Edwin Segovia v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 3D2025-1843
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed November 5, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-1843 Lower Tribunal No. AIST0DE ________________

Edwin Segovia, Petitioner,

vs.

State of Florida, Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.

Carlos Martinez, Public Defender, and Maria Elena Lauredo, Chief Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Daniel Colmenares, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

FERNANDEZ, J. Edwin Segovia files a Petition for Writ of Prohibition against the trial

judge in the underlying case concerning an alleged probation violation.

Segovia argues that the trial court failed to capture jurisdiction before his

probation expired on July 2, 2025, and the trial court no longer has

jurisdiction to hear the alleged probation violation. Because the trial judge

did not issue a notice to appear until after the expiration of Segovia’s

probation and no longer has subject matter jurisdiction, we grant the petition

for writ of prohibition and order the trial court to dismiss the case and

discharge Segovia.

Segovia was charged and found guilty of driving under the influence

with property damage. He was sentenced to serve one year of reporting

probation beginning on July 2, 2024 and expiring on July 2, 2025.

On June 9, 2025, an affidavit alleging that Segovia violated his

probation was filed. On June 11, 2025, the clerk’s office sent Segovia a

standard “praecipe for court notice” setting the case for a hearing. The

probation term then expired on July 2, 2025. On August 8, 2025, the trial

judge issued a notice for Segovia to appear for a probation violation hearing.

Counsel for Segovia filed a motion to dismiss Segovia’s probation

violation for lack of jurisdiction. Segovia’s counsel pointed out that the

probationary term expired on July 2, 2025, and because the trial court did

2 not issue a warrant or notice to appear before the expiration date, as required

by section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (2025), the time was not tolled before

July 2, 2025.

In response, the State argued that the clerk-issued praecipe filed on

June 11, 2025 “functions as a notice to appear” and was satisfactory to

capture jurisdiction. Defense counsel responded that section 948.06(1)(b)

states that the trial judge must issue the required notice to appear rather than

the clerk.

On September 16, 2025, the trial court denied the defense motion to

dismiss, agreeing with the State that the Jun 11, 2025 praecipe was sufficient

to toll the probationary period. Thereafter, Segovia filed the writ of prohibition.

A writ of prohibition is the proper means to review a trial court’s order

denying a motion to dismiss, resulting in the trial court continuing to exercise

jurisdiction after the expiration of probation. See Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.;

Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(3), 9.100; Smith v. State, 348 So. 3d 1208, 1209

(Fla. 5th DCA 2022). We therefore have jurisdiction.

“[It is an] elementary principle of statutory construction that significance

and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the

statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere

surplusage.” Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008) (quoting

3 Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So.2d 599,

606 (Fla. 2006)). The plain language of section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes

(2025), reveals that the legislature intended direct judicial oversight of an

alleged probation violation. Throughout section (1), the legislature takes

each subsection to delineate the specific roles of the trial judge, the probation

officer, and the court in general.

The whole of subsection (1)(b) addresses the actions a “committing

trial court judge” may take. Specifically, “the committing trial court judge” is:

1) to review the facts of the affidavit, and 2) if appropriate based on the facts,

to issue either a) a warrant or b) a notice to appear. As to a notice to appear,

the language explicitly reads, “In lieu of issuing a warrant for arrest, the

committing trial court judge may issue a notice to appear[.]” (Emphasis

added).

Subsection (1)(g) addresses how a probationary period is tolled, which

requires two steps: 1) a filing of an affidavit, and 2) the issuance of either a)

a warrant, b) a “warrantless arrest under this section,” or c) “a notice to

appear under this section.” (Emphasis added). It naturally follows that the

roles defined earlier under this section would fill in the gaps of the who and

the how of the requirements for tolling of a probationary period. As provided

in subsection (1)(b), “the committing trial court judge” 1) reviews the affidavit,

4 and 2) if appropriate based on the facts of the affidavit, issues a warrant or

a notice to appear. 1

Accordingly, it was the explicit intent of the legislature for “the

committing trial court judge” to be the actor in issuing the notice to appear

“under this section.” In this case, the committing trial court judge did

eventually issue the notice to appear but not until after the expiration of

probation.2 As a result, the trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction over

Segovia.

Further, on inspection of the praecipe, absent is any mention of a

probation violation and language ordering Segovia to appear. See Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.125 (“If notice to appear is issued, it shall contain the: . . .

offense(s) charged.”). This is in direct contradiction with the Order on Motion

to Dismiss Probation Violation Affidavit that states that the praecipe was for

a “hearing on the probation violation for June 27, 2025.” 3 The State cannot

rely on the information contained in the affidavit to make up for what is

1 We are not suggesting that the trial court must herself issue the notice to appear, but at minimum, the notice to appear must be issued at the direction of the trial court and must actually notify the defendant that he or she must appear for the scheduled hearing. 2 The notice to appear was issued at the direction of the trial court by the trial court’s judicial assistant. 3 The praecipe issued by the Clerk’s Office, titled “Praecipe for Court Notices Mailed on: June 11 2025,” was nothing more than a printout that contained no language notifying the defendant that he must appear in court.

5 lacking in the praecipe, as the affidavit itself is not sufficient to toll the

probationary period. See Stambaugh v. State, 891 So. 2d 1136, 1139 (Fla.

4th DCA 2005) (“Without the issuance of an arrest warrant [or a notice to

appear], the January 28, 2004 VOP affidavit did not toll the probationary

period.”). Accordingly, in addition to the plain language of the statute, the

praecipe did not include “the factual allegations necessary to fulfill the

function of [a notice to appear].” Chadwick v. State, 118 So. 3d 827, 829 (Fla.

2d DCA 2012).

Because the trial judge did not issue a notice to appear until after the

expiration of Segovia’s probation and no longer has subject matter

jurisdiction, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and order the trial court

to dismiss the case and discharge Segovia.

Petition granted.