IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCCOA-157
No. COA21-7
Filed 15 March 2022
Union County, No. 19 CVS 2803
IDA EDWARDS, Petitioner,
v.
TORRE JESSUP, COMMISSIONER OF THE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent.
Appeal by Respondent from order entered 22 September 2020 by Judge Jeffery
K. Carpenter in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5
October 2021.
Paul A. Tharp for the Petitioner-Appellee.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Christopher W. Brooks, for the Respondent-Appellant.
DILLON, Judge.
¶1 Appellee was charged with driving while impaired (“DWI”). This appeal does
not concern this charge but rather concerns the revocation of her driver’s license by
the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles (the “DMV”) based on her failure to
consent to a chemical analysis after being charged with DWI. The superior court held
that the DMV erred in revoking Appellee’s license on appeal. We reverse the superior
court. EDWARDS V. JESSUP
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
¶2 On 7 February 2019, a law enforcement officer (the “Officer”) responded to a
call about a driver who had fallen asleep in the drive-through lane of a fast-food
restaurant. Upon arrival, police at the scene directed the Officer to a vehicle parked
in the restaurant’s parking lot. Appellee was seated in the driver side of the vehicle.
The vehicle was not running. The Officer asked Appellee to step out of the vehicle.
The Officer noticed that Appellee seemed very lethargic, had a “deer in the
headlights” look, and slurred her speech. When requested to present her driver’s
license, Appellee mistakenly gave the Officer her bank card and post office
identification. Appellee then failed a field sobriety test and eventually admitted to
taking unprescribed Hydrocodone.
¶3 The Officer charged Appellee with DWI, an implied consent offense. Appellee
was transported to a detention center, where she refused to consent to a blood sample
for a chemical analysis.
¶4 Appellee received notice that her driving privileges were being revoked for
refusing chemical analysis pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2 (2019). She
requested an administrative hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the DMV
hearing officer sustained the revocation. Appellee then filed a petition seeking review
in the superior court. After a hearing on the matter, the superior court reversed the
DMV’s decision. The DMV timely appealed to our Court. EDWARDS V. JESSUP
II. Analysis
¶5 If an officer has “reasonable grounds to believe” that a driver has committed
an implied-consent offense, such as DWI, the driver is required to submit to a
chemical analysis. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(a). Any such driver who refuses to
submit to a chemical analysis may have her license revoked, simply for refusing, even
if she is not later convicted of the underlying crime.
¶6 Here, the superior court reversed the DMV decision on two different grounds.
We address each in turn.
A. Reasonable Grounds That Appellee Was Operating Her Vehicle
¶7 The superior court concluded that there was a lack of evidence to support a
finding that Appellee was operating her motor vehicle. However, the evidence does
not need to establish that Appellee was driving the vehicle. The only requirement is
that the Officer had “reasonable grounds to believe that” Appellee had driven the
vehicle while under the influence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(a). We held as such in
unpublished opinions, which we find persuasive. Neilon v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles,
2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1233, *13, 718 S.E.2d 737 (2011) (unpublished); Thurman v.
Comm’r, NC DMV, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1009 *5-6 (2008) (unpublished). Our Court
has equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” Moore v. Hodges, 116 N.C.
App. 727, 730 449 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1994). EDWARDS V. JESSUP
¶8 Here, we conclude that the evidence supports a finding that the Officer had a
reasonable belief/probable cause that Appellee had been driving her vehicle while
impaired. First, the Officer had reasonable grounds that Appellee was impaired
based on the evidence, including that recounted above. And there was evidence that
she had been driving. Specifically, there was a report of a driver who had fallen
asleep in the drive-through lane at a fast-food restaurant. The Officer arrived to
investigate and was directed to Appellee’s car, which was in the restaurant parking
lot. Appellee was seated on the driver’s side. The vehicle belonged to her. She stated
that a friend had been “riding with her.” And she admitted to falling asleep while in
her car in the drive-through lane. It may be that the evidence was not sufficient to
convict Appellee of DWI, but we conclude the evidence was sufficient to give the
Officer probable cause that Appellee had driven her car while impaired.
B. Due Process
¶9 The superior court concluded that Appellee was “denied the fundamental
protections of the Due Process Clause . . . in that she was deprived of the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” However, Appellee
never alleged a due process violation in her petition to the superior court. Assuming
arguendo that Appellee’s due process argument is properly before us, we conclude
that her due process rights were not violated, as explained below. EDWARDS V. JESSUP
¶ 10 The superior court found that Appellee’s due process rights were violated
because the hearing officer is a DMV employee and because she essentially acted, not
only as fact-finder, but also as the prosecutor. Neither party cited, nor has our
research uncovered a North Carolina case on point. We note, though, that the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the Western District of North Carolina concluding
that the hearing procedure prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-16.2 does not violate the
driver’s due process rights. Montgomery v. N.C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 455 F. Supp.
338, 341 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff’d, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).
¶ 11 We conclude that the fact that a hearing officer in a DMV hearing is a DMV
employee does not violate a driver’s due process rights per se. For instance, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a prisoner facing disciplinary procedures
is not deprived of due process merely because the panel who hears the matter is
comprised of prison officials. See Wolff v. McConnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).
Justice Marshall dissented in Wolff, but did agree on the above point, stating:
Finally, the [majority] addresses the question of the need for an impartial tribunal to hear these prison disciplinary cases. We have recognized that an impartial decisionmaker is a fundamental requirement of due process in a variety of relevant situations . . . and I would hold this requirement fully applicable here. But in my view there is no constitutional impediment to a disciplinary board composed of responsible prison officials like those on the Adjustment Committee here.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCCOA-157
No. COA21-7
Filed 15 March 2022
Union County, No. 19 CVS 2803
IDA EDWARDS, Petitioner,
v.
TORRE JESSUP, COMMISSIONER OF THE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent.
Appeal by Respondent from order entered 22 September 2020 by Judge Jeffery
K. Carpenter in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5
October 2021.
Paul A. Tharp for the Petitioner-Appellee.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Christopher W. Brooks, for the Respondent-Appellant.
DILLON, Judge.
¶1 Appellee was charged with driving while impaired (“DWI”). This appeal does
not concern this charge but rather concerns the revocation of her driver’s license by
the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles (the “DMV”) based on her failure to
consent to a chemical analysis after being charged with DWI. The superior court held
that the DMV erred in revoking Appellee’s license on appeal. We reverse the superior
court. EDWARDS V. JESSUP
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
¶2 On 7 February 2019, a law enforcement officer (the “Officer”) responded to a
call about a driver who had fallen asleep in the drive-through lane of a fast-food
restaurant. Upon arrival, police at the scene directed the Officer to a vehicle parked
in the restaurant’s parking lot. Appellee was seated in the driver side of the vehicle.
The vehicle was not running. The Officer asked Appellee to step out of the vehicle.
The Officer noticed that Appellee seemed very lethargic, had a “deer in the
headlights” look, and slurred her speech. When requested to present her driver’s
license, Appellee mistakenly gave the Officer her bank card and post office
identification. Appellee then failed a field sobriety test and eventually admitted to
taking unprescribed Hydrocodone.
¶3 The Officer charged Appellee with DWI, an implied consent offense. Appellee
was transported to a detention center, where she refused to consent to a blood sample
for a chemical analysis.
¶4 Appellee received notice that her driving privileges were being revoked for
refusing chemical analysis pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2 (2019). She
requested an administrative hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the DMV
hearing officer sustained the revocation. Appellee then filed a petition seeking review
in the superior court. After a hearing on the matter, the superior court reversed the
DMV’s decision. The DMV timely appealed to our Court. EDWARDS V. JESSUP
II. Analysis
¶5 If an officer has “reasonable grounds to believe” that a driver has committed
an implied-consent offense, such as DWI, the driver is required to submit to a
chemical analysis. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(a). Any such driver who refuses to
submit to a chemical analysis may have her license revoked, simply for refusing, even
if she is not later convicted of the underlying crime.
¶6 Here, the superior court reversed the DMV decision on two different grounds.
We address each in turn.
A. Reasonable Grounds That Appellee Was Operating Her Vehicle
¶7 The superior court concluded that there was a lack of evidence to support a
finding that Appellee was operating her motor vehicle. However, the evidence does
not need to establish that Appellee was driving the vehicle. The only requirement is
that the Officer had “reasonable grounds to believe that” Appellee had driven the
vehicle while under the influence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(a). We held as such in
unpublished opinions, which we find persuasive. Neilon v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles,
2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1233, *13, 718 S.E.2d 737 (2011) (unpublished); Thurman v.
Comm’r, NC DMV, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1009 *5-6 (2008) (unpublished). Our Court
has equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” Moore v. Hodges, 116 N.C.
App. 727, 730 449 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1994). EDWARDS V. JESSUP
¶8 Here, we conclude that the evidence supports a finding that the Officer had a
reasonable belief/probable cause that Appellee had been driving her vehicle while
impaired. First, the Officer had reasonable grounds that Appellee was impaired
based on the evidence, including that recounted above. And there was evidence that
she had been driving. Specifically, there was a report of a driver who had fallen
asleep in the drive-through lane at a fast-food restaurant. The Officer arrived to
investigate and was directed to Appellee’s car, which was in the restaurant parking
lot. Appellee was seated on the driver’s side. The vehicle belonged to her. She stated
that a friend had been “riding with her.” And she admitted to falling asleep while in
her car in the drive-through lane. It may be that the evidence was not sufficient to
convict Appellee of DWI, but we conclude the evidence was sufficient to give the
Officer probable cause that Appellee had driven her car while impaired.
B. Due Process
¶9 The superior court concluded that Appellee was “denied the fundamental
protections of the Due Process Clause . . . in that she was deprived of the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” However, Appellee
never alleged a due process violation in her petition to the superior court. Assuming
arguendo that Appellee’s due process argument is properly before us, we conclude
that her due process rights were not violated, as explained below. EDWARDS V. JESSUP
¶ 10 The superior court found that Appellee’s due process rights were violated
because the hearing officer is a DMV employee and because she essentially acted, not
only as fact-finder, but also as the prosecutor. Neither party cited, nor has our
research uncovered a North Carolina case on point. We note, though, that the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the Western District of North Carolina concluding
that the hearing procedure prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-16.2 does not violate the
driver’s due process rights. Montgomery v. N.C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 455 F. Supp.
338, 341 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff’d, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979).
¶ 11 We conclude that the fact that a hearing officer in a DMV hearing is a DMV
employee does not violate a driver’s due process rights per se. For instance, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a prisoner facing disciplinary procedures
is not deprived of due process merely because the panel who hears the matter is
comprised of prison officials. See Wolff v. McConnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).
Justice Marshall dissented in Wolff, but did agree on the above point, stating:
Finally, the [majority] addresses the question of the need for an impartial tribunal to hear these prison disciplinary cases. We have recognized that an impartial decisionmaker is a fundamental requirement of due process in a variety of relevant situations . . . and I would hold this requirement fully applicable here. But in my view there is no constitutional impediment to a disciplinary board composed of responsible prison officials like those on the Adjustment Committee here. While it might well be desirable to have persons from outside the prison system sitting on disciplinary panels, so as to eliminate any possibility that EDWARDS V. JESSUP
subtle institutional pressures may affect the outcome of disciplinary cases and to avoid any appearance of unfairness, in my view due process is satisfied as long as no member of the disciplinary board has been involved in the investigation or prosecution of the particular case, or has had any other form of personal involvement in the case.
Id. at 592 (Marshall dissenting).
¶ 12 In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the DMV hearing officer had any
special knowledge or connection to Defendant’s case that would indicate a lack of
impartiality. We hold that there is nothing “in the record presented here for [us to]
conclud[e] that the [DMV Hearing Officer acting in accordance with Section 20-16.2]
presents such a hazard of arbitrary decision making that it should be held violative
of due process of law.” See id. at 571.
¶ 13 The superior court also took issue with the fact that there was no attorney at
the hearing putting on the DMV’s case. Rather, the hearing officer considers the
evidence in the DMV file, issues subpoenas when necessary, and questions the driver
and other witnesses. In sum, the superior court essentially held that the hearing is
not “meaningful” because the hearing officer is biased in favor of the DMV. Based on
our jurisprudence, though, we hold that this procedure does not violate a driver’s due
process rights where there is nothing to indicate that the hearing officer was doing
anything more than attempting to elicit the truth. EDWARDS V. JESSUP
¶ 14 We have made similar holdings in commitment proceedings where the State is
not represented by counsel. See, e.g., In re C.G., 278 N.C. App. 416, 2021-NCCOA-
344, 863 S.E.2d 237 (2021); In re Perkins, 60 N.C. App. 592, 299 S.E.2d 675 (1983).
Our Supreme Court has described this principle, stating that “the trial judge may
interrogate a witness for the purpose of developing a relevant fact . . . in order to
ensure justice and aid [the fact-finder] in their search for a verdict that speaks the
truth.” State v. Pearce, 296 N.C. 281, 285, 250 S.E.2d 640, 644 (1979). That Court
has further held that it is not a per se constitutional violation for the trial court to
exercise its right to call or question witnesses. State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 21-25, 405
S.E.2d 179, 192-93 (1991). And our Court has held that it is not per se prejudicial for
a judge to question a witness, even where the answer provides the sole proof of an
element which needs to be proved. See State v. Lowe. 60 N.C. App. 549, 552, 299
S.E.2d 466, 468 (1983).
¶ 15 In sum, we conclude that the procedure prescribed by Section 20-16.2 does not
violate a driver’s right to due process. The fact that the hearing officer is a DMV
employee and plays a role in drawing out the truth does not render that officer biased
any more than a judge, who has the same employer as the prosecutor (the State of
North Carolina), could be deemed biased for merely questioning witnesses. This is
not to say that the manner in which a hearing officer conducts her hearing could
never rise to a due process violation where the hearing officer displays clear bias. EDWARDS V. JESSUP
However, there is no indication that any such bias was present in the way Appellee’s
hearing officer conducted the hearing.
III. Conclusion
¶ 16 We conclude that the superior court erred by reversing the DMV’s order
revoking Appellee’s driving privileges. The record supports the findings in the DMV
order, and the findings support the conclusions of law. In addition, Appellee was not
deprived of due process at the hearing before the DMV officer.
REVERSED.
Judges MURPHY and JACKSON concur.