Edwards v. Lawson

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: August 21, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00322
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 VINCENT LEE EDWARDS, Case No. 2:24-cv-00322-GMN-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 TOM LAWSON, N. JAYME, A. GREENLAND, 8 Defendants. 9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Vincent Edwards’ Application to Proceed in forma 11 pauperis (ECF No. 14), which is complete and granted below.1 Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1- 12 1) raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding wealth based discrimination in violation of his 13 Fourteenth Amendment rights. 14 I. Screening the Complaint 15 Upon granting Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application the Court must screen his Complaint 16 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and 17 dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 18 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 19 1915A(b)(1), (2). However, pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica 20 Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure 21 to state a claim is established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When a court dismisses 22 a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with 23 directions to cure its deficiencies unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies 24 cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in 26 the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Warshaw v. 27 1 Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less 2 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). 3 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 4 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 5 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Additionally, 6 a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more 7 than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 8 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 9 supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 10 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 11 to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief … [is] a context- 12 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 13 Id. 14 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if that person’s claims lack 15 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 16 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 17 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 18 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); 19 McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 II. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Complaint 21 Liberally construed, the Court finds Plaintiff alleges the State of Nevada Division of Parole 22 and Probation employees violated his liberty interest and denied him equal protection under the 23 Fourteenth Amendment when his participation in a State of Nevada specialty court program was 24 terminated and he was arrested (probation was revoked) because he could not pay SCRAM (secured 25 continuous remote alcohol monitoring) fees and the Sierra Sage Recovery Services sober living 26 facility rent. Plaintiff says Defendants did not take into account factors that impacted his ability to 27 pay the required fees in order to stay in the court program. Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive 1 III. Discussion 2 In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), the Supreme Court held the “Due Process 3 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes procedural and substantive limits on the revocation 4 of the conditional liberty created by probation.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610 (1985) citing 5 Beardon. The Beardon Court recognized the “sensitive treatment of indigents in our criminal justice 6 system” and, citing Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), stated “a State cannot convert a fine imposed 7 under a fine-only statute into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot 8 immediately pay the fine in full.” 461 U.S. at 664. After discussing several other Supreme Court 9 decisions, the Beardon Court stated: “we generally analyze the fairness of relations between the 10 criminal defendant and the State under the Due Process Clause, while we approach the question 11 whether the State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to 12 another class of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 665.2 “To determine whether 13 this differential treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause, one must determine whether, and 14 under what circumstances, a defendant’s indigent status may be considered in the decision to revoke 15 probation.” Id. at 664-65. If the person on probation “willfully refused to pay … when he has the 16 means to pay, the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce 17 collection.” Id. at 668 (internal citation omitted). 18 Here, Plaintiff alleges and, therefore, presents substantial questions as to whether his 19 probation was revoked in accordance with the federal constitutional standards articulated in Beardon 20 and its progeny. See, for example, U.S. v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1996); Briggs v. 21 Montgomery, Case No. CV-18-02684-PHX-EJM, 2019 WL 2515950, at *10 (D. Ariz. June 18, 22 2019) (plaintiffs placed in a pre-prosecution diversion program were “deprived of the ability to 23 complete the program in 90 days like other, wealthier participants solely because they are unable to 24 pay the program fee”); De Luna v. Hidalgo Cty., Tex., 853 F. Supp. 2d 623, 653 (S.D. Tex. 2012) 25 (applying Bearden and granting summary judgment on “Plaintiffs’ claims that the County violated 26

2 The Bearden Court noted there was substantial similarity between the question of whether considering indigent 27 status in revoking probation violates the Equal Protection Clause and the due process question of whether it is 1 their federal due process and equal protection rights by failing to conduct an affirmative indigency 2 determination before incarcerating them for nonpayment of fines and costs[]”); Com. v. Melnyk, 548 3 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. 1988) (applying Bearden to hold that it was fundamentally unfair to deny 4 defendant participation in accelerated rehabilitative disposition program solely because she was 5 unable to pay restitution). In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state his 6 claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff’s claims may proceed to the extent he sues 7 Defendants in their individual capacities for allegedly violating his liberty interest and equal 8 protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 9 III. Order 10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 11 No. 14) is GRANTED. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty and equal 13 protection clause claims may proceed against the named defendants in their individual capacities. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court must electronically serve copies of 15 this Screening Order and Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) on the Office of the Attorney General 16 of the State of Nevada by adding the Attorney General of the State of Nevada to the docket sheet. 17 This does not indicate acceptance of service. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that subject to the findings of this Screening Order, the 19 Attorney General’s Office must file a notice, no later than September 13, 2024, advising the Court 20 and Plaintiff of: (a) the names of the defendants for whom it accepts service; (b) the names of the 21 defendants for whom it does not accept service, and (c) the names of the defendants for whom it is 22 filing the last-known-address information under seal. As to any of the named defendants for whom 23 the Attorney General’s Office cannot accept service, the Attorney General’s Office must file, under 24 seal, but not serve Plaintiff, the last known address(es) of those defendant(s) for whom it has such 25

26 3 While employees of the state are immune from suit in the official capacities when the plaintiff seeks money damages (Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991)), Plaintiff’s Complaint against these same defendants in their individual 27 capacities for money damages is not barred under the Eleventh Amendment and is at least facially sufficient to state a 1 || information. Ifthe last known address of the defendant(s) is a post office box, the Attorney General 2 || Office must attempt to obtain and provide the last known physical address(es). 3 If service cannot be accepted for any of the named defendant(s), Plaintiff must file a motic 4 || identifying the unserved defendant(s), requesting issuance of a summons, and specifying a full nan 5 || and address for the defendant(s). For the defendant(s) as to which the Attorney General’s Office h 6 || not provided last-known-address information, Plaintiff must provide the full name and address f 7 || the defendant(s) to the best of his ability to do so. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Attorney General’s Office accepts service of proce 9 || for any named defendant(s), such defendant(s) must file and serve an answer or other response 10 || the Complaint within sixty (60) days from the date of this Order. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for any named defendant for whom the Attorney General 12 || Office does not accept service, service of the operative Complaint must be accomplished within ‘ 13 || days of the date of this Order. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must serve upon defendant(s) or, if an appearan 15 || has been entered by counsel, upon their attorney(s), a copy of every pleading, motion or oth 16 |} document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff must include with the origin 17 || document submitted for filing a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of tl 18 || document was mailed or electronically filed to the defendants or counsel for the defendants. 19 || counsel has entered a notice of appearance, Plaintiff must direct service to the individual attorn 20 || named in the notice of appearance, at the physical or electronic address stated therein. The Cot 21 || may disregard any document received by a District or Magistrate Judge that has not been filed wi 22 || the Clerk, and any document received by a District Judge, Magistrate Judge, or Clerk of Court th 23 || fails to include a certificate showing proper service. 24 Dated this 21st day of August, 2024. 25 26 . ELAYNAY. YOU: 27 AYN, {yt iia JUDGE 28