Edwin Earl Sanborn v. Carlotta Joan Sanborn

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMay 11, 2004
DocketM2003-00418-COA-R3-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Edwin Earl Sanborn v. Carlotta Joan Sanborn (Edwin Earl Sanborn v. Carlotta Joan Sanborn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edwin Earl Sanborn v. Carlotta Joan Sanborn, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE February 19, 2004 Session

EDWIN EARL SANBORN v. CARLOTTA JOAN SANBORN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 00D1616 Marietta Shipley, Judge

No. M2003-00418-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 11, 2004

After twenty-five years of marriage, Father filed for divorce asserting irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct due to Mother’s alleged prescription drug abuse. Father requested that he be the primary residential parent of the parties’ two minor children. Mother filed an answer and counterclaim also requesting to be the primary residential parent. The trial court granted Father the divorce but designated Mother as the primary residential parent. Father appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in designating Mother as the primary residential parent and in setting the residential schedule. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM B. CAIN and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL , JJ., joined.

Thomas F. Bloom, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Edwin Earl Sanborn.

D. Scott Parsley and Joshua G. Strickland, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Carlotta Joan Sanborn.

OPINION

Appellant Edwin Sanborn (Father) and Appellee Carlotta Sanborn (Mother) married in 1975 and had three (3) children, two of whom are minors.1 After twenty-five years of marriage, Father filed for divorce asserting irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct allegedly due to prescription drug abuse by Mother. Mother filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce, admitting to irreconcilable differences but denying inappropriate marital conduct. Both parents asked to be the primary residential parent of the two minor children.

1 The older of the two minors was born in July 1985 and the younger was born in March 1992. On July 20, 2001, the parties agreed to a temporary parenting plan. It provided that the children would reside mainly with Mother in the summer in Nashville and with Father during the school year in Murfreesboro. The agreed temporary parenting plan was entered just prior to Father accepting employment in and moving to Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

In April 2002, Mother filed a motion to restructure the temporary parenting plan due to the fact that Father was employed in Nashville.2 Father objected and argued that the current temporary parenting plan, which placed the children primarily in his care, was necessitated by Mother’s prescription drug abuse. On June 11, 2002, the court amended the agreed temporary parenting plan directing that the children would remain in Father’s primary residential care, and that Mother would alternate having the children from Thursday mornings until Saturday evenings one week and from Thursday mornings through Monday evenings the next.

On August 26, 2002, Mother filed a proposed parenting plan, requesting that the children reside primarily with her as well as the exclusive authority to make decisions regarding their education, non-emergency health care and religious upbringing. On September 17, 2002, the court referred the matter to mediation. The parties successfully negotiated an agreement; however, the agreement was never approved by the court. Therefore, the case was set for trial.

After three days of trial, the court granted Father a divorce based on Mother’s inappropriate marital conduct, prescription drug abuse, designated Mother as the primary residential parent, and set a residential schedule that assigned primary responsibility of the children to Mother during the school year. Father was allowed the following times with the children: from Friday after school or 5:00 p.m. to Monday morning at school on the first and third weekend of each month, from Friday after school or 5:00 p.m. to Saturday at 7:00 p.m. on the second weekend of each month, and one night per week after school or 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. In the summer, the parties were to adhere to the same schedule except that each parent could choose two consecutive non-interference weeks with the children.

Father appealed challenging the designation of Mother as the primary residential parent and the residential schedule.3 He contends that the trial court erroneously found that Mother had sufficiently rehabilitated to be the primary residential parent. He also complains that the trial judge placed too much emphasis on its concern that Father created transportation problems by living in Murfreesboro instead of Nashville. He asserts that his decision to stay in Murfreesboro was based on its superior school system and the fact that his best friend, who lives there, provides support for

2 By F ebruary 20 02, F ather was employed in N ashville tho ugh still living in M urfreesboro.

3 Father’s issue reads, “Whether the trial court erred in designating Mother as the primary custodial parent of the parties’ two children and in setting their residential schedule.” However, Father’s brief and citations to the record deal almost exclusively with the issue of the primary residential parent. Father only makes reference to the residential sched ule in passing and does not set forth separate contentions with resp ect to the residential schedule with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the reco rd, as re quired by T enn. R . App . P. 27 (a)(7).

-2- the children. Further, he asserts that the court’s emphasis on transportation is not an appropriate consideration.

Our review is de novo on the record with a presumption that the trial court’s findings are correct, unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984). The paramount concern in such cases is the welfare and best interest of the child. Rice v. Rice, 983 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). While there are no hard and fast rules for determining what sort of custody and visitation schedule will best serve a child’s needs, Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 327 (Tenn. 1993), determinations regarding child custody and visitation often hinge on subtle factors, including the credibility and demeanor of the parties involved. Adelsperger v. Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, we decline to disturb the trial court’s decision unless it is based on a material error of law or the evidence preponderates against it. Id.

A final decree in a divorce action that involves minor children must include a permanent parenting plan. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404. A permanent parenting plan is a written plan for the parenting and best interests of the child, including the allocation of parenting responsibilities and the establishment of a residential schedule. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-402(3). Designing a residential schedule includes designating the primary residential parent, who is the parent with whom the child resides more than fifty percent of the time. Tenn. Code Ann.

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Related

Rice v. Rice
983 S.W.2d 680 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1998)
Adelsperger v. Adelsperger
970 S.W.2d 482 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1997)
Hass v. Knighton
676 S.W.2d 554 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1984)
Taylor v. Taylor
849 S.W.2d 319 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1993)
Bah v. Bah
668 S.W.2d 663 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1983)
Whitaker v. Whitaker
957 S.W.2d 834 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1997)

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Edwin Earl Sanborn v. Carlotta Joan Sanborn, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/edwin-earl-sanborn-v-carlotta-joan-sanborn-tennctapp-2004.