Edwin Jose Torres (A-201-375-774) v. Warden, Mesa Verde Detention Center, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-04141
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 EDWIN JOSE TORRES (A-201-375-774), No. 1:26-cv-04141-DC-CSK 11 Petitioner, 12 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 WARDEN, MESA VERDE DETENTION CENTER, et al., 14 Respondents. 15

16 17 Petitioner Edwin Jose Torres (A-201-375-774), a native and citizen of Venezuela, has 18 filed a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 Petitioner was 19 admitted to the United States on May 20, 2018 as a nonimmigrant B-2 visitor for pleasure with 20 authorization to remain for a temporary period not to exceed November 19, 2018. Petitioner 21 remained in the United States beyond November 19, 2018 without authorization. On November 22 9, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained petitioner following his 23 arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. This habeas action concerns petitioner’s 24 detention. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that respondent’s motion to dismiss 25 be granted. 26 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 28 and Local Rule 302(c)(17). 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 2 Petitioner is a citizen and native of Venezuela. (ECF No. 6-1 at 1.) On May 20, 2018, 3 petitioner was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant B-2 visitor for pleasure with 4 authorization to remain for a temporary period not to exceed November 19, 2018. (Id.) Petitioner 5 remained in the United States beyond November 19, 2018 without authorization. (Id.) On 6 November 9, 2025, ICE detained petitioner after encountering him at the Seminole County Jail 7 following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. (ECF No. 6-2 at 2.) On November 8 9, 2015, ICE served petitioner with a Notice to Appear and placed into Immigration and 9 Nationality Act (“INA”) Section 240 (8 U.S.C. § 1229a) removal proceedings, which are standard 10 removal proceedings.3 (ECF No. 6-1 at 1.) 11 On April 27, 2026, an immigration judge provided petitioner with a bond hearing. (ECF 12 No. 1 at 9.) The immigration judge denied bond based on “danger and discretion.” (Id.) On May 13 19, 2026, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) received Petitioner’s appeal of the 14 immigration judge’s bond decision. (Id. at 12.) Petitioner states the appeal remains pending and 15 has not yet been assigned a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) 16 The parties do not dispute that Petitioner is being detained pending removal proceedings 17 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (ECF No. 6 at 9-10.) Petitioner has been in continuous detention since 18 November 9, 2025. (ECF No. 6-2 at 2; ECF No. 1 at 1-2.) Respondents do not contest 19 petitioner’s factual allegations. (See ECF No. 6.) 20 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 21 On May 30, 2026, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for 22 temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (ECF Nos. 1 and 2.) On June 2, 2026, 23 respondents timely filed a consolidated motion to dismiss, response to the petition, and opposition 24 2 Petitioner filed a verified habeas petition. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) A court “may treat the allegations 25 of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987)). 26 Respondents do not contest petitioner’s factual allegations. (See ECF No. 6.) 27 3 Removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (INA § 240) are standard removal proceedings, which are different from expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 28 § 1225(b)(1) (INA § 235(b)(1)). 1 to the motion for temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 6.) On June 15, 2026, petitioner filed an 2 opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) On June 18, 2026, the district judge issued an 3 order denying petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order and referred the petition to the 4 assigned magistrate judge for all further proceedings. (ECF No. 8.) Briefing is now complete. 5 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 6 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 7 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 8 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 9 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 10 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 11 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 12 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 13 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 14 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s 15 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 16 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 17 Habeas corpus petitions are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules 18 Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court. The provisions of Rule 4, 19 which are applicable to a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provide in pertinent part: “If 20 it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to 21 relief in the district court, the judge must not dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the 22 petitioner.” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 indicate that the court may dismiss a 23 petition for writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to 24 respondents’ motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. 25 IV. DISCUSSION 26 Generally, noncitizens are subject to civil immigration detention only if the noncitizen 27 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that 28 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention). Petitioner challenges his 1 continued detention based on the violation of the following: (1) the Fifth Amendment procedural 2 due process clause; and (2) the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (ECF No. 1 at 5-6.) 3 Respondents contend petitioner failed to present a cognizable claim. (ECF No. 6 at 2-3.) 4 Respondents further assert petitioner is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); he failed to 5 exhaust his administrative remedies; and any due process claims fail. (Id. at 4-10.) 6 A. Statutory Basis for Detention 7 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs the arrest, detention, and release of noncitizens like petitioner 8 who are in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1226; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530 9 (2003). Under § 1226(a), the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has discretionary 10 authority to detain a noncitizen, release them on bond, or release them on conditional parole 11 pending removal proceedings. This discretionary authority does not apply to noncitizens who fall 12 within the criminal categories described in § 1226(c), for whom detention is mandatory. 13 When a noncitizen is taken into immigration custody under § 1226(a), ICE makes an 14 initial custody determination, which may include setting bond. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). A 15 detainee may then request a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. 16 § 236.1(d)(1). At that hearing, the detainee bears the burden of demonstrating to the immigration 17 judge that the detainee warrants release on bond. See In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 18 2006). The immigration judge must consider whether the detainee “is a threat to national 19 security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk.” Id. 20 (citing Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1976)). The immigration judge may also weigh 21 other discretionary factors. Id. 22 If the immigration judge denies bond, the detainee may appeal to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. 23 § 236.1(d)(3). If the BIA affirms, the detainee may seek habeas relief in federal district court. 24 Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1159-61 (9th Cir. 2011). While district courts have 25 jurisdiction to review bond determinations for constitutional error, Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 26 F.4th 1189, 1209 (9th Cir. 2022), district courts may not review discretionary judgments 27 regarding the detention and release of noncitizens in removal proceedings under § 1226(a). 28 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). 1 Further, an individual detained pursuant to § 1226(a) may request an additional bond 2 hearing whenever he experiences a material change in circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). 3 In their motion to dismiss and answer, respondents assert that petitioner is lawfully 4 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (ECF No. 6 at 9-10.) Petitioner does not dispute this. 5 (See ECF No. 7.) As discussed above, an immigration judge held a bond hearing and issued an 6 order denying bond on April 27, 2026. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Petitioner filed an appeal which 7 remains pending before the BIA. (ECF No. 1 at 12; ECF No. 7 at 2.) 8 B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 9 Respondents argue that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies where his 10 appeal of the immigration judge’s April 27, 2026 order denying his request for bond remains 11 pending before the BIA. (ECF No. 6 at 4-5.) Respondents argue that petitioner makes no 12 argument as to why he should be excused from prudential exhaustion of administrative remedies. 13 (Id. at 5.) 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals 14 before filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004). 15 However, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available 16 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 17 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not 18 jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by 19 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 20 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the 21 district court, in its discretion, may “determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach 22 the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in 23 court.” Id. “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency 24 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of 25 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 26 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude 27 the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 28 citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the court may waive the exhaustion requirement 1 when administrative remedies are inadequate, irreparable injury may occur without immediate 2 judicial relief, or exhaustion otherwise would be futile. Laing, 370 F.3d at 1000-01 (“[D]istrict 3 court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is ordinarily reserved for instances in which 4 no other judicial remedy is available.”). 5 For the following reasons, as to petitioner’s challenge to the immigration judge’s April 27, 6 2026 decision denying his request for bond, this Court agrees with respondents that this claim 7 should be denied based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In Leonardo v. 8 Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011), the petitioner was a noncitizen held in immigration 9 detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and filed a petition for writ of habeas in the federal 10 district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his prolonged detention without a bond 11 hearing violated his due process rights. See Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1159. The district court 12 entered an order directing respondent to hold a bond hearing consistent with the requirements set 13 forth in Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008), and 14 refrained from entering judgment on the habeas corpus petition until respondents had reported to 15 the court that such a hearing had been held. See Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1159. Respondents 16 complied with the order and an Immigration Judge held a bond hearing, at which he denied bond 17 upon finding petitioner was a danger to the community. See id. The petitioner did not appeal this 18 determination to the BIA but instead filed in the district court in his pending habeas corpus 19 proceeding a motion for the court to review and reverse the Immigration Judge’s bond order, 20 arguing that the bond hearing did not conform to the court’s prior order nor satisfy due process. 21 Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the petitioner’s request should have been denied, and his 22 underlying claim dismissed without prejudice, due to his failure to exhaust administrative 23 remedies by seeking review of the bond decision to the BIA. See id. at 1160. The Ninth Circuit 24 explained that the statutory and regulatory scheme of § 1226(a) 25 entitle[s] [detainees] to a bond hearing before an immigration judge. If they are dissatisfied with the IJ's bond determination, they may file 26 an administrative appeal so that “the necessity of detention can be reviewed by ... the BIA.” If they remain dissatisfied, they may file a 27 petition for habeas corpus in the district court. 28 Id. (citations omitted). As such, it was “improper” for petitioner to employ the “short cut” of 1 seeking review of the immigration judge’s bond decision in the district court before seeking 2 review in the BIA. See id. Instead, petitioner “should have exhausted administrative remedies by 3 appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the immigration judge’s 4 decision” and “[o]nce the BIA rendered its decision, [petitioner] could have properly pursued 5 habeas relief in the district court and the district court’s decision would have been subject to 6 review in this court.” Id. Because petitioner had not shown that his request should be excused 7 from the prudential exhaustion requirement, nor that the proceeding should be stayed to permit 8 him to exhaust the new claim, the Ninth Circuit held that the petition should be dismissed without 9 prejudice due to petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claim challenging the adequacy of the bond 10 determination. See id. at 1160-61. 11 In the instant action, petitioner did seek review of the immigration judge’s April 27, 2026 12 decision and his appeal remains pending before the BIA. Petitioner fails to show why he should 13 be excused from the prudential exhaustion requirement regarding this claim where his appeal 14 remains pending. Accordingly, as to petitioner’s challenges to the April 27, 2026 decision by the 15 immigration judge denying his request for bond, his claim is denied. See id. 16 C. Petitioner’s Other Claims for Relief 17 The Court declines to reach petitioner’s remaining habeas corpus claim asserting that his 18 continued detention violates due process (claim one). (See ECF No. 1 at 5). See, e.g., Rodriguez 19 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding no due process violation where 20 petitioner detained over sixteen months pursuant to § 1226(a) had received a bond hearing and a 21 further bond hearing before an immigration judge was available to him upon a showing of 22 materially changed circumstances); see also Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th 23 Cir. 2008) (finding no due process violation where petitioner detained for three years under 24 § 1226(a) “received a bond hearing that afforded him an individualized determination of the 25 government’s interest in his continued detention by a neutral decisionmaker”). 26 V. CONCLUSION 27 In summary, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 28 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6) be GRANTED. ] 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED. 2 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of respondents and close 3 this case. 4 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 5 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days of the 6 || date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court 7 || and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 8 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed and 9 || served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to 10 || file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 11 || See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 12 13 | Dated: July 9, 2026 YY 2 Aan Spe | CHI SOO KIM 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 tom4141.2241.imm9 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28