordering deficiencies. The Tax Court found that “petitioner was availed of during 1948 for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its sole shareholder, Egan, through the medium of permitting earnings to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.” It stated in its Opinion that “it is plainly apparent that on the date of termination of its Chevrolet sales franchise on October 31, 1948, and because thereof, it had been dealt its death blow from which it was at no time considered it would recover. It therefore at that time had no reasonable business needs, either present or prospective, for its rather substantial surplus.”

The Tax Court also said that, although Mr. Egan made attempts to regain a Chevrolet franchise, he did so without any real expectation of success. Before the close of 1948 he agreed with representatives of Chevrolet Motor Division to discuss the sale of the taxpayer’s agency, realty and equipment to a successor to the franchise and effectuated such sale early in March 1949. He caused the company's charter to be amended on December 30, 1948, deleting “Chevrolet” from its name as it was obligated to do when it ceased to receive or sell Chevrolet cars on termination of the franchise, and authorizing it to transact real estate business instead. The court further stated that “during the closing months of 1948 Egan was but *345 exploring the possibilities of petitioner’s continuance in some sort of business but had no real present intention that it should do so.” It declared further that taxpayer failed to show any concrete basis for a finding that at December 31, 1948, it had business prospects other than winding up the car selling business it had been conducting. Mr. Egan came to his death in 1953 and in that year the taxpayer was liquidated and its assets were turned over to the executor of Mr. Egan’s estate. It had never applied its accumulated surplus to any business needs.

On this review the petitioner does not question that the effect of retaining its large surplus accumulated in 1948 and prior years without distributing it was to save Mr. Egan from large surtax nor that the surplus was never used by it for any business needs. But it contends that findings should have been made in accord with the allegations of its petition for redetermination of deficiency above set forth and the surtax should have been set aside.

It is well settled that the issue raised was a question of fact to be determined by the Tax Court. Helvering v. National Grocery Company, 304 U.S. 282, 58 S.Ct. 932, 82 L.Ed. 1346; Bride v. Commissioner, 8 Cir., 224 F.2d 39, cer-tiorari denied, 350 U.S. 883, 76 S.Ct. 136, and whether there was substantial evidence to support the ultimate findings can best be shown by setting forth a summary of the Findings of Fact of the Tax Court as follows:

Taxpayer is a Minnesota corporation and during the years here involved maintained its principal office at 222 North Concord Street, South St. Paul, Minnesota. It kept its books and filed its income tax returns on the basis of a calendar year and upon the accrual method of accounting.

Egan, Inc. is the present name of taxpayer. As incorporated, its name was Egan Chevrolet, Inc., the change having been effected by amendment to its charter on December 31, 1948. Taxpayer was incorporated December 14, 1932, with an authorized capital stock of $50,-000 represented by 500 shares of par value stock at $100 per share. Only 100 shares of such stock were issued and were held as follows:

Number of Shares Held on
December 14, December 31,
1932 1948
Henry G. Egan President and
General Manager 98 100
Alice M. Egan
(Wife of Henry
G. Egan) Secretary-Treasurer 1 0
Alois J. Piepcr Vice-President (1932)
Secretary (1948) 1 0
Total 100 100

Henry G. Egan, hereinafter referred to as Egan, died on January 15, 1953. Before his death, and by the close of 1948, he had acquired all of the outstanding stock of taxpayer.

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236 F.2d 343, 49 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2017, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 5304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/egan-inc-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca8-1956.