Efrain Aparicio-Camacho v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 18-71714
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EFRAIN VICTORIANO APARICIO- No. 18-71714 CAMACHO, AKA Efrain Aparicio, Agency No. A213-082-587 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 9, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, M. SMITH, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Efrain Victoriano Aparicio-Camacho (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of

Mexico, seeks review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application

for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). deny the petition.

Where, as here, the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s decision without issuing

an opinion, we review the IJ’s decision. See Villavicencio-Rojas v. Lynch, 811

F.3d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 2016). “The facts underlying any determination on

cancellation of removal . . . [are] unreviewable.” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S.

209, 225 (2024). The only question subject to judicial review is “whether those

established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard.” Id. “[W]e review for

substantial evidence [the] fact-intensive mixed questions” of eligibility for

cancellation of removal. Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi, 158 F.4th 944, 954 (9th Cir.

2025) (citing Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1000–03 (9th Cir. 2025)).

1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Petitioner did

not establish the ten years of continuous physical presence required for

cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). The IJ found that Petitioner

failed to offer any evidence of his physical presence in the United States during

“any portion of any year prior to 2011.” Given that Petitioner applied for

cancellation of removal in 2017 and was ordered removed in 2018, the record does

not compel the conclusion that Petitioner established ten years of continuous

physical presence in the U.S.1 See Lemus-Escobar, 158 F.4th at 954 n.1.

1 Petitioner argues that his Notice to Appear (“NTA”), served on July 25, 2017, was deficient under Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018), and thus he continued to accrue physical presence in the United States until the IJ’s decision on

2 2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Petitioner did

not establish that his qualifying relative, his U.S.-citizen daughter, will suffer

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” in the case of his removal from the

United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The IJ’s unreviewable factual findings

include the facts that Petitioner’s daughter does not have any special needs or

health problems, and that Petitioner “should not have difficulty finding some type

of employment in Mexico.” See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225. Petitioner does not

show that the record “compels” the conclusion that the hardship his daughter

would suffer as a result of his removal “deviates, in the extreme, from the hardship

that ordinarily occurs in removal cases.” Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1007; see

also Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005) (economic

and emotional hardship are “sadly common” in the removal context).

PETITION DENIED.

February 2, 2018. However, given the IJ’s finding that Petitioner failed to provide any evidence of his residence in the United States prior to 2011, Petitioner fails to demonstrate ten years of continuous physical presence even if his claim regarding his NTA is correct, and thus remand to address this point would be an “idle and useless formality.” Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).