IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 25-605
Filed 17 December 2025
Durham County, No. 24CV009349-310
REBECCA EDWARDS, Plaintiff,
v.
STRATA SOLAR, LLC, Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 25 February 2025 by Judge John M.
Dunlow in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
18 November 2025.
Elliot Morgan Parsonage, PLLC, by R. Michael Elliot and Suzanne Reynolds, for plaintiff-appellant.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Phillip J. Strach and Nathaniel J. Pencook, for defendant-appellee.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Rebecca Edwards (“plaintiff”) appeals from the trial court’s order granting a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) in favor of Strata Solar, LLC
(“defendant”). Plaintiff contends her complaint sufficiently asserted a prima facie
case for wrongful discharge from her employment on the basis of sex discrimination.
For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed a complaint in Durham County on 18 October 2024. Her EDWARDS V. STRATA SOLAR, LLC
Opinion of the Court
complaint alleged the following:
Plaintiff is an attorney who began employment with defendant on
28 November 2022, following a period of recruitment for a senior legal role at the
company. During the recruitment process, defendant “actively and aggressively
pursued” plaintiff and represented that she would be groomed for the Deputy General
Counsel role, with defendant’s General Counsel allegedly repeatedly communicating
that the advancement would be swift: “[I]f you are in the same place in a year, we will
have failed you.” Plaintiff expressed her concern about being the only woman on the
legal team, but she accepted the position on the basis of defendant’s communications.
Plaintiff worked in defendant’s legal department for about three months and received
positive feedback in her only performance evaluation.
Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant in December 2022, after many years
of difficulty becoming a parent. Given the early stage of the pregnancy and her
“anxiety” that defendant would “hold her desire to be a mother against her” in
advancement considerations, she did not inform defendant at the time.
Plaintiff experienced a miscarriage in January 2023. Beginning January 20
and throughout the subsequent two weeks, plaintiff experienced a series of medical
emergencies requiring professional attention and regularly communicated with
defendant about her inability to be present in the office, citing medical reasons. Then,
on January 29, plaintiff contacted her supervising General Counsel to fully inform
him of the pregnancy’s termination and her need for remote work in the coming week.
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At his request, she contacted defendant’s Human Resources, who informed her that
management sought documentation to verify her medical visits. Plaintiff alleges
upon information and belief that defendant made no similar requests of male
colleagues who requested either remote work or time off for medical appointments,
and that defendant’s General Counsel had authority to approve her remote work
accommodations personally. Plaintiff provided medical records, but alleges that the
General Counsel “remained cold and skeptical” and “was noticeably resentful of her
need to work remotely.”
After returning to work the following week, plaintiff met with the General
Counsel, who allegedly remained skeptical about the miscarriage and expressed that
plaintiff had “work to do” to repair her relationship with defendant’s CEO. The
following week, on 16 February 2023, plaintiff and the General Counsel met once
again, where he allegedly said he “had never considered [plaintiff]” for the Deputy
General Counsel position. On 28 February 2023, plaintiff and General Counsel
discussed her performance review, which described her as meeting expectations
generally and exceeding expectations as to professionalism. However, on
3 March 2023, plaintiff met with the General Counsel and two Human Resources
representatives, who terminated her employment, allegedly because she wasn’t
“trustworthy” or a “team player.” Plaintiff alleges that this explanation was
pretextual, and that defendant terminated her due to her sex, her pregnancy and the
disability accompanying her miscarriage, and “the concerns she voiced on multiple
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occasions regarding the disparate treatment.” Plaintiff alleges financial, emotional,
personal, and professional injury after the fallout of her termination.
Plaintiff initially filed suit in Wake County Superior Court on 23 April 2024
asserting a single claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because
pregnancy is not a protected category under the North Carolina Equal Employment
Practices Act and because plaintiff failed to state a claim based on sex discrimination
alone. The court dismissed her action without prejudice on 1 August 2024.
Plaintiff filed her present complaint in Durham County Superior Court on
19 October 2024, asserting claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
based on (1) sex and pregnancy and (2) disability. Defendant again moved to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s action with
prejudice on 25 February 2025. Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal 21 March 2025.
II. Discussion
We review de novo a trial court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. Bridges v. Parrish, 366 N.C. 539, 541 (2013). The Court must
determine “whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true, are sufficient
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal theory.” Id. “In
reviewing a trial court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal the issue for the court is not whether
the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer
evidence to support the claim.” Bill Clark Homes v. Town of Fuquay-Varina, 281 N.C.
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App. 1, 4 (2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In ruling upon a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “the complaint is to be liberally
construed, viewing all permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, and the court should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond
doubt the plaintiff could prove no set of facts” in support of a claim which would
entitle the plaintiff to relief. Gouch v. Rotunno, 291 N.C. App. 7, 10 (2023) (cleaned
up).
The employer-employee relationship is governed in North Carolina by the at-
will employment doctrine: “[I]n the absence of a contractual agreement between an
employer and an employee establishing a definite term of employment, the
relationship is presumed to be terminable at the will of either party without regard
to the quality of performance of either party.” Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus.,
Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331 (1997), reh’g denied, 347 N.C. 586 (1998). However, we
recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of the state’s public
policy. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., Inc., 325 N.C. 172, 175 (1989). “While there
may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or
irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful
reason or purpose that contravenes public policy.” Id. (citation omitted). “Public
policy has been defined as the principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.”
Id. at 175 n.2.
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In order to state such a claim, “an employee must plead and prove that the
employee’s dismissal occurred for a reason that violates public policy.” Brackett v.
SGL Carbon Corp., 158 N.C. App. 252, 259 (2003) (citation, quotation marks, and
alterations omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine is confined to the express statements contained within our
General Statutes or our Constitution.” Whitings v. Wolfson Casing Corp., 173 N.C.
App. 218, 222 (2005). Therefore, it is not sufficient to simply point to public policy
that may be implicated in issues that an employee has raised in a wrongful
termination action; the employee must show that defendant violated the statutorily
expressed public policy in terminating plaintiff from at-will employment.
Judicially created exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine must be
interpreted narrowly, and expansion of public-policy protections is a matter reserved
to the General Assembly. Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333–34. When the legislature is
aware of a subject and chooses not to act, courts may not create an expanded cause of
action. See Jarman v. Deason, 173 N.C. App. 297, 300 (2005) (holding no wrongful
discharge claim exists based on employer size where legislature did not include
employers with fewer than 15 employees under statute).
A. Wrongful Discharge Based on Pregnancy
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her wrongful
discharge claim to the extent it was premised on alleged discrimination related to her
pregnancy and subsequent miscarriage. Insofar as her complaint alleges
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discrimination based on pregnancy rather than sex, we find the trial court’s dismissal
was not erroneous because the General Assembly has stated no such public policy.
The North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act (“NCEEPA”) declares it
to be the public policy of this State to safeguard the right and opportunity to seek and
hold employment without discrimination or abridgement on account of “race, religion,
color, national origin, age, sex or handicap.” N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2. Notably,
pregnancy is not included among the protected classifications identified in the
statute, and neither the Act nor any other North Carolina statute articulates a public
policy expressly prohibiting adverse employment action on the basis of pregnancy.
This statute was based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and North
Carolina courts look to federal Title VII jurisprudence for guidance on its
interpretation. N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 136, (1983). The Supreme
Court held in Gilbert that when enacting Title VII, Congress did not intend its term
“sex” to encompass pregnancy. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 146 (1976). In
so doing, the Court explained:
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134–35. No such “inclusion” came forth from North Carolina’s
General Assembly, despite their awareness of discrimination due to pregnancy.
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Indeed, defendant cites opportunities when the General Assembly has declined to
pass legislation that would add pregnancy to the protected categories under North
Carolina employment-discrimination law—further confirming that the existing
statute does not encompass pregnancy-based claims. See S.B. 474, 2017-2018 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017) (proposing to amend § 143-422.2 to change “race,
religion, color, national origin, age, sex or handicap” to “race, sex, sexual orientation,
national origin, citizenship, religion, age, veteran status, genetic information,
pregnancy, handicap, or disability”); H.B. 186, 2017-2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2017) (same).
Adopting a theory of pregnancy discrimination enlarges the scope of § 143-
422.2 beyond its text and would judicially recognize a cause of action the legislature
has not enacted. Furthermore, aside from a criminal statute excepting breastfeeding
women from indecent exposure prohibitions, plaintiff largely cites to executive orders,
rather than statutes, to show the existence of a public policy protecting mothers from
employment discrimination due to pregnancy. The language plaintiff offers is
insufficient to point us to such a policy’s expression.
As we will discuss later, this does not in itself prevent plaintiff from surviving
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if she adequately pleads a claim alleging wrongful
discharge on the basis of sex. However, insofar as plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim
is premised on discrimination due in particular to her pregnancy, miscarriage, or
pregnancy-related medical leave, the trial court properly concluded that she failed to
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allege a violation of a recognized North Carolina public policy or statute, and
dismissal of that portion of her claim was appropriate.
B. Wrongful Discrimination Based on Disability
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her wrongful
discharge claim to the extent it relied on allegations of disability discrimination.
Again, we must conclude that dismissal of this claim was proper.
The NCEEPA establishes a public policy protecting employment opportunities
without discrimination “on account of . . . handicap.” N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2. The term
“handicap” is defined within the Persons with Disabilities Protection Act
(“NCPDPA”), N.C.G.S. § 168A-3(7), which limits the term to physical or mental
impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activities and excludes
temporary or transitory impairments of short duration. “[T]he remedial provisions
of this statute are intended to aid only those who are presently disabled.” Burgess v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 528 (1979). Thus, to sustain a wrongful
discharge action based on disability discrimination, a plaintiff must identify a public
policy expressed in the North Carolina statutes or Constitution prohibiting discharge
because of disability, while adequately pleading facts demonstrating that she had,
had a record of, or was perceived as having a qualifying disability at the time of
termination.
Here, plaintiff alleges that she experienced medical complications surrounding
her miscarriage and required short-term remote work and recovery time. She does
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not allege that these conditions persisted beyond several weeks or continued to affect
her after she returned to the office, nor does she allege that defendant maintained
knowledge of any ongoing physical or mental impairment at the time it made the
termination decision. As such, these allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to
establish a qualifying disability under § 168A-3(7). Thus, we conclude that plaintiff
failed to plead facts demonstrating the existence of a legally cognizable disability at
the time of her termination or that defendant was then aware of such a disability.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s disability-based
argument for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
C. Wrongful Discharge based on Sex Discrimination
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for
wrongful discharge to the extent it alleges discrimination on the basis of sex in
violation of the public policy expressed in N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2. We agree that
plaintiff has adequately stated a claim under this theory and conclude that dismissal
at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage was premature.
The NCEEPA expressly declares it the public policy of North Carolina to
protect the right of individuals “to seek, obtain and hold employment without
discrimination or abridgement on account of . . . sex.” N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2. Clearly,
a claim that defendant discharged plaintiff because of sex discrimination falls
squarely within the text of the public policy identified by the General Assembly.
Accordingly, at the pleading stage, plaintiff was required to include facts supporting
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her claim that (1) she was a member of a protected class (women), (2) that she was
qualified and met the expectations of the employment, and (3) that her employer
terminated her. Plaintiff’s complaint satisfied these first three prongs. Lastly,
plaintiff is also required to include facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory
motive on the basis of sex, typically satisfied in federal jurisprudence with facts
alleging that employees of the other sex were retained under similar circumstances.
See Gibson, 308 N.C. at 137–38; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973).
Here, plaintiff alleges that prior to disclosing her medical circumstances, she
had been encouraged to expect rapid advancement within defendant’s legal
department. After returning from approved medical leave, she alleges a sudden and
negative shift in management’s attitude, including questioning of her professional
reliability and honesty, statements indicating that she would need to “repair” her
relationship with management, and rescission of previously communicated
expectations regarding promotion. She further alleges that similarly situated male
attorneys were not subject to comparable scrutiny or distrust, and that as the only
woman working full-time in the department, she was singled out by this treatment
and terminated shortly thereafter. She was terminated despite a highly positive
performance evaluation the previous week, including the conclusion that her
professionalism was exceeding expectations. In short, plaintiff alleges that she
experienced a serious medical episode particular to her sex, that defendant imposed
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requirements on her which it did not require of male co-workers who missed work or
worked remotely due to medical matters, and that in the aftermath, defendant fired
her for professionalism reasons, despite its recent evaluations taking no issue with
her performance.
Taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, as we must, they permit the reasonable
inference that plaintiff’s sex was plausibly a motivating factor in the termination
decision. The complaint’s alleged facts support other reasonable interpretations, to
be sure, but this particular reasonable inference is what matters to survive
defendant’s motion to dismiss. Whether plaintiff can ultimately prove such a theory
remains a matter for later discovery and fact-finding.
Defendant is correct that the General Assembly excluded a pregnancy-specific
discrimination claim from its employment statutes, but this exclusion does not
thereby extinguish all potentially litigable sex discrimination claims by women whose
complaints plead some facts related to childbearing. Such a plaintiff may include
such facts in her complaint if they support a reasonable inference that she suffered
wrongful discharge on the basis of sex; if sufficient facts are so pled, her complaint
should survive the pleading stage.
Workplace sex discrimination occurs and gives rise to a legitimate claim for
relief, as our General Assembly intended. A plaintiff is not foreclosed from the benefit
of inferences that may be drawn regarding allegations of sex discrimination, because
as here, she also includes allegations regarding her pregnancy. Allegations in
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pleadings regarding a woman’s pregnancy could be relevant to and implicated in the
allegations in her sex discrimination complaints, without her pregnancy being itself
the reason for the defendant employer’s allegedly adverse actions. In reading the
complaint at issue here, the trial court was obligated to grant plaintiff this reasonable
inference. Recognizing the viability of these complaints does not enlarge North
Carolina’s narrow public policy framework; such claims seek only the enforcement of
our statutes, not their expansion.
Further, the fact that plaintiff alleges discrimination due to “sex and
pregnancy” rather than just “sex” does not forestall this claim’s survival of the
pleading stage. A motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint’s allegations are
sufficient to state a litigable claim for relief under some legal theory, whether that
theory is properly labeled or not. Driver v. Burlington Aviation, 110 N.C. App. 519
(1993). Where the legal theory is improperly labeled, what matters is whether the
allegations supporting that legal theory nevertheless give sufficient notice of the
wrong complained of. McAllister v. Ha, 347 N.C. 638 (1998). As discussed above,
plaintiff alleged facts that, taken as true, were sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her sex. It is a
question for determination at later procedural stages as to whether her sex was the
motivating factor in defendant’s decision to terminate her. It makes no difference
here that she claims she suffered wrongful discharge due to “sex and pregnancy” and
included facts about her pregnancy and miscarriage.
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III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm dismissal as to plaintiff’s pregnancy and disability-
based claims and hold that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s wrongful
discharge claim based on sex discrimination pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). That portion
of the lower court’s Order must be reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Judges CARPENTER and WOOD concur.
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