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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-6853
EDWIN BLADIMIR ESCOBAR-SALMERON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
STEPHEN T. MOYER; COREY T. HOLLAND; CO II DANIEL ARNDT,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:19-cv-02717-RDB)
Argued: September 24, 2024 Decided: August 14, 2025
Before AGEE, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Rushing joined.
ARGUED: Dallas Floyd Kratzer, III, Columbus, Ohio, Margaret Ann Lohmann, STEPTOE LLP, Bridgeport, West Virginia, for Appellant. Sandra Diane Lee, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. USCA4 Appeal: 20-6853 Doc: 95 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 2 of 25
DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge:
Correctional Officers Corey T. Holland and Daniel Arndt (collectively, “the
Correctional Officers”) received a tip that a prisoner at Eastern Correctional Institution
(“ECI”), Edwin Bladimir Escobar-Salmeron, had a knife. The Correctional Officers
ordered Escobar-Salmeron and his cellmate to exit their cell and escorted the two men to
the institution’s recreation hall, known as the Day Room. Once in the Day Room, the
Correctional Officers strip searched—and by Escobar-Salmeron’s account, brutally beat—
Escobar-Salmeron.
Escobar-Salmeron sued the Correctional Officers and Stephen T. Moyer, the former
secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, alleging
that the Correctional Officers violently assaulted him in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and Maryland law. The Correctional Officers disputed Escobar-Salmeron’s
compliance with the strip search, his injuries, and the sequence of events through which
the confrontation turned physical. But the district court nonetheless dismissed Escobar-
Salmeron’s Maryland law claims and his claims against Moyer before granting summary
judgment on Escobar-Salmeron’s remaining excessive force claim because “[t]he
undisputed evidence d[id] not support [the] allegation that Officers Holland and Arndt used
force maliciously or sadistically.” Escobar v. Moyer, No. RDB-19-2717, 2020 WL
2061503, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 29, 2020). Escobar-Salmeron appealed, challenging the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on his excessive force claims against the
Correctional Officers.
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Finding that material facts remain in dispute, we vacate the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
Because this case is before us on appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we
view the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Butler v. Drive Auto.
Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp.
of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). We also draw all reasonable inferences in their
favor. Bennett v. Garner, 913 F.3d 436, 438 (4th Cir. 2019).
A. The Search
Acting on a tip that Escobar-Salmeron possessed a knife, the Correctional Officers
planned to search Escobar-Salmeron and his cell. They arrived at the cell shortly before
9:00 a.m. and ordered Escobar-Salmeron and his cellmate, Gabriel Struss, to remain in
their bunks. While lying in the top bunk, Escobar-Salmeron “pull[ed] the sheet over his
body and beg[an] to move his hands underneath of his body.” J.A. 190 (Arndt’s Use of
Force report). 1 Arndt ordered Escobar-Salmeron “to stop moving, come down from his
bunk, and be handcuffed.” J.A. 190. Escobar-Salmeron complied. The Correctional
Officers then escorted both men to the Day Room. At this point, the parties’ stories
diverge.
i. The Correctional Officers’ Version
1 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties, which contains the record on appeal. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 20-6853 Doc: 95 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 4 of 25
Across their various incident reports and affidavits, the Correctional Officers recall
that Holland ordered Escobar-Salmeron “to place his hands on the wall and to remove one
piece of clothing at a time.” J.A. 189. Escobar-Salmeron took off his shirt, then “placed
his hands near his crotch area.” J.A. 189. Holland ordered Escobar-Salmeron to place his
hands on the wall. Though Escobar-Salmeron did not comply with this first order, when
Holland repeated himself, Escobar-Salmeron placed his hands on the wall. J.A. 189.
Next, Holland ordered Escobar-Salmeron to remove his shorts and hand them to
Arndt. J.A. 189. Escobar-Salmeron complied. J.A. 189. At that time, Arndt discovered
a homemade sheath wrapped in Escobar-Salmeron’s shorts. J.A. 189. Arndt asked
Escobar-Salmeron whether “he had a weapon on him.” J.A. 189. Escobar-Salmeron
denied having a weapon, saying “there’s no knife” and that the sheath was his “pencil
holder.” J.A. 189.
Escobar-Salmeron again placed his hands “near his crotch area,” and Holland again
ordered to him to put his hands on the wall. J.A. 189. When Escobar-Salmeron did not
comply, Holland repeated his order several times. J.A. 189. Escobar-Salmeron then
“turned towards [Holland] in an aggressive manner and was placed on the wall.” J.A. 189.
Holland twice more ordered Escobar-Salmeron to place his hands on the wall, and Escobar-
Salmeron again did not comply. J.A. 189. Escobar-Salmeron “then tried to maneuver
himself at which time [Holland] placed [Escobar-Salmeron] on the floor trying to gain
compliance.” J.A. 189.
Once on the floor, Escobar-Salmeron “continued to struggle” with Holland. J.A.
189. Holland “then ordered [Escobar-Salmeron] to stop resisting,” but Escobar-Salmeron
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did not comply. J.A. 189. Instead, he “bit [Holland’s] lower right arm.” J.A. 189. Holland
told Arndt that Escobar-Salmeron was biting him, so Arndt came to Holland’s aid. J.A.
189.
The Correctional Officers’ stories vary about how exactly Arndt assisted Holland.
In the majority of their accounts, the Correctional Officers maintain that Arndt “place[d]
his hand on [Escobar-Salmeron’s] forehead and pulled his face away from [Holland’s]
arm.” J.A. 189 (Holland’s Use of Force Incident Report dated June 15, 2017); see also
J.A. 59 (Holland’s Notice of Inmate Rule Violation dated June 16, 2017), 191 (Holland’s
Use of Force Incident Report dated June 16, 2017), 194 (Arndt’s Notice of Incident dated
June 17, 2017), 222 (Holland’s Affidavit dated June 12, 2018), 225 (Arndt’s Affidavit
dated June 4, 2018). But at other times, the Correctional Officers have both claimed that
Arndt “utilized a pressure point behind [Escobar-Salmeron’s] ear.” J.A. 34 (Motion to
Dismiss, or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment), 45 (same), 172 (Investigative
Report dated September 6, 2017), 283 (Assault Proceedings).
After Arndt intervened, Escobar-Salmeron released Holland’s arm. J.A. 189.
Holland ordered Escobar-Salmeron “to place his hands behind his back to be handcuffed.”
J.A. 189. Escobar-Salmeron did not comply. J.A. 189. At this point, a third officer arrived
and “assisted in getting [Escobar-Salmeron’s] hands behind his back.” J.A. 189. Arndt
then handcuffed Escobar-Salmeron, and Holland and Arndt “removed [them]selves from
the situation.” J.A. 189. Four officers not party to this suit “took control of [Escobar-
Salmeron] and escorted him to medical.” J.A. 189.
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In a subsequent search of Escobar-Salmeron’s cell, Arndt found “a 6 ¾ inch long
knife style homemade weapon” in a slit in Escobar-Salmeron’s mattress. J.A. 191. The
homemade weapon was “the exact shape and length to fit inside of the sheath that was
discovered” in Escobar-Salmeron’s shorts. J.A. 191.
ii. Escobar-Salmeron’s Version
In his original verified complaint 2 and other filings, Escobar-Salmeron maintains
that the altercation proceeded as follows.
Holland gave Escobar-Salmeron “[v]arious orders” over the course of the strip
search, with which he “promptly complied.” J.A. 11. Even so, Holland, “without cause or
justification otherwise grabbed [Escobar-Salmeron]” and “forc[ed] him to the floor.” J.A.
11. Holland then began to repeatedly punch, kick, and choke him while laughing and
screaming “stop resisting.” J.A. 11. At some point, though it is unclear when, Arndt also
began to punch and kick Escobar-Salmeron to “assist” Holland. J.A. 11. Throughout the
altercation, Escobar-Salmeron repeatedly told Holland that he could not breathe. J.A. 11.
But Holland did not loosen his hold. J.A. 11. Consequently, Escobar-Salmeron bit
Holland’s lower right arm “[]in an effort to obtain air.” J.A. 11. Finally, Holland
“relinquished his choke hold.” J.A. 11.
2 We treat Escobar-Salmeron’s original verified complaint as “an opposing affidavit for summary judgment purposes” because “the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge.” See Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991)). That Escobar-Salmeron subsequently amended his complaint “does not divest an earlier verified complaint of its evidentiary value.” See id. at 499.
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After the Correctional Officers handcuffed him, Escobar-Salmeron alleges that
“Holland kicked him in the back of the head and face,” and when the other officers arrived,
they “beat [Escobar-Salmeron] and messed up [his] shoulder and spine.” J.A. 34, 268.
B. Medical Treatment
When Escobar-Salmeron arrived at medical after the incident, the nurse “noted
[Escobar-Salmeron’s] bleeding lower lip, [but was] unable to assess [his] teeth, tongue,
[or] gums.” J.A. 85. She observed that Escobar-Salmeron had “blood under [his] right
earlobe,” a “scratched abrasion” on his “left ear top corner,” and a “bruised area
approximately 2 [inches in] diameter” in the center of the top of his head. J.A. 85. Escobar-
Salmeron did not respond to the nurse’s requests and attempts to take his vitals, assess him,
and clean his bleeding lower lip, and he refused all medical care. J.A. 85. But while
waiting to be transported from medical, Escobar-Salmeron complained on video 3 that “this
bitch come over here and get me like that, hitting me for no reason, choking me for no
reason, just because I forgot to put my, my hand on the wall, that’s not right though.”
Hand-Held Video at 11:36–46.
In the months that followed, Escobar-Salmeron repeatedly sought care for injuries
allegedly related to the incident:
3 The Correctional Officers attached 35 exhibits to their motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. J.A. 3. Exhibit 10 was a DVD containing a hand-held video recording of Escobar-Salmeron’s visit to medical, his transport to Housing Unit 4, and his strip search upon entering his new unit (hereinafter “Hand-Held Video”). See id.; Escobar v. Moyer, No. RDB-19-2717 (D. Md., PACER No. 15).
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• On July 5, 2017, Escobar-Salmeron requested a sick call. He complained of
shoulder and neck pain, which he said had begun 25 days prior and was caused by
the altercation with the Correctional Officers. He also reported dizziness and
blurred vision. His provider’s notes referenced “neuro” and observed that Escobar-
Salmeron had a lump on his head. J.A. 117, 210.
• On July 20, 2017, Escobar-Salmeron complained of left shoulder and lower back
pain. His provider ordered an x-ray. J.A. 86–87.
• On October 26, 2017, Escobar-Salmeron requested a medication refill for the pain
in his left shoulder. J.A. 112.
• On November 17, 2017, Escobar-Salmeron reported “being attacked by custody
[sic] about 5.5 months ago” and “requested results from x-rays of [his] shoulder and
lower back.” J.A. 146. His provider indicated in his notes that the x-rays were
“negative,” presumably for fractures, and advised that Escobar-Salmeron should try
range of motion exercises and hot showers. He prescribed an over-the-counter
painkiller and told Escobar-Salmeron to return if his condition did not improve. J.A.
146.
• On December 25, 2017, Escobar-Salmeron requested a sick call for neck pain that
began a “couple months ago.” J.A. 109. He reported that “[t]he pain is too much
that I can’t even stand up or move my neck, and getting worse.” J.A. 109. When
Escobar-Salmeron was offered a neck and shoulder examination three days later, he
refused, saying the issue had resolved. J.A. 98, 150.
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• On January 1, 2018, Escobar-Salmeron requested a sick call for a runny nose and
pain in his neck and head. J.A. 108.
• On January 27, 2018, Escobar-Salmeron requested a sick call for his neck and
shoulder pain, which he said began seven months prior. In his request, he notes that
he “put a sick call [in] like a month ago” and that he did not understand why he had
not been called in. J.A. 107.
• On February 7, 2018, Escobar-Salmeron again requested a sick call, saying:
I put [in] 2 sick call[s] last month and you haven’t call[ed] me[.] I don’t know what you or the [Correctional Officers] got against me, but this is not a game. I am sick[.] I need to get something for my head[.] I [have] been having bad pain in my head and my shoulder.
J.A. 106.
C. Internal Investigations
Escobar-Salmeron was later administratively charged with violations of inmate
rules against (1) assault or battery on staff; (2) possession of a weapon; (3) interfering with
and resisting the duties of staff; (4) disobeying a lawful direct order; (5) disrespect, vulgar
language; and (6) misuse, alteration, tampering with, damaging or destruction of any
property, tool, or equipment to include possession of any property in a hazardous condition.
J.A. 63. He was found guilty of all but the vulgar language violation. J.A. 64.
The Intelligence and Investigative Division (“IID”) conducted criminal
investigations of both Escobar-Salmeron and the Correctional Officers in connection with
the altercation. J.A. 250–84. The IID investigator reviewed the Correctional Officers’
documentation of the event and Escobar-Salmeron’s letter alleging that the Correctional
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Officers assaulted him. J.A. 252–53. He reviewed Escobar-Salmeron’s Officer of Health
Services report from the day of the incident but reviewed no other health records. J.A. 253.
He interviewed Escobar-Salmeron, Struss, and the Correctional Officers. J.A. 253–54.
The investigator also requested that Escobar-Salmeron provide a more detailed written
statement of his version of events. J.A. 253. Escobar-Salmeron declined, citing his limited
English proficiency, but “signed [the investigator’s] notes as factual.” J.A. 253.
Ultimately, the investigator declared that “there was no evidence found to
substantiate [Escobar-Salmeron’s] claim that he was assaulted,” and “[t]here was no
incident of excessive force.” J.A. 254. And so the IID cleared the Correctional Officers
of any wrongdoing and found Escobar-Salmeron guilty of assault on a staff member. J.A.
369.
D. Procedural History
Escobar-Salmeron filed a civil rights action based on the Day Room altercation and
subsequent events. He later moved to voluntarily dismiss his claims, but soon thereafter
reinstated them in this action. J.A. 6–8. In reinstating his complaint, Escobar-Salmeron
did not pursue his original conditions of confinement and Administrative Remedy
Procedure claims. J.A. 366. Rather, he limited this action to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive
force claim and a state law claim. J.A. 9–13. He filed a motion for appointment of counsel
soon after, which the district court denied. J.A. 15–21.
Moyer and the Correctional Officers moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment, to which they attached 28 exhibits. J.A. 22, 159–346. Escobar-
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Salmeron opposed the motion, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) 4 to argue summary judgment
should be denied because he had been unable to pursue discovery. The district court
nonetheless dismissed Escobar-Salmeron’s state law claim and his claims against Moyer
before granting the Correctional Officers summary judgment on the remaining claims. See
Escobar, 2020 WL 2061503, at *1, *4–5.
Escobar-Salmeron timely docketed his appeal with this court. 5 J.A. 378. In his
informal brief, Escobar-Salmeron argued that, in light of factual disputes and evidence in
the Correctional Officers’ sole possession, summary judgment was improper on the record
before the district court, and that the factual allegations in his verified complaint “were
sufficient to state a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Appellant’s Informal Br. (ECF
No. 12) at 9, 13. 6 In their informal brief, the Correctional Officers responded that the grant
of summary judgment was proper because there were no material facts in dispute, and
Escobar-Salmeron had not pursued discovery while this action was pending at the district
4 “Rule 56(d) was formerly Rule 56(f). . . . [T]he textual differences between current Rule 56(d) and former Rule 56(f) are purely stylistic. . . . Thus, case law developed under former Rule 56(f) remains controlling, and we cite to it where applicable.” Nieves-Romero v. United States, 715 F.3d 375, 381 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). For clarity and uniformity’s sake, we have replaced all references to “56(f)” with “56(d).” 5 Earlier in the life of this appeal, we remanded this case to determine whether Escobar-Salmeron filed a timely notice of appeal. See Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer, 847 F. App’x 203 (4th Cir. 2021) (No. 20-6853). On remand, the district court determined that Escobar-Salmeron’s notice of appeal was timely delivered to prison officials for mailing and allowed his claims to proceed. See Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer, No. CV RDB-19- 2717, 2021 WL 4847266, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2021). 6 Citations to the parties’ informal briefs refer to the page numbers generated by this court’s CM/ECF system.
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court. Appellees’ Informal Br. (ECF No. 35) at 1–2, 4–6. 7 After this court appointed
counsel, the parties filed their formal briefs.
In his formal brief, Escobar-Salmeron challenges the district court’s failure to
address his Rule 56(d) discovery request, its award of summary judgment to the
Correctional Officers, its dismissal of his conditions of confinement and due process
claims, and its denial of his motion to appoint counsel. Finding the latter two challenges
waived, 8 we address the former two challenges in turn.
II. The Discovery Challenge
We begin by addressing Escobar-Salmeron’s Rule 56(d) discovery challenge.
A. Law
7 On October 6, 2023, Escobar-Salmeron moved for default judgment because, he alleged, the Correctional Officers did not file their informal brief by the court’s September 8, 2023, deadline. Mot. for Default J. at 2. In fact, the Correctional Officers did timely file their brief, but they served it on the incorrect address. After receiving the motion, the Office of Staff Counsel asked the Clerk’s Office to require the Correctional Officers to properly serve their brief on Escobar-Salmeron at his correct address; and the Clerk’s Office issued a docket correction request. The Correctional Officers filed their corrected certificate of service that same day. Because the Correctional Officers promptly corrected their mistake, and “[w]e have repeatedly expressed a strong preference that, as a general matter, defaults be avoided and that claims and defenses be disposed of on their merits,” we hereby deny the default judgment motion. See Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). 8 “[U]nder Fourth Circuit rules, our review is limited to issues preserved in [the informal] brief.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing 4th Cir. Local R. 34(b)). Because Escobar-Salmeron did not challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to appoint counsel or its dismissal of his conditions of confinement and due process claims in his informal brief, we need not address them here.
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We “review the decision to award summary judgment while discovery requests are
still pending for abuse of discretion.” Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir.
2021) (internal citation omitted).
“[S]ummary judgment should only be granted ‘after adequate time for discovery,’ ”
McCray v. Maryland Dep’t of Transp., Maryland Transit Admin., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). “[W]hen a party
lacks material facts necessary to combat a summary judgment motion, [he] may file an
‘affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, [the party] cannot present facts essential
to justify its opposition,’ ” referred to as a Rule 56(d) motion. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d)).
Rule 56(d) motions “must be granted ‘where the nonmoving party has not had the
opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.’ ” Id. at 483–84
(quoting Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002)).
“[S]uch motions are ‘broadly favored and should be liberally granted.’ ” Id. at 484 (quoting
Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 721
F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). “This is especially true in the context of pro se
litigation,” Jenkins v. Woodard, 109 F.4th 242, 251 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Pledger v.
Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 526 (4th Cir. 2021)), particularly “when a case involves complex
factual questions about intent and motive” and “the relevant facts are exclusively in the
control of the opposing party.” Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 247 (citations omitted).
The threshold showing to support a Rule 56(d) motion is low. For example, when
a nonmovant bears no fault for its “little or no opportunity to conduct discovery, and when
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fact-intensive issues, such as intent, are involved,” a formal Rule 56(d) affidavit is not
mandatory. Id. at 244. The nonmovant need only “adequately inform[] the district court
that the motion is pre-mature and that more discovery is necessary.” Id. (collecting cases).
Still, Rule 56(d) “motions may be denied . . . if ‘the additional evidence sought for
discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
defeat summary judgment.’ ” Ingle ex rel. Est. of Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Strag v. Bd. of Trs., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995)). And “vague
assertions as to matters upon which the district court should have allowed discovery”
cannot support a Rule 56(d) motion. Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir.
1995).
Circuits disagree as to whether a court must explicitly acknowledge a Rule 56(d)
declaration. Compare In re Avandia Mktg., Sales & Prod. Liab. Litig., 945 F.3d 749, 761
(3d Cir. 2019) (“A district court abuses its discretion when it grants summary judgment in
favor of the moving party ‘without even considering’ a Rule 56(d) declaration filed by the
nonmoving party.”), and Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260,
1265 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he trial judge must expressly rule on plaintiff’s Rule [56(d)]
affidavit and give specific reasons for the grant or denial thereof.”), with Qualls v. Blue
Cross of California, Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that district courts need
not “explicitly state[]” their decision on Rule 56(d) motions when granting summary
judgment), and Snider v. L-3 Commc’ns Vertex Aerospace, L.L.C., 946 F.3d 660, 667 (5th
Cir. 2019), abrogated on other grounds by Ben E. Keith Co. v. Dining All., Inc., 80 F.4th
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695 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[A] court does not abuse its discretion by entering summary judgment
without expressly ruling on a pending Rule 56(d) motion.”).
B. Party Arguments
Escobar-Salmeron argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting
summary judgment despite his Rule 56(d) declaration because he had not had the
opportunity to discover essential information—the contents of the Day Room video—
which was in the Correctional Officers’ sole possession. He also argues that the district
court’s failure to explicitly address his declaration was itself error. Without addressing the
latter point, the Correctional Officers argue that the district court properly granted summary
judgment despite Escobar-Salmeron’s purported Rule 56(d) declaration because any such
“request” was deficient for several reasons. They point out that Escobar-Salmeron did not
file a formal Rule 56(d) affidavit, request discovery, or move to compel or permit
discovery, and that he did not identify the specific facts in dispute in the sole possession of
the Correctional Officers and of which he was not already aware.
C. Analysis
As a threshold matter, we agree with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that district courts
need not directly address an outstanding Rule 56(d) motion. Absent evidence of
accidentally overlooking the motion, “[w]hen a district court enters a final judgment, it has
implicitly denied any outstanding motions, even if the court does not explicitly deny a
particular motion.” See Snider, 946 F.3d at 667–68. Because Escobar-Salmeron has
presented no evidence that the district court overlooked his Rule 56(d) declaration, we
interpret the district court’s silence as a denial.
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Regarding Escobar-Salmeron’s Rule 56(d) motion, we find his request procedurally
insufficient. While Escobar-Salmeron need not have filed a formal Rule 56(d) affidavit,
see Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244, our practice of construing pro se litigants’ Rule 56(d)
declarations “liberally” cannot remedy the deficiencies in Escobar-Salmeron’s request. See
Jenkins, 109 F.4th at 251 (quoting Pledger, 5 F.4th at 526).
Escobar-Salmeron failed to identify “additional evidence . . . creat[ing] genuine
issue[s] of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” See Ingle, 439 F.3d at
195 (quoting Strag, 55 F.3d at 954). True, he thrice referred to the Correctional Officers’
alleged failure to comply with his discovery requests. See J.A. 351 (“The Court’s grant of
dismissal or summary judgment in favor of defendants’ [sic] is premature where
defendants’ [sic] have refused to answer plaintiff’s discovery request therein an effort to
obtain additional evidence through the discovery process.”); J.A. 360 (“[E]vidence
sustaining plaintiff’s allegations that he was unjustifiably and maliciously beaten by
defendants’ [sic] Holland and Arndt [is] in possession of defendants, whom to date, have
ignored plaintiff’s efforts to obtain responses to his repeated discovery requests.”); J.A.
362 (“In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. [56(d)], defendants’ dispositive motion for
summary judgment should be denied where plaintiff, as the non-moving party, has not been
able to pursue discovery, as those request [sic] made by plaintiff to date have been ignored
and remain outstanding.”). But merely alleging that the Correctional Officers had not been
responsive to his discovery requests—without having requested discovery in the instant
case—was insufficient to put the district court on notice of the discovery he sought. See
Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242.
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This court’s non-precedential decision in Putney v. Likin, 656 F. App’x 632 (4th
Cir. 2016) (No. 14-6882), does not alter our analysis. There, Kory Putney, a prisoner at
Western Correctional Institution (“WCI”), represented himself in a § 1983 suit alleging
Eighth Amendment violations by officials at WCI. Id. at 634, 636. The officials moved
to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Id. at 636. Putney opposed the
motion and attached a declaration seeking discovery before the entry of judgment. Id.
In an unpublished, per curiam opinion, this court found the district court’s failure to
address Putney’s Rule 56(d) discovery request to be an abuse of discretion. Id. at 638–39.
But Putney’s declaration was significantly more detailed than Escobar-Salmeron’s
declaration. In his declaration, Putney “specifically stated that he had ‘not yet had access
to discovery’ and that it was ‘difficult for [him] to get documentation and declarations[,]
especially from prisoners and prison officials from the[ ] Cumberland region, and prisoners
who[ ] have been released.’ ” Id. at 638–39. And in his declaration, Putney clearly
identified “nine pieces of evidence [he] need[ed] but [could not] obtain in order to mount
an adequate opposition.” Id. at 639. Putney’s detailed declaration “adequately inform[ed]
the district court that the motion [was] pre-mature and that more discovery [was]
necessary.” See Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (collecting cases). The declaration was therefore
procedurally sufficient. See Putney, 656 F. App’x at 639.
In light of the declaration’s procedural sufficiency; this court’s policy of “broadly
favor[ing]” and “liberally grant[ing]” Rule 56(d) motions, see McCray, 741 F.3d at 483–
84; and the additional leeway allowed to pro se litigants, see Jenkins, 109 F.4th at 251;
denying Putney’s discovery request and granting summary judgment was an abuse of
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discretion. But it was the denial signified by the court’s silence—not the mere fact of the
court’s silence—that constituted abuse. See Putney, 656 F. App’x. at 640 (“For these
reasons, the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant [Putney’s] discovery
request.” (emphasis added)). And considering the stark contrast between Putney’s clarity
and Escobar-Salmeron’s vagueness, Putney is factually inapposite and lacks persuasive
value.
So, because Escobar-Salmeron’s Rule 56(d) declaration contained only “[v]ague
assertions as to matters upon which the district court should have allowed discovery,” see
Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary
judgment despite his Rule 56(d) declaration. See Ingle, 439 F.3d at 195.
III. Excessive Force Claim
We turn next to the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Finding genuine
disputes of material fact remain, we vacate the district court’s decision and remand for
further proceedings.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, ‘using the same
standard applied by the district court.’ ” Goodman, 986 F.3d at 497 (quoting Brooks v.
Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 2019)). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if
‘the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.’ ” Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “[A] few stray (and
contradictory) statements in the record” do not necessarily “create a genuine issue of fact.”
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Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 591 (2009). But the district court may not itself “weigh[]
the evidence or mak[e] credibility determinations.” Roberts v. Gestamp W. Va., LLC, 45
F.4th 726, 732 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888
F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018)).
“An inmate’s claim of excessive force involves both an objective and a subjective
component.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir. 2021). “The objective component
measures the nature of the force employed, asking whether that force ‘was sufficiently
serious to establish a cause of action.’ ” Id. (quoting Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112). “This is
not a high bar; de minimis or trivial force is not enough, but anything more will suffice.”
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brooks, 924 F.3d at 112). “[T]he subjective component,
. . . [asks] whether the officers acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ ” that
being “wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Id.(citations omitted).
“Whether an inmate can establish that impermissible motive turns on ‘whether force
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’ ” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). To determine an officer’s state of mind, courts consider “(1)
the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount
of force that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application
of force was intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 239 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
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In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), “the Court aimed to shift the ‘core
judicial inquiry’ from the extent of the injury to the nature of the force—specifically,
whether it was nontrivial and ‘was applied . . . maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.’ ” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). As
Hudson explained, “[t]he objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is
. . . contextual and responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’ ” 503 U.S. at 8
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
“When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or not significant
injury is evident.” Id. at 9 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). “Otherwise, the Eighth
Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman,
inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result would have been as
unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is today.” Id. (first citing
Estelle, 429 U.S. at102; and then citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879)).
Escobar-Salmeron argues that because the Correctional Officers’ affidavits and
attachments to their motion conflicted with the contents of Escobar-Salmeron’s complaint
on the sequence of events and the force used, material facts were still in dispute. The
Correctional Officers argue that because the circumstances supporting a need for force (the
bite and the presence of the sheath) were not in dispute and because Escobar-Salmeron’s
“de minimus [sic]” injuries evince less force than he alleged, there was no genuine dispute
of material fact. Appellees’ Br. (ECF No. 73) at 22–23 [hereinafter “Resp. Br.”] (emphasis
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added). Thus, because Escobar-Salmeron’s story was “blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,” the district court properly granted
summary judgment. Id. at 23 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Escobar-Salmeron, we find that
material facts remain in dispute.
Escobar-Salmeron’s verified complaint, which retains its “evidentiary value as an
affidavit at the summary judgment stage,” see Goodman, 986 F.3d at 499, alleges that the
Correctional Officers kicked, punched, and beat him, thereby injuring his neck, shoulders,
head, and back. J.A. 11. These allegations are supported by the large, raised bruise on the
top of Escobar-Salmeron’s head, which was still observable by medical providers more
than three weeks later, J.A. 117, 210, and by his months-long string of requests for x-rays,
medication, and treatment for back and shoulder pain stemming from the altercation. See
J.A. 86–87, 112, 146, 108, 109, 107, 106.
Both Correctional Officers denied striking Escobar-Salmeron yet provided no
alternative explanation for the bruise’s source. J.A. 223, 225. Neither the Correctional
Officers’ predominant account of Arndt “plac[ing] his hand on [Escobar-Salmeron’s]
forehead and pull[ing] his face away from [Holland’s] arm,” J.A. 59, 189, 191, 194, 222,
225, nor their alternative retelling wherein Arndt “utilized a pressure point behind
[Escobar-Salmeron’s] ear,” J.A. 34, 45, 172, 283, clarify the bruise’s origin. This
difference of accounts is exactly the sort of “genuine dispute of material fact” that renders
summary judgment inappropriate on an excessive force claim.
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First, a reasonable jury could find that Escobar-Salmeron’s injuries substantiate the
“objective” component of his excessive force claim. See Dean, 984 F.3d at 302. Though
the district court characterized Escobar-Salmeron’s bruised head, bleeding ear, and
shoulder and back pain as “minor,” see Escobar, 2020 WL 2061503, at *5, these injuries
do not establish that the Correctional Officers applied only de minimis force to Escobar-
Salmeron. See Dean, 984 F.3d at 302; see, e.g., Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (“[B]lows
. . . which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are not de
minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes.”); Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 35 (holding that force
causing “bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood pressure as well as migraine
headaches and dizziness” could exceed de minimis threshold).
The district court’s observation that Escobar-Salmeron “refused all medical care”
for his injuries is not fully accurate and is irrelevant for our present purposes. See Escobar,
2020 WL 2061503, at *5. While he refused treatment in the immediate aftermath of the
altercation, the record contains evidence that Escobar-Salmeron repeatedly sought medical
care for his injuries. See J.A. 86–87, 112, 146, 108, 109, 107, 106. But even if Escobar-
Salmeron had refused all care, it would not undermine our analysis. Although patients
might refuse medical care because they perceive their injuries as minor, patients also may
refuse medical care for a host of reasons. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244–47 (D.C.
1990) (collecting cases). Because the record does not disclose Escobar-Salmeron’s reasons
for initially refusing medical care, we decline to infer from his refusal alone that his injuries
were caused by a de minimis amount of force.
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Second, a reasonable jury could also find that the Correctional Officers used force
“maliciously and sadistically.” See Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at
320–21). The district court improperly ruled out malice based on Escobar-Salmeron’s
supposedly “minor” injuries. See Escobar, 2020 WL 2061503, at *5. But the pertinent
questions undergirding our malice analysis are not how much force officers use or how
much injury they cause. Malice analysis interrogates the need for and proportionality of
force, which cannot be measured by observing physical injuries alone. See Dean, 984 F.3d
at 304–06 (evaluating proportionality of pepper spray usage based on circumstances of its
use). When the district court foreclosed the possibility that the Correctional Officers’ use
of force was malicious based on Escobar-Salmeron’s “minor” injuries, it improperly
imposed a physical metric of malice in contravention of Hudson. See 503 U.S. at 9
(explaining that requiring “significant injury [be] evident” as evidence of malice ‘would
permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than
some arbitrary quantity of injury’ ”).
Furthermore, the fact that Escobar-Salmeron “bit [] Holland’s arm during the
struggle” does not conclusively prove that the force which caused Escobar-Salmeron’s
bruise was applied in “good faith.” See Escobar, 2020 WL 2061503, at *5. Escobar-
Salmeron alleges that the Correctional Officers began to kick and beat him before he bit
Holland, J.A. 11, that “after he was handcuffed, [] Holland kicked him in the back of the
head and face,” J.A. 34, and that when the other officers arrived, they “beat [him] and
messed up [his] shoulder and spine.” J.A. 268.
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Though the Correctional Officers assert that they did not kick or beat Escobar-
Salmeron, it appears the district court concluded that whatever force caused the bruise was
applied in response to the bite. The timing of the Correctional Officers’ application of
force bears on “the need for [its] application,” “the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used,” and “the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the
application of force was intended to quell.” See Iko, 535 F.3d at 239 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). That timing is yet another genuine
dispute of a fact material to Escobar-Salmeron’s excessive force claim.
The Correctional Officers also argue that the record “blatantly contradict[s]”
Escobar-Salmeron’s “conclusory assertions . . . that he complied with all the Correctional
Officers’ orders and that their use of force was unwarranted.” Resp. Br. at 23–24. But
Escobar-Salmeron disagrees with that claim and notes the lack of specific unrebutted
evidence in the record that would permit the grant of summary judgment at this point. So,
because material facts remain in dispute, Escobar-Salmeron met his burden at this stage,
and the district court’s grant of summary judgment was improper. See Tolan, 572 U.S. at
656–57.
IV. Conclusion
We have repeatedly cautioned that summary judgment is “seldom appropriate”
where, as here, a party’s motive is a “decisive . . . element[] of [a] claim or defense.” See
Ballinger v. N. Carolina Agr. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1987) (third
alteration in original) (quoting Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th
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Cir. 1979)). Because genuine disputes of material fact remain surrounding the Correctional
Officers’ use of force against Escobar-Salmeron, we vacate the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and remand the case to allow Escobar-Salmeron to renew his motion
for counsel and proceed to trial.
VACATED AND REMANDED