Effort F., Inc. v. Un. Comp. Bd. of Rev.

558 A.2d 571, 125 Pa. Commw. 505, 1989 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 292
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 1, 1989
DocketAppeal 1618 C.D. 1988
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 558 A.2d 571 (Effort F., Inc. v. Un. Comp. Bd. of Rev.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Effort F., Inc. v. Un. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 558 A.2d 571, 125 Pa. Commw. 505, 1989 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 292 (Pa. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

Opinion by

Senior Judge Barbieri,

Effort Foundry, Inc. (Petitioner) petitions for review of the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which affirmed a referees decision awarding benefits to Jerome E. Lynn (Claimant) and 23 other employees because they had been constructively “locked out” of their place of employment during a labor dispute pursuant to Section 402(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., EL. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 PS. §802(d). We affirm the Board.

Claimant was a member of Local 14797 of the United Steel Workers of America (Union) which represented employees at Petitioners plant. The labor management agreement between the Union and Petitioner was set to expire by its own terms on December 14, 1987. Prior to this date, the parties held a series of negotiating sessions during which Petitioner represented it was seeking economic concessions from the Union in order to remain competitive. The Union rejected Petitioners position and asked for and received financial information about the company to verify Petitioners claim of economic distress.

On December 14, 1987, Petitioner presented the Union its final offer which demanded wage and benefit cuts. The Unions representative stated this proposal wap unacceptable but offered to take back to its membership a proposal to extend the present contract for a three month, six month or one year period. Petitioner replied that it could not hang on that long and that work would only be available on December 15, 1986, under the terms of its final wage offer. The Union then held a membership meeting and unanimously rejected Petitioners final offer. *508 The Union struck Petitioners plant at midnight on December 14, 1987.

On January 12, 1988, while the strike was continuing, the parties held another negotiating session before a federal mediator. Petitioner offered to allow the employees to return to work at substantially the same wage rate as before, but with a different recall and employee discipline policy. The Union rejected this proposal and the strike continued.

The referee awarded benefits to Claimant, who is the test employee in this case, because he found that the Union attempted to maintain the status quo between the parties by offering to extend the existing contract, which offer Petitioner rejected, thereby converting this labor dispute into a constructive lockout under the holding of Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91 (1960). The Board made its own findings of fact and affirmed.

Petitioner presents several related arguments. First, Petitioner notes the Union did not formally offer to extend the contract, it merely offered to take a proposal for an extension back to its membership. Second, Petitioner argues that the Unions offer to extend the contract did not contemplate that negotiations would continue, but was instead a proposal for a contract of limited duration and therefore not an attempt to maintain the status quo between the parties. See Jehn v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 110 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 209, 532 A.2d 57 (1987). Third, Petitioner asserts that if a lockout did occur on December 14, 1987, its offer to take the employees back at the previous wage rate on January 12,1988 converted any lockout back into a strike. We review Petitioners contentions seriatim, mindful that the Board is the final arbiter of credibility and its decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. *509 Peak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 509 Pa. 267, 501 A.2d 1383 (1985).

Initially, we must determine if the Unions offer to take a proposal for contract extension back to its membership is sufficient to satisfy its burden under Vrotney of offering to continue working under the terms and conditions of the existing contract. The union need not offer to continue the status quo if it definitely appears the gesture would be “futile” and not accepted by management. Philco Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 430 Pa. 101, 242 A.2d 454 (1968). The response of Petitioners representative, William Corry, to the Unions offer is illustrativé of the futility doctrine:

Q: The only offer was for the three-month, six-month or one year?
A: Right.
Q: And take it back to the membership?
A: Yeah. And that’s a long time. Three months.
Q: What was your response to that?
A: My response was, is that we just can’t hang that long. .. we need immediate help, immediate relief. . . .

(N.T 64, R.R. 78a). The Union representative testified that Mr. Corry stated that Petitioner’s final offer would be unilaterally implemented at midnight that day. Under the circumstances, the Union had no duty to have its membership vote on a contract extension and then present a formal offer to management. Petitioner had already rejected even the suggestion of an extension.

Petitioner next asserts that what the Union attempted to do was not to offer to continue working under the existing terms of the contract pending negotiations, but to offer a new contract of limited duration under the same terms, at the end of which the Union would take another look at the situation depending on the financial strength *510 of the company. This is legally insufficient to Convert the strike into a lockout. Jehn; Hoffman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 100 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 264, 514 A.2d 668 (1986). This argument turns on the question of whether continuing negotiations were contemplated during the proposed contract extension.

Whether negotiations were contemplated is a question of the intent of the parties. Petitioner’s counsel attempted to ascertain this intent through cross-examination of the Union’s shop steward, Michael Nothstein:

Q: . . . You were not offering just to extend to allow the parties to continue to negotiate'. You were offering that extension so that you felt that within that period of time, whatever it was, the Company’s financial condition would improve. Is that a fair statement?
A: No. Not necessarily '. . . .

(N.T.'33, R.R. 47a).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
558 A.2d 571, 125 Pa. Commw. 505, 1989 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/effort-f-inc-v-un-comp-bd-of-rev-pacommwct-1989.